

United Nations Security Council Reform:

Why is it so hard?



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Declaration

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Abstract

Since the 1990s UNSC reform has been a dominant topic in International Relations, especially since the establishment of a working group by the UN to explore UNSC reform proposals. The UN, and accordingly the UNSC, was founded after World War II by the superpowers and their allies. The UNSC is the most powerful supranational organ in international relations, because it has the power to authorise legally binding resolutions and deploy peacekeeping operations. This is in conjunction with the most important responsibility of maintaining international peace and security.

The creators of the UN, or the Permanent Members of the UNSC, wanted to pursue the prospect of a new international order enshrined through an international institution that would encourage increased multilateralism among the dominant international actors on the premise that there should be equality among sovereign states. The founders of the UNSC also granted themselves the highest power in the multilateral organisation; the UK, the USA, Russia, China and France, ensured their permanent presence in the UN as they possessed veto powers. However, the emergence of the UN occurred in conjunction with the Cold War, and the decolonisation and independence movements from the mid-1950s. Consequently, this created a surge of new independent power contenders for seats on the UNSC from the Global South. The UNSC instituted one reform in 1965 with the addition of four non-permanent members. The UNSC has undergone no reforms since then, yet almost all UN member states continue to advocate for further expansion and reform of the UNSC.

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s brought increased criticism of the Council because of its inefficiency in dealing with international tensions since WWII. Hence, UN members set up the Open-Ended Working Group. UNSC reform has become an acceptable discourse since members of the international community broadly endorse it. In order to determine the influence that international actors have in international norm dynamics, it is essential to understand how norms emerge, how they cascade through the legal framework, and what kind of resistance inhibits their internalisation. The theoretical framework devised by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) is utilised to illustrate the respective roles actors play in the pursuit of UNSC reform. But the question remains: *Why is it so hard?* Without reform of the UNSC, it runs the risk of becoming obsolete or inconsequential.

Opsomming

Sedert die 1990's, is die hervorming van die VNVR 'n dominante onderwerp in internasionale betrekkinge, veral sedert die stigting van 'n werkgroep deur die VN om die voorstelle betreffende die VNVR se hervorming te ondersoek. Die VN, en daarmee saam die VNVR, is deur die supermoondhede en hul bondgenote na die Tweede Wêreldoorlog gestig. Die VNVR is die magtigste supranasionale orgaan in internasionale betrekkinge omdat hulle die mag het om regsbindende besluite te bekragtig en om vredesoperasies te ontplooi. Hierdie bestaan in samewerking met die belangrikste verantwoordelikheid: om internasionale vrede en veiligheid te handhaaf.

Die skeppers van die VN, insgelyks die permanente lede van die VNVR, het die vooruitsig gehad om 'n nuwe internasionale bestel te skep wat in 'n internasionale instelling verskans is, wat verhoogde multilateralisme onder dominante internasionale akteurs sal aanmoedig, met die veronderstelling dat daar gelykheid tussen soewereine state sal wees. Die stigters van die VNVR het aan hulle-self ook die hoogste mag in die multilaterale organisasie toegestaan: die VK, die VSA, Rusland, Sjina en Frankryk het hul permanensie in die VN met die besit van vetoreg verseker. Die opkoms van die VN het egter gelyktydig met die Koue Oorlog, dekolonisasie en onafhanklikheidsbewegings in die 1950's plaasgevind. Dit het 'n oplewing in nuwe onafhanklike magsaanspraakmakers vanuit die Globale Suide tot gevolg gehad. Die VNVR het in 1965 'n hervorming ondergaan met die toevoeging van vier nie-permanente lede. Die VNVR het sedertdien geen hervorming ondergaan nie maar nogtans ondersteun byna alle lidlande van die VN verdere uitbreiding en hervorming van die VNVR.

Die beëindiging van die Koue Oorlog in die 1990's het toenemende kritiek weens die ondoeltreffende hantering van die oorlog op die Raad gebring - vandaar die vorming van die Oop-Einde Werkgroep deur die VN. VNVR-hervorming het 'n aanvaarbare norm geword omdat lede van die internasionale gemeenskap dit in die breë onderskryf. Ten einde te bepaal watter invloed akteurs op internasionale normdinamika het, is dit noodsaaklik om te verstaan hoe norme ontstaan, hoe hulle deur die wetlike raamwerk kaskadeer, en watter vorm van weerstand hulle internalisering inhibeer. Die teoretiese raamwerk wat Finnemore en Sikkink (1998) geskep het, word gebruik om die onderskeie rolle wat akteurs in die strewe na die hervorming van die VNVR speel, te illustreer: Maar die vraag bly: Waarom is dit so moeilik? Sonder die hervorming, loop die VNVR die risiko om verouderd of onbeduidend te word.

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List of Abbreviations

APG	Asia-Pacific Group
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
EE	Eastern Europe
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GPE	Global Political Economy
G4	Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
GRULAC	Latin America and Caribbean Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEWG	Never-ending Working Group
NPMs	Non-Permanent Members
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OEWG	Open-Ended Working Group
P2	Russia and China
P3	The US, France and the UK
P5	Permanent Five (Russia, China, US, UK and France)
PMs	Permanent Members
PNVM	Permanent Non-Veto Member
PRC	People's Republic of China
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UFC	Uniting For Consensus
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEOG	Western European and Others Group
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Research rationale

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six main organs of the United Nations (UN) and the only UN organ with the power to authorise legally binding resolutions. Hence, the UNSC is recognised as the foremost international body responsible for advancing and maintaining international peace and security. This responsibility is complicated in essence and has become increasingly so since the emergence of the UNSC in 1945 (Langmore & Farrall, 2016:59). The resolutions that the UNSC imposes deeply influence the norms of international law. As a consequence, the UNSC has come under close scrutiny over the past 27 years: it is widely acknowledged that it needs to be reformed to account for the shifting distribution of international power relations, especially in the current globalised era, which is characterised by rapid change (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). Many conceptual and theoretical frameworks of International Relations (IR) attempt to understand the nature of international politics, but most of the theories are better at explaining stability than change. Although our comprehension of international politics will always be partial (Keohane, 1988:380), constructivism provides a good framework to enhance one's understanding of the challenges that arise from the changing political norms of global governance, including those norms that had been adopted by the UNSC.

It is vital to consider the context and history from which the UNSC emerged. The UN, and accordingly the UNSC, was founded by the superpowers and their allies after World War II (WWII). During WWII the United States (USA) and Russia (USSR) were allies and together (along with their smaller allies) they overcame Germany and Japan, and emerged as the two world superpowers after 1945. The founders of the UN wanted to pursue the prospect of an international order enshrined through an international institution, which would attempt to address the shortfalls of its predecessor, the League of Nations, by encouraging increased multilateralism among the dominant international actors (Schlesinger, 2003:2).

The new post-WWII international system was also founded on the idea that there should be equality among sovereign states (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Schlesinger, 2003:169; Szasz, 1983:345). This occurred in conjunction with the two largest social construction projects dealt with by IR scholars after the war: European integration and decolonisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). However, during the UN's emergence on the world stage, the Cold War became the new bipolar international system marked by continuous rivalry between the two superpowers. This international context highlighted the UNSC's ineffectiveness in achieving the multilateralism it set out to achieve. However, what did retain powerful actors' endorsement of the UNSC was the fact that they were granted a veto provision, which conferred on them the most prestigious role in international politics: the greatest responsibility for maintaining international peace and security (Månsson, 2007:218).

The League of Nations was founded at the end of World War I (WWI) and was the predecessor of the UN. It was the first intergovernmental organisation aimed at maintaining international peace. Like the UN, the League of Nations aimed to prevent future world wars. However, the absence of the US contributed to the inability of the League of Nations to prevent WWII (Wilcox, 1945:954). Towards the end of WWII, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington proposed the establishment of the UN, and consequently the UNSC. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were later revised and reformulated at the San Francisco conference in 1945 (Månsson, 2007:218). Along with the absence of a great power, the Assembly and the Council had no determinable division of authority (Wilcox, 1945:943). Hence, it was decided that the important responsibility of the authoritative function would be bestowed on the UNSC. The negotiations leading to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals formed the basis of the UN Charter (also known as the Charter), which stipulates the UNSC's composition and decision-making procedures. The composition of the UNSC was kept small to allow the Council to make decisions quickly and effectively without any interference from the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), especially in times of international crises. Two separate groups engaged in the negotiations: the great powers with their industrial and military strength, and the smaller powers whose purpose was to defend the law and ensure justice in the Charter. Inevitably, the great powers secured the privilege of determining which political norms or rules would be perpetuated in the Charter (Månsson, 2007:219). Furthermore, it was agreed that the five great powers – whose military, economic and political might was immense enough to defeat the Axis powers to end WWII – would be endowed with the

responsibility of maintaining international peace. This would inevitably help the implementation of the security function of the UNSC. In conjunction with their immense duty of upholding international peace and security through the UNSC, the five great powers were granted a special status: firstly in terms of their tenure, and secondly in their decision-making powers (Wilcox, 1945:944).

The five great powers of WWII, namely the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR until 1991, or in other words, Russia today), the USA, the United Kingdom (UK), China and France, were awarded permanent tenure. Today, they are also known as the Permanent Five (P5) or the Permanent Members (PMs) of the UNSC. The second privilege the P5 were awarded was a veto provision. The veto right grants greater voting power to the P5 than to any other UNSC member states (O'Neill, 1996:221; Schlesinger, 2003:170). For a veto to be effective on substantive matters requires only one negative vote from one of the P5 actors (Hosli, Moody, O'Donovan, Kaniovski, & Little, 2011:164). This is not a democratic procedure, because it means that the P5 actors are over-represented compared to the rest of the UNSC actors. The UNSC has distinctive institutional features that impact on the kinds of norms it disseminates (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The veto provision is one of the most compelling threats potentially contributing to the undercutting of the UNSCs legitimacy within the international community (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). Legitimacy is essential to the effective promulgation of social purpose and political norms within the international environment. The probability of the UNSC reforming is consequently dependent on the veto players and their preferences towards a new policy (Dörfler & Hosli, 2013:377). It is believed that the P5 members demanded veto rights to stop other smaller UN member states from ever outvoting them (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). Since reform of the UNSC is proving to be so difficult, the veto provision and the special status of the P5 have received much criticism.

The inability of the UNSC to account for shifting power relations has been clear since its inception. After WWII the UN's purpose was to prevent future interstate wars. This was appropriate since 80% of all conflicts from 1900 to 1941 were interstate conflicts. However, after WWII and during the Cold War 85% of all conflicts have been intrastate conflicts and often through proxies (Binder & Heupel, 2015:239). The UN was founded on the premise that the equality of sovereign states should be upheld; however, the inequity of sovereign states within the UNSC is seen in their

disproportionate representation. Many decisions regarding the intrastate conflicts and the decolonisation of countries in the Global South, especially in Africa, have been in the hands of the P5, the majority of which are positioned in the Global North. Although the number of sovereign countries and membership of the UN has expanded since the 1960s, the UNSC has not expanded to encompass a more equitable representation of the world (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:153). The Cold War was not only a war of ideologies, but it was also a positional conflict between the East (USSR) and the West (US). The United States of America (USA), or in other words, the West was ultimately victorious after the collapse of the USSR. This ushered in a unipolar era in the international system whereby the USA exercised most of the military, political, economic and cultural influence in international politics. Owing to the inability of the UNSC to adapt to the transformative nature of the international community, the end of the Cold War brought with it intensified divisions between the Global North, which is mainly characterised by the USA's dominance in the international system, and the Global South, especially Africa's decolonised countries (Zifcak, 2016:136). This division was a direct threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Global North and Global South need to work together to develop internationally and sustainably. The economic growth of countries in the Global South – often referred to as emerging powers (Naik, 2018:100) – has created a surge of new competitors in the Global Political Economy (GPE). For stability to be achieved within the GPE, characterised by increased interdependence and change, norms of governance need to be reformed more than ever (Jordaan, 2003:169). A reformed UNSC must take account of the rise of emerging powers and a renewed world order by incorporating the coherent set of norms emerging from the Global South.

To date, the most recent historical drive for UNSC reform occurred in 1993 with the establishment by the UN of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to investigate the 'Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and on Other Matters Related to the Security Council' (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). The reason for its establishment was to investigate UNSC reform proposals; however, it is often referred to as the *Never-Ending Working Group* as it is currently entering its 27th consecutive year of deliberations (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). Even though there is an agreement to expand representation and reform the UNSC, there is little consensus on how to do so (Zifcak, 2006:137). The UNSC is considered the most powerful organ of the UN, and the most powerful supranational organ on the globe (Binder

& Heupel, 2015:238). Hence, UNSC reform can be considered one of the leading international issues of today. The significant role the UNSC plays in ensuring international peace, through norms of global governance, acts as the underpinning of macro-politics and macroeconomic stability (Gould & Rablen, 2017:161). The macro-theoretical apparatus of constructivism suggests why international actors conform to these norms; however, there is little research done on how these norms might change (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:888). Recent studies on norm dynamics criticize the imbalance of research done on norm emergence versus norm reform. Consequently, norm entrepreneurs, or in other words international actors who promote new norms, have received a special status. An oppositional role is increasingly acknowledged in the literature in the form of norm *antipreneurs* who attempt to protect existing global norms. The reform of global norms will be realised only if we, as IR scholars, recognize the role of the *antipreneurs* (Bloomfield, 2015:2). Currently, the international environment is in a constant state of flux and turmoil. If international governance does not adjust and adapt accordingly, sustained international peace and security are unattainable. If the UNSC fails to adapt to the changing international environment, it runs the risk of becoming as obsolete and anachronistic as a dinosaur.

Research problem

The reform of the UNSC has been a longstanding international issue; however, the UNSC has attracted plenty of criticism over the last two decades. Why is this? The UNSC was established during a time when the world was dominated by the economic, military and political strength of a few powerful state actors, predominantly in the Global North. Since then the integration and decolonisation of countries, especially in the Global South, has increased and established an escalating interdependence of international economics and politics. Today, new powerful state actors are emerging in the globalised world. Many of these decolonised countries now play an important role as a result of their economic growth. Since many emerging powers were born out of turmoil and change, it is crucial that they are provided with the platform needed for international governance to address the flux in the GPE. If the maintenance of international peace and security is prioritised, then the UNSC's reform is the foremost multilateral governance issue today. The ever-evolving interdependent international system demands legitimate global governance; global governance can assist to create stability in the globalised GPE. To achieve this, there must be equitable representation and democratic decision-making procedures by powerful international

actors across the globe. The UNSC is the preeminent institution for sustaining the norms of global governance. Presently, four of the P5 represent the Global North. The P5 have retained their special status in the international system. However, this presents an immense legitimacy problem for the UNSC, which seems increasingly anachronistic. There are prominent actors who want to change that, but there are also prominent actors who want to maintain the existing norms of governance. The surge of powerful new actors from the Global South means that the norms of global governance presently adopted by the UNSC must be reformed.

Research questions

The research problem was guided by one main research question and four secondary research questions. The main research question was the following:

Why is UNSC reform proving to be such a complex and intractable international issue?

The four supplementary research questions are the following:

1. Who have acted as norm entrepreneurs and norm *antipreneurs*, respectively, in the framing of UNSC reform since 1993?
2. How have new norms of UNSC reform emerged and become diffused in the international system since 1993?
3. Which institutions have been created and which norms have informed their operations in UNSC reform since 1993?
4. Is there a coherent set of reactionary norms emerging in opposition to UNSC norms of global governance?

Theoretical and conceptual framework

The challenge was to identify, describe and explain the emergence of new norms of multilateral governance, their diffusion and their internalisation in the international system which contrast with and challenges the maintenance of pre-existing UNSC norms of governance. The contribution to the study of norm dynamics by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) may be able to explain why reform of global governance is proving to be so difficult, and more specifically, why UNSC reform is

proving to be such an intractable issue. Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work, entitled *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, has provided crucial insights into this constructivist approach. The theoretical framework of constructivism enables the expansion of theoretical discourse within IR (Checkel, 1998:325). Constructivists are fascinated by the phenomenon of change. They have consequently often overemphasized the malleable aspect of social structures and norms. More recently, constructivists have engaged with the idea that the agents maintaining social structures and norms impact on the norm change process in diverse ways. This is where research done on norm dynamics is situated. Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) framework has been used by countless norm scholars in a multitude of academic disciplines.

Notably, Finnemore and Sikkink's norm evolution framework has been utilised in a number of studies. Krook and True (2010) illustrate and compare the norm evolution of two global gender norms: gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming. Karlsrud (2015) illustrates the importance of norm change with specific reference to the UN peace-keeping norm. Kelley (2008) discusses the emergence of international election monitoring. These studies reference current international issues such as the emergence of new values that can become entrenched in institutions and in the changes occurring in multilateral governance. Norm dynamics research within constructivism shows that change in the political context and normative environment facilitated the emergence of new norms of global governance (Adler, 1997:342).

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:895) define a norm as a "standard of appropriateness" pursued by actors with a shared identity. Norms are expectations which transform into guidelines that are agreed upon by actors with a shared identity; norms ensure the regulation of these actors' behaviour in any given situation. Hence, Finnemore and Sikkink's norm definition distinguishes between solitary and group standards of behaviour (1998:896). On the other hand, institutions are defined as relatively consistent assemblages of guidelines defining appropriate behaviour to which specific groups of actors must conform in specific situations (March & Olsen, 1998:743). Furthermore, the institutional structure of norms, expectations and rules inform political behaviour. This is important to mention against the backdrop of seeking the UNSC reform of norms of global governance.

The further entrenchment of norms through institutions, such as the UNSC, is a significant stage of the *norm life cycle* as framed by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:895). The *norm life cycle* is a

model that follows the evolution of a norm from its inception, through its diffusion and its adoption. The influence of norms can be interpreted as a three-stage process: (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade, and (3) norm internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). There are no universally absolute ‘bad’ norms. Norms we consider bad today, such as racial superiority or slavery, were once prominent because powerful groups of actors (norm entrepreneurs) believed in and defended the appropriateness of the norm (1998:892).

The first stage of the *norm life cycle* is known as norm *emergence* and it highlights the importance of norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs call attention to issues. They frame issues with motives that are empathetic and altruistic, and incorporate ideational commitment. Take the norm entrepreneurs of the UN – for example, Cordell Hull, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill; their motives encompassed all three of these qualities with the goal of achieving wellbeing and security for all (Månsson, 2007:220; Schild, 1995:30). Recent studies done on the emergence of norms show that most norm origins emphasise human agency. Thus, the successful creation of new norms generally involves norm entrepreneurs and organisational platforms from which the entrepreneurs act (1998:896).

Research on norm dynamics does not focus on conceptualising the opposition to the emergence of global norms – the “resistance to normative change” (Bloomfield, 2015:1). This has created an imbalance in the literature on norm dynamics. This is relevant in addressing the question of the UNSC’s resistance to reform. Norm *antipreneurs* are accorded the same analytical status as norm entrepreneurs to highlight the resistance to efforts to reform the existing norms of global governance within the UNSC (Bloomfield, 2015:2). As defined by Bloomfield, norm *antipreneurs* aim to defend the normative status quo usually through their acquired strategic institutional power (2015:3). It is essential to understand the degree to which global norms are entrenched through institutions to explain the perks that the *antipreneurs* enjoy and consequently why they resist change. Taking context into account is crucial to understand the impact of exogenous forces, such as the changes in the global distribution of power and the effect this has on the role of actors in global politics (Bloomfield, 2015:3). Context will better highlight the role actors play in the norm contestation within the process of seeking UNSC reform.

For an emergent norm to reach a threshold of normative change, norm entrepreneurs (whatever their platform) need to coerce/persuade state actors to endorse their norms and initiate norm

socialization as a part of their agenda (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Furthermore, for an emergent norm to move into the second stage of norm *cascade*, it usually becomes institutionalised in an international organisation and in a particular set of international rules. Institutionalising the emergent norm means that it is legitimized and this is crucial for reaching the tipping point. Hence, the normative and legal process is intertwined in the second stage of the *norm life cycle*. Although there is no quantitative empirical evidence for norm tipping and norm cascades, norm tipping seldom occurs before one third of the total number of states in a specific system adopt the norm. After the tipping point is reached, more states begin to adopt the norm more rapidly, depending on which states adopt the norm (1998:902).

Emergent norms have become increasingly institutionalised in the form of international law and in the rule of multilateral organisations since 1948 (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Powerful actors in international institutions often insist their mission is to spread and enforce global norms (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:176). Global norms play a vital and increasing role in domestic and world politics (Krook & True, 2010:104). If the norm is internalised by actors, then conformity with the norm is almost automatic (1998:904). This means that the norm has entered the third stage of its evolution: norm *internalisation*. Subsequently, an internalised norm is extremely powerful. New norms never infiltrate a normative vacuum; new norms emerge in a highly contested normative arena where they must compete with existing norms, ideas and interests (1998:897). Often norm entrepreneurs deliberately use inappropriate acts to frame an issue and send a message. The method of invoking a logic of appropriateness to highlight specific behaviour is a powerful tool when standards of appropriateness are exactly what is being contested with the emergence of a new norm (1998:898).

This process of norm influence has been described in work on social norms in IR and US legal theory (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Research done on women's suffrage globally provides support for the notion of the *norm life cycle*. Although there were many domestic women's suffrage organisations in the 19th century, the diffusion of the norm only began when an international campaign for suffrage was launched in 1904 by the International Women's Suffrage Association (IWSA) (1998:896). After 1930 women's suffrage was adopted by many countries without any domestic pressure. For women's suffrage, the norm emergence stage began in 1848 with the Seneca Falls Conference and lasted for eighty years until 1930 when approximately twenty US

states adopted the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). This process is seen in the case of many global gender norms. Consequently, Krook and True highlight how global gender norms continue to evolve after they emerge by contrasting two distinct gender *norm life cycles* – the gender-balanced decision-making norm and the gender mainstreaming norm – and their subsequent convergence in the 1990s and their divergence after that (2010:104).

The usefulness of Finnemore and Sikkink's framework is that it is able to trace the evolution of norms from an idea to practice. A focus on norm dynamics offers a lens for examining the impact that a globalised changing world can have on the standards of global governance. Routes to normative change are indirect and evolutionary. Changes in practice that establish new political processes can lead to slow and unintentional normative, ideational and political convergence (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:905). Global governance is crucial to maintaining peace and security in the current globalised era. This framework will explain the process of UNSC reform by identifying the norm entrepreneurs framing the emergence, cascading and internalisation of new norms of global governance and identifying the norm *antipreneurs* resisting change. Consequently, the norms of global governance already prevailing within the UNSC need to be effectively reformed for the multilateral organisation to retain its legitimacy.

Research design and methodology

In order for research to achieve credibility, it needs to evince validity and reliability (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:2). This research is conducted predominantly through the use of secondary sources. Secondary sources are defined as documents discussing information presented elsewhere. Several secondary academic sources have been consulted to collect data on UNSC reform through the theoretical perspective of constructivism and norm dynamics. This gives the research a deductive logic (Kothari, 2004:20). As I am a student at Stellenbosch University, the secondary data were retrieved mainly through the online databases and the library. This study also collected data through the use of primary sources such as UN documentation and proceedings which are publicly available.

The research problem and questions help organize, analyse and present the data in a concise and coherent way (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:64). The appropriate research design for this study is a qualitative approach. This study was aimed at addressing the international community's

perspective on the foremost multilateral organisation. The qualitative data of this design are concerned with assessing the *quality* or *standards* of a multinational organisation, i.e. the UNSC (Kothari, 2004:3). Furthermore, this research is aimed at contributing to existing literature seeking UNSC reform.

This is a desktop-based study. However, primary data is also collected in the conduct of two semi-structured interviews. Interviews are a beneficial aspect of the comprehensive data collection (Burnham *et al*, 2008:231). The interviews are semi-structured, with a combination of open-ended and contingent questions. These are well-suited to the research topic because it ensures the exploration of the perspectives of strategic informants on the topic of UNSC reform (Burnham *et al*, 2008:244). Semi-structured interviews facilitate the probing for clarification on specific answers (Barakso, Sabet & Schaffner, 2014:194). In other words, it allows for the adaptation of questions as the interview proceeds.

The key informants were selected based on their expertise. They included academics, particularly at universities, as they could contribute most objectively to the relevant theoretical and empirical data (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:4). This study is aware of the ethical pitfalls of the interview process, however, no individuals in these interviews are compromised. The selection process lent itself to snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is a non-random sampling effect (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:107), based on the referrals of key informants.

Ethical considerations are crucial when conducting research in the social sciences, specifically with regards to the collection of primary data. Correspondingly, research ethical principles were followed meticulously throughout this study. Although participation in the interviews involved a low risk of harm to the key informants, all precautions were taken to ensure the safety and confidentiality of the participants. The academics participated voluntarily in the interview process after signing a consent form. All data collected will be protected. The ethical clearance document was applied through the Stellenbosch University's Departmental Ethics Screening Committee (DESC) for review, which was approved and signed.

Outline of study

Chapter 1 is the *Research Rationale* which provides an introduction to, and formulation of, the research problem, questions and objectives of the methodological procedure. The research problem

is a crucial part of this chapter and the research questions posed are meant to guide the study. A background to the research is provided along with the theoretical and conceptual framework to carry out the study. This chapter highlights the research design and research methodology. Lastly, this study identifies the ethical considerations relevant to the collection of the primary data.

Chapter 2 is titled *UNSC: a dinosaur?* It provides a literature review and a historical survey of reform attempts since the emergence of the UNSC in 1945 and particularly since the end of the Cold War in 1991. This chapter gives an overview of the norms of global governance adopted within the UNSC. It examines the significance of norm entrepreneurs and the establishment of UNSC structures which currently inhibit reform. This chapter also discusses historical events such as World War II (WWII) and the Cold War, which framed the establishment of the UNSC as a multilateral institution of governance.

Chapter 3 is titled *Through a Constructivist lens* and explores the utility of the constructivist perspective on UNSC reform. This chapter provides an overview of constructivism in IR and the recent studies done on norm dynamics, specifically as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) in their work *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*. A thorough analysis of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) *norm life cycle* framework explains how global norm change occurs. The three stages of the *norm life cycle* are analysed in depth. This chapter also conceptualises the opposition to the normative status quo and acknowledges the role of norm *antipreneurs*, specifically as described by Bloomfield (2015).

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 apply Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) *norm life cycle* framework to the case of UNSC reform and the emergence of new norms of global governance. Chapter 4 is titled *The Entrepreneurs and Antipreneurs* and acknowledges the prominent actors in the establishment of existing and emerging global governance norms. Chapter 5 is titled *The Diffusion of New Norms of Global Governance* and describes the emergence of these new norms in the international community since 1993. Chapter 6 is titled *The Internalisation of New Norms of Global Governance*. This chapter focuses on the structures created to legitimise the emergence of new norms of global governance in the light of the institutional entrenchment of pre-existing norms of global governance.

Chapter 7 is the *Conclusion* which gives an overview of the study as a whole, addressing in particular the specified research problem and resultant research questions. Research findings will be presented on the intractable issue of UNSC reform of norms of global governance as well as on the contributions of constructivist theory towards understanding this international political phenomenon. Finally, the chapter identifies areas for further research within the field of International Relations.

Chapter 2

UNSC reform: transforming a dinosaur?

dinosaur

noun

A person or thing that is outdated or has become obsolete because of failure to adapt to changing circumstances (Oxford Dictionaries, 2018).


Introduction

The UNSC configuration and decision-making rules were established in the aftermath of WWII. Since 1945, global reality has shifted tremendously with the shifting distribution of international power relations. This is largely because of the massive movements towards European integration and decolonisation that began in the mid-20th century (Baccarini, 2018:98; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 887; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155). From its inception in 1945 the UNSC's effectiveness and legitimacy have been challenged (Granja, 2017:4). Yet the UNSC has undergone very little reform since its establishment. The Allies during WWII, who won the war, established a foundational UN treaty known as the Charter, which stipulates the configuration and procedures of the UNSC (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Law, 2017:88; O'Neill, 1996:221; Schlesinger, 2003:155). The creators shaped the Charter to pursue their own domestic interests by assigning to themselves the greatest power when it came to tenure and decision-making (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:712; Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Law, 2017:88). Any reform of the UNSC would require an amendment of the Charter, which could occur only with the ratification of the P5 members (UN, 1945:19).

This chapter surveys the literature on UNSC reform to give an overview of its history. The history of UNSC reform provides an account of the establishment of the institution, which set in place the structures and procedures contested today. Why has there been such contestation on UNSC reforms specifically over the last two decades? The escalating interdependence of international economics and politics has created a surge of demand for legitimate forms of global governance. Legitimacy is essential for effective and good governance (Du Plessis, 2014:12). If legitimate

global governance is maintained, then surely this would create stability on the globe? The global contestation over the existing structures and procedures of the UNSC has threatened its legitimacy, which subsequently generates ongoing moves for its reform (Du Plessis, 2014:12; Gould & Rablen, 2013:24; Hosli, Moody, O'Donovan, Kaniovski, & Little 2011:164). The UNSC reform literature outlines the five key areas challenged: UNSC configuration, the veto provision of the P5, regional representation, UNSC procedures, and lastly, the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003; Gould & Rablen, 2017; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Malone, 2000; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014). The last category is critical as it highlights the dynamics of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) debates on these issues; this forms the basis of UNSC reform proposals. The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the intractable issue of UNSC reform. This will help address the research problem and questions in an attempt to answer the overriding question: *why is UNSC reform so hard?*

Figure 1. *A timeline of the ongoing drive for UNSC reform*



(Sources: UN, 1945; UNGA, 1963; UNGA, 1993).

A historical account: UNSC, a post-World War II creation

The policemen of the post-WWII world

The history of UNSC reform attempts would be incomplete without an account of the organisation of the UN itself. Alongside the Allied powers there were other peace-loving nations who desperately wanted to put an end to the international catastrophe of WWII (Ogunnoiki, 2018:47). This began with the Declaration of St. James's Palace and subsequently the Atlantic Charter of 1941. To set the scene in Britain in 1941: the region was plagued with the war, bombs and sirens that went off regularly for almost two years. Most of Europe had fallen to the Axis powers and vessels were frequently torpedoed crossing the Atlantic. In London and among the Allied powers hope remained unshaken in anticipation of the day that the war would end and victory would be achieved. However, for most people the post-war future looked incredibly bleak. What would be the point of a military victory if it brought on yet another war? There should be more purpose in life than a military victory. On 12 June 1941 the Declaration of St. James's Palace, also known as an Inter-Allied Declaration, was signed in London. The Declaration was the first real step taken to achieve a peaceful and cooperative world, which would be better for all in the post-WWII era (United Nations, n.d.).

The origins of the UNSC are founded in the philosophical reflections of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, known as the Four Policemen concept (Granja, 2017:11; Schild, 1995:29). Essentially, the four main Allies who won WWII – the USA, the UK, the USSR and China – would be the four policemen keeping watch over the new international system. The roots of this theory can be traced back to the initial policy documents outlining the intentions of the post-WWII international system. Firstly, the Atlantic Conference on 14 August 1941 formulated the Atlantic Charter, which was an important policy document that drafted the objectives for the post-war system (Månsson, 2007:220; Schild, 1995:28). The Atlantic Charter was drafted by the USA (Roosevelt) and the UK (Churchill) and later confirmed by the Allies of WWII. In May 1941 the US Secretary of State at the time, Cordell Hull, declared the US objective of establishing an international arrangement whereby independent countries would act collectively on international security issues (Schild, 1995:30). This was to create international cooperation and prevent the USA from reverting back to its isolationist policies after WWII. Hull did not blame the failure of the League of Nations on its universal membership, but attributed the failure of the organisation to its

inability to enforce its policies and principles. Many, including Roosevelt, believed that Hull was the mastermind behind the establishment of the UN. Hence, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1945 for his contributions.

During the Atlantic Conference the British Prime Minister, Churchill, proposed a similar idea to Hull's of a post-WWII international organisation that would be based on universal membership (Schild, 1995:28). All nations would live safely, peacefully and free from fear within their own boundaries. However, the US President, Roosevelt, rejected this proposal stating that it was near impossible to satisfy so many nations all at once. Roosevelt proposed that their two nations (the USA and the UK) should ensure world peace by policing the world, enforcing disarmament after WWII, and in any instance where there was a violation of international peace, the two nations should block the violator and bomb it into yielding. Later, Roosevelt reformed the proposal to include the Big Four Allied powers of WWII, namely the UK, the USA, the USSR and China (Månsson, 2007:231; Schild, 1995:29). In the Atlantic Charter the Big Four were proposed as the policing nations of the post-war world. This is how the infamous *Four Policemen* theory emerged.

The name 'United Nations' was coined by US President Roosevelt (Ogunnoiki, 2017:48). Another important policy document that laid down the foundations for the establishment of the contemporary UN was the Declaration by the United Nations of 1942 (Månsson, 2007:219; Ogunnoiki, 2018:47). This was the first time the name of the future organisation was ever mentioned. Subsequently, this proved to be the key policy document that formalized the commitment of the Allies of WWII. The Big Four initially signed the document on New Year's day of 1942. The very next day, representatives of 22 other countries signed the document. Between 1942 and 1945 21 other countries added their signatures to the short declaration. The signatories on the document confirmed the concept of the Policing Nations (Månsson, 2007:220). Consequently, a complete triumph over the enemies of the Allies during WWII would achieve a life of independence, justice, freedom (including religious freedom) and peace whereby all would maintain human rights norms within their own borders as well as the borders of the others. The initial Declaration of the UN became formalized within the UN Charter three years later.

After consensus has been reached between Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill on the Great Power domination in the post-war world order, the Moscow Conference was held to formalise procedures (Schild, 1995:30). The Declaration of the Four Nations was signed on the 30th October 1943 at the

Moscow Conference, which was held by the Big Four Allies of WWII, and it recognised the necessity for a post-war international organisation that would supersede the League of Nations. The Big Four, or in other words, the victors of WWII – the USA, the UK, the USSR and China – signed the Moscow Declaration. This was to ensure cooperation on international security issues. Subsequently, in 1944, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington was convened for the international leaders to re-negotiate paragraph 4 of the Moscow Declaration of 1943, or in other words, discuss the establishment of an international peace and security Council (Wilcox, 1945:943). The debates between representatives of the international powers at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference formed the basis of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Two separate groups engaged in the negotiations: the great powers who had industrial and military strength, and the smaller powers whose purpose was to defend the law and ensure the principles of justice were incorporated into the UN Charter. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals stipulated the composition and decision-making procedures of the UNSC, which formed the basis of the UN Charter. Inevitably, the great powers retained for themselves the privilege of determining which political norms or rules would be perpetuated in the Charter. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference and Proposals were imperative steps towards the institutionalisation of the UN and UNSC (Månsson, 2007:219; Wilcox, 1945:944).

Today, the concept of the *Policemen* refers to the post-war Council, or in other words, the UNSC, which Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated to bring about world peace (Schild, 1995:27). The idea was that the Four Powers that dominated during WWII would form an authority structure within the post-war international organisation – this would enable them to be the policemen or the guarantors of security (Granja, 2017:11; Schild, 1995:27; Wilcox, 1945:944). It was believed that the League of Nations failed, firstly because of the absence of a great power (the USA), and also because there was no determinable division of authority between the Assembly and the Council. Keeping the composition of the UNSC down to a few members was purposefully done to allow the Council to take decisions quickly and effectively without any interference from the UNGA. This institutionalisation of the *Four Policemen* idea is seen in the establishment of the permanent members of the UNSC. The Four Powers became the permanent members of the UNSC and, surprisingly, they had significantly less power than the *Four Policemen* theory had previously proposed. In 1945, when the UN was established, France was added as the fifth permanent member upon Churchill's insistence, so the group became known as the P5.

The creators of the UN wanted to pursue the prospect of a new international order enshrined in an international body which would try to overcome the shortfalls of its predecessor, the League of Nations (Schlesinger, 2003:2). Like the League of Nations, however, the UN aimed at maintaining international peace by preventing future world wars. So it is worth noting that 85% of all conflicts after the end of WWII have been internally oriented on the territory of one state, and often through proxies (Dörfler & Hosli, 2013; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Szasz, 1983; Schlesinger, 2003:168). Subsequently, the UNSC has undergone very little reform since its emergence to ensure its continuing relevance (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10;). The international post-WWII system was founded on the idea that there should be equality among sovereign states (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Schlesinger, 2003:169; Szasz, 1983:345). However, the UN also asserted the responsibility of the superpowers to maintain global peace (O'Neill, 1996:221; Schlesinger, 2003:170). This is one of many contradictions between the UNSC's ideals and its practices. The Charter itself is aimed at sustaining the post-WWII global order whose legitimacy is founded on rational thinking and habit. However, there are emerging contenders for power in the international system, which the UNSC does not take into account. This is threatening the UNSC's legitimacy and subsequent existence. Nonetheless, the Charter itself presents difficulties and barriers in the quest for UNSC reform.

The Charter

The idea of securing world peace through an international organisation in the midst of WWII was translated into practice with the adoption of the Charter at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Four pivotal policy documents formed the basis of the Charter: the Atlantic Charter of 1941; the Declaration by the United Nations of 1942; the Moscow Declaration of 1943; and the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of 1944 (Månsson, 2007:220). All of these, except for the Moscow Declaration, reference human rights in the establishment of world peace. On 26 June 1945 50 founding countries of the UN gathered at the San Francisco War Memorial and Performing Arts Center to sign the Charter of the UN (Månsson, 2007:218). Poland signed the Charter later on 15 October 1945, which made the total number of founding members 51. The founders acknowledged the precondition for peaceful co-existence, which was the idea that human rights must be respected. By signing this UN document, these countries created an international organisation based on

altruistic motives such as empathy, charity and hope. The Charter came into effect on the 24th October 1945.

The UN consists of six organs, namely, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Secretariat (Ogunnoiki, 2018:48). The UNSC is considered the highest division of authority (Wilcox, 1945:943). Hence, at the core of the UN resides the most powerful organ aimed at safeguarding international peace and security (Granja, 2017:10). The creators of the UN wanted to strategically pursue their own interests and redefine the meaning of the post-war world by diffusing norms through the UNSC (Granja, 2017:10; Månsson, 2007:219). The Charter legally ensured the diffusion of these norms – norms that emanate from rational thinking and habits, the *Policemen* concept and the utilisation of force. The obsolete nature of the UNSC is highlighted through an extensive analysis of the Charter. The Charter indicates the configuration and the procedures of the UNSC, which represents the status quo (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). All UN members are bound by its articles. The UNSC is unable to reform without an amendment to the Charter, but this requires the ratification of all the P5 members. This is incredibly difficult to achieve. Hence, the UNSC has only ever undergone one official reform since its inception (Baccarini, 2018:97; Du Plessis, 2014:1). Article 108 in the Charter explains why this is the case:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council (UN, 1945:19).

UN membership

A two-thirds majority may have been an equitable threshold when there was a total of 51 founding UN members; however, UN membership has more than tripled to 193 UN member states since its inception. The specifications that Article 108 of the Charter imposes has created a ‘lock-in’ effect, rendering the UNSC resistant to reform. According to Article 108, any amendments to the Charter that would implement a reform of the UNSC would require not only 129 affirmative votes from the UNGA, but also all P5 votes. The rest of the 63 UN member states have the option of forming a blocking minority. According to Baccarini, Hosli and Dörfler (2018:110; 2017:6), significant membership expansion within the UNGA has created a further ‘lock-in’ effect, prohibiting any other UNSC reform. A high voting threshold in any political institution reduces the chances that

winning coalitions can be formed (Freixas & Zwicker, 2017:411; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6). The membership growth and high majority threshold have affected the UNGA's actual substance of resolutions and the probability of decision-making (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161). Whereas several multilateral institutions progressively take the role of emerging powers into account, the UN's most important organ is incapable because of the restrictions the Charter imposes. The old structures and procedures of the UNSC are entrenched in international law, which makes it notoriously difficult to officially reform.

UNSC membership

The UN membership expansion, which was largely a consequence of the decolonisation movements in the mid-1950s, was clearly unanticipated by the UN's creators (Baccarini, 2018:110; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155). Decolonisation happened in conjunction and in contrast with the integration and nationalism pursued by European states. As the imbalance between the number of UNSC members and the number of UNGA members became more apparent, the old structures and procedures were increasingly challenged. In 1963 the UNGA voted on the resolution for UNSC membership to be expanded from 11 to 15 members (Malone, 2000:5; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411). This was the first time a resolution on UNSC reform passed. The official reform of the UNSC occurred in 1965 when the Charter was amended to incorporate Resolution 1991 A (XVII) (UNGA, 1963:13). This increased the Non-Permanent Members (NPMs) from 6 to 10. Almost all UN member states continue to support further expansion of the UNSC membership, yet no further expansion has taken place since 1965 (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161). Article 108, which stipulates the majority threshold and the need for the ratification of the P5 members for any amendments to the Charter to be passed, is the precise formula contributing to the limitations placed on UNSC possibilities for expansion and reform (Baccarini, 2018:101).

Permanent Five

The P5 are the USA, Russia (the USSR until 1991), China, the UK and France, each of which the Charter grants a permanent seat on the UNSC. These states were the victorious allies at the end of WWII. During the San Francisco Conference of 1945 these states relentlessly lobbied for the adoption of the veto provision. Apparently, the USA and others went as far as to threaten their withdrawal if the veto was not granted (Granja, 2017:14; Wilcox, 1945:944). Consequently, the

P5 possess the most privileged role among UN members with regards to their tenure and decision-making power (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411; Garwood-Gowers, 2013:601; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12). The veto comes into effect with only one negative vote from a P5 member on all substantive matters (Hosli *et al.*, 2011:164). The P5 are thus over-represented compared to the rest of the UN member states. The UN majority threshold (which is two thirds) can be overridden by far fewer than one-third of the UNSC members with the veto right (Gould & Rablen, 2016:35; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:229). How is this democratic? The veto enables a single state to stand in the way of dealing with aberrant conduct, which breaches international customary law. By providing the P5 with such immense power, the Charter reflects the authority of the decision-makers of the world order after WWII (Binder & Heupel, 2015:239).

Resolutions would be reached more frequently if the Charter did not empower the P5 members with the right to veto a resolution (Gould & Rablen, 2016:28; Hosli *et al.*, 2011:164; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:4). The Charter wanted to implement a tool that would ensure the collective work of the most powerful nations towards achieving or maintaining international peace. Alongside this, the creators of the UN also wanted to employ an instrument that would help protect their national interests. As such, the veto aimed to prevent the passing of a resolution that one or all of the P5 members considered to be destructive. Later the course of the Cold War sparked extraordinary changes in the global system. The veto provision became a power tactic that was often used during the Cold War. Although the veto power was intended to ensure cooperation among the P5 members, the culmination of a bipolar system was that the USA and USSR constantly invoked the veto right for two main reasons: to prevent each other from gaining more power, and to protect their allies (Granja, 2017:14; Schild, 1995:28). The veto has led to stagnation of the UNSC more than it has enabled its effectiveness and cooperation (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:151). Consequently, the UNSC's legitimacy is increasingly being questioned. But reform of the UNSC is dependent on the cooperation of a handful of powerful elites (Du Plessis, 2014:11; O'Neill, 1996:221). Hence, the veto provision is one of the most inhibiting mechanisms for UNSC reform. The P5 share a bias to retain the normative status quo because of the immense power it bestows on them (Zifcak, 2006:136). The P5 have the power to stop other smaller UN member states from reforming the UNSC, or in other words, outvoting them (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). The veto provision awarded to the USA, the USSR, the UK, China and France needs to change, otherwise the preeminent

institution for maintaining world peace and security can be viewed as outdated (Gould & Rablen, 2016:36).

Non-Permanent Members

At any given time there are 10 elected non-permanent rotational seats. There must be a minimum of 4 affirmative NPM votes for a resolution to pass (Dreher, Gould, Rablen & Vreeland, 2014:1). This gives the NPMs a key position in this multilateral institution. The NPMs receive special pay, owing to their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, and they must represent an equitable geographical distribution (UN, 1945:6). The Charter bestows the responsibility for the election of NPMs on the UNGA (UN, 1945:6). In order for a country to become an NPM, they must win at least two-thirds of UNGA votes (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:7). The UNGA elects the NPMs for non-renewable two-year terms through a regional grouping process (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). At first the distribution of the NPM seats was not formally established. However, an understanding of the pressing nature to allocate representational seats emerged after the process of decolonisation began in the mid-20th century (Baccarini, 2018:97; Malone, 2000:3). Hence, the formal alteration of the Charter, Resolution 1991 A (XVII), which came into force in 1965, specifies the regional election pattern for the NPMs. The pattern is as follows:

1. Five representatives from the African and Asia-Pacific Group (APG);
2. One representative from Eastern Europe (EE);
3. Two representatives from the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC);
4. Two representatives from Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) (UNGA, 1963:22).

An undocumented, yet unbroken, agreement divides the five seats between Africa and Asia by reserving two seats for Asia and three seats for Africa (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:5). Another agreement was established between Africa and Asia around 1968, which further reserved one out of the five seats for an Arab state, whereby the regions alternate every two years in providing an appropriate candidate (Security Council Report, 2011: 7). This seat has been dubbed the ‘*Arab swing seat*’ (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:5).

The regions are represented unequally (Gould & Rablen, 2013:24). The regional groupings of the EE and WEOG are over-represented when compared to Africa and Asia. This points to a much broader representational imbalance between the South (Africa, Asia and the GRULAC) and the North (EE and WEOG) (Gould & Rablen, 2017:147). The EE has more than twice its equitable

representation, hence it is the most over-represented region. Although Africa is riddled with international crises, it is the most under-represented region (Gould & Rablen, 2016:21). When the total UN membership is distributed in regional groupings, Africa outweighs any other group. The African group accounts for 28,2% of the total UN membership (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12). The lack of equitable regional representation within the UNSC proves that this body was not prepared to allow emerging powers to govern in the new international order (Von Einsiedel, Malone & Ugarte, 2015:3).

Another important point of contestation throughout the literature on UNSC reform regarding the NPMs is the positive relationship between temporary UNSC membership and foreign aid flows (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland, 2009:743; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006:907; Reynolds & Winters, 2016:1; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:87). NPMs receive considerably fewer policy conditionalities than non-members, especially from development actors such as the USA, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:35). An important example is the following: Zimbabwe entered into an IMF agreement in 1992, when the IMF agreed to disburse regular loans subject to Zimbabwe's cooperation with the economic reform conditions. Zimbabwe was simultaneously serving a two-year term on the UNSC, when it was deciding the fate of Iraq. Iraq had invaded Kuwait. At the time, it was no secret that the USA aimed to dismantle the military power of Saddam Hussein's administration in Iraq. During Zimbabwe's term as a UNSC member, it voted affirmatively on many resolutions against Iraq. However, when Zimbabwe failed to vote in favour of just one resolution against Iraq, it was threatened with increased levels of IMF conditionality, which was heavily influenced by the USA (Dreher *et al.*, 2009:743; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006:907; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:64). This kind of pressure does not promote legitimate decision-making procedures.

Decision-making procedures

Article 27 in the Charter states:

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [which was changed to nine in the 1965 amendment] members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven [which was changed to nine in the 1965 amendment]

members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting (UN, 1945:7; UNGA, 1965:88).

It is no secret that the Charter has empowered the P5 with greater decision-making power than the rest of the UNSC members (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:229). Although the veto power is not explicitly mentioned in the Charter, the great powers that emerged victorious after WWII agreed upon the function of the veto right and Article 27 necessitates the concurring votes of the P5 members (Felsenthal & Machover, 2014:2). However, in practice the term ‘concurring’ has presented a clear difficulty. At the beginning of the UN’s establishment, the debate was extensive as to whether all the P5 members had to vote affirmatively, or if they could simply abstain, for a non-procedural resolution to be adopted. At the time there was diplomatic and geopolitical tension between the UN and Spain because during WWII Spain had sympathised with the opposition: the Axis powers. The debate on the ‘concurring’ votes settled down in 1946, when the USSR declared their abstention from voting on resolution 4: The Spanish Question, which was centred on the UN denying Spain admission to the organisation. Subsequently, the resolution passed without a vote from the USSR (Granja, 2017:14; Felsenthal & Machover, 2014:3; UNSC, 1946:1). Furthermore, in practice since 1946 a P5 member proclaiming “I abstain” was not interpreted as a veto. Since 1947 and 1950 the absence or non-participation of a P5 member in decision-making procedures has not been interpreted as a veto (Felsenthal & Machover, 2014:3; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:412).

The term ‘concurring’ has come to be understood as an abstention. What can certainly be extracted from the original wording is that a negative vote is different from an abstention. However, in terms of equity within the Council, an abstention from one of the P5 is still twice as powerful as an NPM vote (Gould & Rablen, 2013:13; 2016:34; 2017:150). In a weighted simple game, an abstention from a P5 member is tantamount to a negative vote for the NPMs; this is purely based on the fact that P5s are weighted more heavily than NPMs in the UNSC decision-making procedures (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425). Early commentators in the literature conclude that the probability of effective decision-making within the UNGA is lower with the P5 “concurrent” votes (Freixas & Zwicker, 2017:411; Gould & Rablen, 2017:147; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). This also shows that the P5 members hold unequivocally more power than any other UNGA member.

For example, one of the best known accounts of one of the P5 exercising their right to abstain occurred in 1950, when the Soviet Union (USSR) boycotted the UNSC, claiming that the UNSC was refusing to expel the Nationalist Chinese representative (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:412; Gould & Rablen, 2016:34; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). The USSR had identified the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) as the true Chinese government. Thus the USSR wanted the PRC to replace the Nationalist Chinese deputation at the UN. Jacob Malik, the Soviet representative at the time, joined the UNSC meeting on January 13 to vote in favour of expelling Nationalist China (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). The USA, Cuba, Egypt, Ecuador and Nationalist China voted against the resolution to expel Nationalist China, whereas Yugoslavia, India and USSR voted affirmatively for the resolution. In the hope of preventing future UNSC action, Malik exited the meeting announcing that the USSR would no longer attend UNSC meetings (Gould & Rablen, 2016:34). Subsequently, the remaining member states of the UNSC continued to operate despite the Soviet boycott. The Soviet's absence backfired. North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. On 27 June 1950 the UNSC voted in favour of military action for the first time in the history of the UN (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:412). This could have been blocked by the Soviet veto as the USSR strongly opposed the action of sending UN armed forces to Korea. In hindsight, the abstention of the USSR led to a gruelling three-year war in Korea (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:413).

In conclusion, the meaning of 'concurring' and the immense voting power of the P5 (such as their option to abstain) stipulated in the Charter is contested throughout the literature on UNSC reform (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:28; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). Surely, with the greatest responsibility for maintaining peace and security, one should not be permitted to abstain from resolutions, even on non-procedural matters? The Charter raises issues of interpretation and this is heightened in the contestation of its outdated nature. This highlights the fact that the UNSC decision-making procedures go beyond a simple majority rule; it does not even advocate for equitable representation (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21). The present UNSC status quo undermines the less powerful member states and in turn creates a hierarchy (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:28; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:229).

The history of reform

The only official reform of the UNSC took place in 1965 with the amendment of the Charter to incorporate Resolution 1991 A (XVII) (Baccarini, 2018:97; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411; UNGA,

1963:13). This increased the number of NPMs from 6 to 10. This meant that resolutions on substantive matters needed to be passed by more NPMs than was previously stated in the initial Charter. The qualified majority changed from 7 to 9 NPMs, as well as the P5 members (Malone, 2000:5; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161). Although this amendment was ratified by two thirds of the UNGA and all P5 members, its effect has not been empowering. The increase in the number of NPMs has had a negative effect on the decision-making power of the NPMs (Baccarini, 2018:98). Consequently, the NPM's individual voting power has decreased because the P5 members can rely on an increased number of probable positive votes to pass a resolution. With an increase in winning coalitions, the possibility of NPMs providing the decisive decision has decreased. So, a possible way forward would be to increase the required majority to ensure an increase of NPM's decision-making power. Yes, prestige, foreign aid and information comes with a seat at the UNSC. However, if the level of NPM's decision-making power is not increased, a seat at the UNSC table would bring only a degree of participation, without the veto right (Baccarini, 2018:99; O'Neill, 1996:236). For NPMs and PMs, the UNSC signals what the limitations are on exercising power; states seek the international institution's approval to indicate their political outcomes to national and international audiences (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:712; Binder & Heupel, 2015:239; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Law, 2017:88). This was done throughout the Cold War.

The end of the Cold War

Like WWII, the Cold War was instrumental in structuring the contemporary UNSC. The ability of the UNSC to adapt is dependent on the configuration and intensity of state preferences (Freixas & Zwicker, 2002:18). The regional and global divisions within the UN have intensified over the course of the last 75 years and this has made institutional reform within the UNSC increasingly difficult (Dörfler & Hosli, 2013:450; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8; Von Einsiedel *et al.*, 2015:2; Dreher *et al.*, 2014:66; Gould & Rablen, 2016:43). The divisions between the powers during the Cold War were classified as a bipolar system with the East versus the West. However, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) developed in 1961 in opposition to an alignment with a major power bloc (Non-Aligned Movement, n.d.). Today, the NAM consists of 120 developing states and it is considered the second largest grouping of states internationally, after the UN. Nevertheless, the bipolar system prevailed during the Cold War and the geopolitical tensions were classified more broadly as the democratic Western bloc versus the communist Eastern bloc. The East and West differed in their

political systems, ideologies, history, religion and many, many more ways. The Western ideals were guided by none other than the US, and the Eastern ideals were guided by the USSR. It all began after WWII with the ‘containment policy’ and the Truman Doctrine, which was announced by the US President at the time, Harry S. Truman, on 29 March 1947 (Baccarini, 2018:103). Prior to this, in 1946, US diplomat George F. Kennan advocated, in what is known as Article X, not only a strong policy of containment of the USSR but a more general anti-communist strategy. The Truman Doctrine reiterated this and stated the US foreign policy objective of counteracting USSR geopolitical expansion in what was to become known as the Cold War. Within the UN and UNSC member states would employ their powers consistently during the Cold War to protect their allies or proxies (Granja, 2017:14; Schild, 1995:28).

During the Cold War state preferences among UN member states were predominantly regional. This was seen in the division between the UNSC with the P3 – the USA, France and the UK – on the one hand, and the P2 – USSR and China – on the other (Von Einsiedel *et al.*, 2015:2). The Cold War intensified the divisions within the UNSC (Dörfler & Hosli, 2013:450; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8; Dreher *et al.*, 2014:66; Gould & Rablen, 2016:43). By the end of the Cold War these divisions had changed from regional to global preferences among UN members (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:66). This brought about new distributions of power (Baccarini, 2018:104). The UN transitioned from being East-West to North-South orientated (Von Einsiedel *et al.*, 2015:2; Zifcak, 2016:136). However, this intensified division simply reinforced the segregation already present within the UNSC. The North-South division has influenced UN members’ preferences, which directly affects the members’ voting behaviour on new policies (Hosli and Dörfler, 2017:8). Furthermore, there is substantial inequity in representational voting powers between the North – comprising the EE and the WEOG – and the South – comprising Africa, Asia and the GRULAC (Gould & Rablen, 2016:43). The inability of the UNSC to address shifting power relations is clear with the heightened disparities among its members.

The increasingly active agenda of the UNSC can be traced to the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War (Malone, 2000:3). The Charter has allowed the UNSC to redefine the meaning of an internal conflict (Szasz, 1983:346). By the end of the Cold War the UNSC had started to redefine what constitutes an international threat to the peace and security of all (Binder & Heupel, 2015:241; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:2; Szasz, 1983:345). The term ‘threats’ (to international

peace) as described under Article 39 in the Charter was widely expanded in meaning, to say the least. What constitutes a legitimate realm of state sovereignty and what is treated as a legitimate international intrusion have been drastically changed from the UN's inception in 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1991 (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:1). The UNSC has determined that civil wars, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, armed conflicts, coups and humanitarian crises are international threats (Binder & Heupel, 2015:241; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:2). Consequently, the UNSC has employed a prominently interventionist interpretation of Chapter VII in the Charter, or in other words the provisions for peace enforcement (Binder & Heupel, 2015:241; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:1; Szasz, 1983:346). Not only has the UNSC increasingly authorized military interventions, implemented more robust mandates in the UN peacekeeping missions, and created sanction regimes, but the UNSC has also instituted innovative and intrusive tools such as international criminal courts and transitional governments (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240).

This widening of the scope for collective intervention was as a response to the civil and ethnic wars that erupted across the globe from 1990 to 1993 as well as the UNSC's ineffectiveness in combating prior international crises (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:2; Garwood-Gowers, 2013:596; Law, 2017:94; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017:633). Examples of the civil strife that has plagued the international community over the last three decades include the civil wars in Bosnia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, Sudan, Syria, a coup in Haiti, failure of state institutions in Somalia and many more (Granja, 2017:18). As in the case of Bosnia and Somalia, the UN transformed peace-making initiatives into war-making ventures when the institution threatened the imposition of force – from imposing new state boundaries, to disarmament and safe zones with no-fly territories – on troops who recognized no political power other than their own (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:9). An astonishing UN incident was the case of Rwanda, where the UNSC failed to exercise its peace-making mandate as peace agreements completely fell apart (Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:639). The consequence was catastrophic: approximately 800 000 Tutsis and Hutus were killed by the genocidal radicals who had captured the government. The UNSC's ineffectiveness in enforcing peace and security in the post-Cold War era can be attributed to its increased use of force and unfulfilled promises (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:1).

Since the end of the Cold War around 1991, the criticisms of the UNSC have intensified (Granja, 2017:4). The power of the UN, including the UNSC as a whole, has increased since 1991 with its

increasingly interventionist role. Consequently, excluded states have shown a growing interest in participating in UN peacekeeping and decision-making (O'Neill, 1996:236). Many emerging states, because of their size, population and economic development, have become eager to gain increased representation in the body that has the greatest responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Notably, economic powers in the Global South as well as Japan and Germany (who were instrumental in peacekeeping missions during the Cold War) started to demand increased participation in UNSC decision-making at the end of the Cold War (Baccarini, 2018:98). UNSC reform accordingly became a hot topic for the UNGA. The 1992 UNSC Summit launched UNSC reform discussions once again, with the new UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who laid down the conceptual framework for an ambitious *Agenda for Peace* (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:10). *An Agenda for Peace* set the foundations for the role of the UN in securing international peace and security whereby Boutros-Ghali hoped the UN would cooperate in the rapidly changing context of post-Cold War politics. The intentions were to reform the anachronistic configurations and procedures of the UNSC to reflect the flux of the new world.

In the 21st century the disconnect between the UNSC and the geopolitical realms is becoming increasingly glaring. Surely it is about time the UNSC reflects the global reality of the present times instead of the era when it was conceived. Furthermore, after many postponements on the salient issue of UNSC reform, the second historical movement for change was the establishment of the OEWG on the 'Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and on Other Matters Related to the Security Council', which occurred in December 1993 (UNGA, 1993:17). Today, the OEWG is dubbed the *Never-ending Working Group* (NEWG) because the incessant debate on UNSC reform has produced no results (Baccarini, 2018:98; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Malone, 2000:3). After 27 years of discussion on UNSC reform, there are still no tangible results. Although most member states are in agreement that UNSC reform is of the utmost importance to take into account the surge of emerging economies in the Global South, especially since decolonisation and the end of the Cold War, there is a lack of consensus on what changes need to be implemented (Malone, 2000:3; Zifcak, 2006:136).

Reform proposals

The proposals for the reform of the UNSC cover the following topics: UNSC membership expansion, UNSC reconfiguration, the veto powers of the P5, UNSC procedures and the

relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018; Ariyoruk, 2005; Baccarini, 2018; Binder & Heupel, 2015; Fox *et al*, 2018; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003; Gould & Rablen, 2017; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Malone, 2000; Venter, 2003; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014)

Permanent Member expansion

At the end of 1992 Japan and Germany became the second and third largest financial benefactors to the UN after the US, largely on the basis of their contributions to the peacekeeping missions during the Cold War (Baccarini, 2018:98). Hence, these two nations began to demand a PM seat on the UNSC. Brazil, the nation with the fifth largest land area, and India, the nation with the second largest population, which saw themselves as the most powerful nations and pivotal contributors within their respective regions – also began seeking membership of the most prestigious body at the UN. Prior to 2005, Germany and Brazil had arranged a diplomatic attempt together with Japan and India to obtain permanent seats on the UNSC as part of its undertaking to reform; this initiative became known as the G4 proposal (Baccarini, 2018:99; Schirm, 2010:201). All four countries mutually supported each other's quest for permanent seats on the UNSC. The main argument the G4 put forward was that the current configuration of the UNSC P5 (USA, Russia, China, UK, France) does not represent the current distribution of power in the international system (Schirm, 2010:202). Instead, the G4 believe that the UNSC should reflect the ascent of the emerging powers. Based on this initiative, these four countries believed that their membership as PMs of the UNSC would give the institution the representation and legitimacy it needed to address its deficit. The most noticeable opposition came from the G4 neighbouring countries: Italy opposed Germany, Mexico and Argentina opposed Brazil, several Asian countries opposed Japan, and Pakistan opposed India's aspiration (Ariyoruk, 2005:205; Schirm, 2010:202). Consequently, the initiative has not succeeded and the G4 remain no closer to acquiring their desired UNSC prestige. Even though the P5 themselves were not delighted at the idea of sharing their exclusive veto provision with the G4, it was the UNGA which fundamentally would not allocate the qualified majority mandatory for the new members to acquire their permanent seats within the UNSC.

At the same time as the G4 proposal emerged, the African group also began to demand a permanent presence at the OEWG debates (Venter, 2003:37). Their motivation is founded on the historical injustice they experienced and the fact that most of the UNSC's agenda is concentrated on the African continent. Conflict resolution in Africa has become one of the main topics dealt with by

the UNSC since the end of the Cold-War (Du Plessis, 2014:67; Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). Between 1990-2013 approximately 60% of the conflicts the UNSC attempted to address were in Africa (Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). Consequently, 32% were in Sub-Saharan Africa and 28% were in the Middle East and North Africa. Between 2004-2014 53% of the 678 resolutions passed were concerned with African topics, yet the group of 55 African states are still not democratically represented within the UN. Since the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union (AU) in 2001, the AU has sought UNSC reform and better representation of African states. The rotation of African countries at the PM table at the Council is a strongly supported proposal by the African group (Venter, 2003:37). The strongest candidates for these seats are as follows: South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria. These countries along with Algeria, Ethiopia and Kenya are considered the most likely contenders, but no one country has yet formally been put forward for election as a PM on the UNSC.

Non-Permanent Member expansion

After the overt resistance from regional rivals to the G4 pursuit to become PMs with veto rights, the NPM category for expansion gained support (Schirm, 2010:202). Subsequently, the Coffee Club led by Italy formed in opposition to the expansion of the PMs in the early 1990s. The Coffee Club's motivation was that it rejected a quick-fix PM expansion. Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Colombia, Canada and Egypt started the interest group, which transformed into what is now known as the 'Uniting for Consensus' proposal, which advocates for a consensus to be reached on the expansion of the UNSC (Ariyork, 2005:205). The group is predominantly composed of the G4's economic and regional competitors. For the 'Uniting for Consensus' proposal, it is of the utmost importance that the UN decides on what the form and size of the renewed Council will be before any action is taken to expand the UNSC. The expansion of the UNSC from 11 to 15 members in 1965 was made possible only by the 1963 majority vote for the amendment of the Charter. Hence, the G4 argue that UNSC reform is not possible through consensus; it is only possible through an actual vote on a specific resolution (Schirm, 2010:202; Ariyork, 2005:205). In other words, consensus for the G4 is equivalent to inaction. Nevertheless, on 16 May 2005 the G4 introduced a new draft resolution for the expansion of the UNSC. The new G4 proposal stated that there should be a creation of 6 additional permanent seats and 4 additional non-permanent seats. In July 2005 a group of 5 UN member states of the 'Uniting for Consensus' proposed that the UNSC preserve the

5 PMs and expand the number of NPMs to 20 (Ariyoruk, 2005:205). However, there has been no cooperation on either proposal thus far.

Veto reform

The dominance of the P5 and their immense power owing to their veto right has created significant problems for UNSC reform. The costs of UNSC reform are high for the P5 members (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12). The power of the veto has in the past prevented the UNSC from addressing international conflicts effectively and it endows the P5 with greater influence than any other UN member state. So, to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of the UN, reducing the power of the veto of the P5 on the UNSC is essential (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:399; Gould & Rablen, 2016:28). Although there is a lack of support for this from the P5 members, it is widely acknowledged that the veto right needs to be reformed (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161; Schaefer, 2016:10). Veto reform proposals include: the requirement to obtain affirmation from multiple states before exercising a veto, restricting the use of the veto to crucial national security issues, the cooperation of all P5 members alongside their consultation with the UNGA as stipulated in Article 106 of the Charter, and the elimination of the veto completely (UN, 1945:19). On the other hand, which PM would be willing to relinquish its veto right? The most popular proposed reform is to dilute the power of the veto without completely compromising the status of the P5 (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). In order to minimise the power of the veto, maybe there should be a requirement of two negative votes from the P5 instead of one. The most compelling reform proposals are the ones that address both the efficiency and the equity crisis within the UNSC, and therefore work towards the creation of a more legitimate Council.

The 2005 World Leaders' Summit

Following many demands by leaders, politicians, scholars and diplomats to reform the UNSC, the Secretary-General declared UNSC reform a salient issue. On 21 March 2005 the UNGA called for a World Leaders' Summit, which was instigated by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). Annan reiterated the saliency of the intractable issue of UNSC reform. At the Summit Annan distinctively presented UNSC reform as an important proposition of the 21st century. Annan presented his report *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*, commonly known as the Annan report, which set the international

organisation on route towards pursuing the most ambitious pathway for its reform since 1945 (Zifcak, 2006:136). Annan sought the cooperation of the UN in his comprehensive strategy of expanding the Council from 15 to 24 members (Annan, 2005). In the report Annan proposed two options for the implementation of the expansion of the UNSC. Although it was not explicit which proposal he favoured, the two options were labelled Models A and B (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). Model A proposed the creation of 6 new PMs with no veto and 3 new NPMs with a term of two years, for a renewed membership total of 24 members. Model B offered no new PMs, but recommended the creation of a new category of members in which 8 new seats would be renewable and 1 new seat would be non-renewable. The 8 new members would serve for a period of 4 years, subject to renewal, and the NPM seat would serve for a period of 2 years, non-renewable in Model B's proposal.

The proposals were adopted to reflect the four global regions (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). The four global regions are as follows: Africa, Asia-Pacific, the Americas and Europe. In terms of Model A, Africa would receive 2 PM seats with no veto, and 4 NPM seats, non-renewable, for a period of 2 years. Furthermore, the balance of power would remain in Europe's favour as the UK, France and Russia would preserve their veto power, as would the USA and China. Consequently, Africa would be the only region without a veto provision. Again, in Model B Africa gets the short end of the stick. Although Africa would receive 4 NPM seats, the USA and Europe benefit more because they would receive 2 NPM seats for a 4-year period and still preserve their veto provision. Hence, all regions in both models will acquire at least one veto right except for Africa, which will be the only region without a veto right. Nevertheless, in Annan's address to the UNGA, he did not state a preference for implementation of one model over the other; however, he advocated for the decision to be made quickly, saying that the imperative issue of UNSC reform had been "discussed for too long" now (Annan, 2005). Annan also highlighted the importance of the issue saying, "no reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council" (Zifcak, 2006:136). This shows how powerful the UNSC is to the international peacekeeping mission. The legitimacy of the UNSC is under threat. The statement by Annan highlights that without adaptation of the UNSC to reflect present conditions, the UN is unable to adjust to the global reality thereby, making it ineffective in ensuring international peace and security for all (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146).

What does the UNGA think about it all?

There is no debating the fact that the UNSC's legitimacy is under scrutiny (Binder & Heupel, 2015:239). The questions regarding the UNSC's legitimacy have preoccupied UN member states for the last two decades (Du Plessis, 2014:10; Schaefer, 2016:6). There is an ever-growing demand for an amendment of the Charter to transfer the power of the UNSC to the UNGA (Faizi, 2004:5216). The call to eradicate the UNSC is centred on the fact that the UNSC itself is undemocratic, so any pursuit to obtain a seat on the Council is self-defeating. The UNGA represents all the countries in the world, which suggests that the elimination of the UNSC would strengthen the principles of democracy within the UN (Faizi, 2004:5217). The idea is that all decisions can be made within the UN based on a two-thirds majority or a simple majority. This would encourage greater cooperation and democracy in the international body. The UNSC is a historical anachronism which needs to be reformed by the diminution of its power, or the Council needs to be dispensed with completely in order for the UN to become more relevant to the world which the UN serves to protect.

The way in which Binder and Heupel attempt to address the legitimacy deficit of the UNSC is by systematically examining UN member states' perception of the UNSC's legitimacy (2015:239). They do this by evaluating the UNGA debates. The UN member states either declare their approval or disapproval of the UNSC. The negative evaluations of the UNSC by UNGA member states far exceed the positive evaluations (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238). The findings also showed that states represented in the UNSC critique the UNSC less than the states that are not represented. Hence, the representational distortion is reinforced by the preferences of the over-represented or more powerful members (Gould & Rablen, 2016:23). Nevertheless, the UNSC is not suffering from a complete legitimacy crisis, because it does still possess a rudimentary degree of legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). States continually seek the UNSC's approval to justify their domestic and international actions (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:712; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Law, 2017:88). However, the basic standards of legitimacy are not met, because the UNSC is dominated by a handful of powerful elites as a result of the unfairness of the veto power granted 75 years ago after WWII. For the implementation of UNSC reform, this important organ needs the support of the UNGA to initiate reform procedures and so to be regarded as wholly legitimate (Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:141).

Conclusion

There is no denying that the UN Charter set up a rigid pattern created by decisions made during WWII (Schlesinger, 2003:168). The existence of the Charter explains the historical 'lock-in' effect based on the perpetuation of the main members' interests, which has greatly contributed to the intractable nature of UNSC reform (Baccarini, 2018:104). Any reform of the veto will be very difficult without the necessary ratification of the P5 members. The veto right must be modified or eliminated otherwise the UNSC will continue to reflect a world that no longer exists. Although there is currently a legitimacy crisis within the UNSC, states (especially in the global South and particularly in Africa) still pursue membership on the UNSC because of its expanded agenda after the end of the Cold War (Malone, 2000:3). There needs to be increased diplomacy between UNSC member states so that collective action can be taken to address various international crises and changes across the globe (Du Plessis, 2014:1; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641). Hence, an expansion of the UNSC is widely supported, but the lack of consensus on how to do this is undeniable (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161; Zifcak, 2006:136). It is essential that the UNSC is reformed to reflect the global reality and for it to become more representative of the emerging powers of the 21st century. Seeing as none of the literature on UNSC reform denounces the ambition to seek change, the need to pursue UNSC reform itself has become a norm (Schaefer, 2016:103). Furthermore, the UNSC's failure to adapt to the changing international geopolitical environment thus far means that it has in effect turned into a dinosaur that should have become extinct a long time ago.

Chapter 3

Through a Constructivist lens

Introduction

The need for reform of the UNSC has been a longstanding issue. The UNSC was established when the world was dominated by the economic, military and political strength of a few powerful state actors, predominantly in the Global North. Today, globalisation and the internationalisation of economic, social and political facets of life have meant that their identities are intertwined (Held, 1999:33). Constructivist theories are good at explaining change because they combine the ideational world with the material world. Ideational phenomena include identities, values, ideas, expectations, beliefs, norms and many more elements. The integration and decolonisation of countries, especially in the Global South, have established new powerful state actors. Since many emerging powers were born out of turmoil and change, it is crucial that they are provided with the platform needed for international governance to address the flux in the global political economy (GPE) (Naik, 2018:100). Constructivism is the lens deployed to explain geopolitical change and its resistance in the 21st century. Constructivism enables a theoretical elucidation of social change and institutions, grounded on the idea that reality is socially constructed through cognitive structures (the identities, norms and behaviour of international actors) (Alder, 1997:342). The UNSC is the preeminent institution for implementing the norms of global governance. Presently, four members of the P5 represent the Global North. The fact that the UN itself is questioning the legitimacy of the UNSC with the establishment of the *NEWG* proves that the need for UNSC reform is urgent (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). This presents an immense legitimacy problem for the UNSC, which seems increasingly anachronistic.

Why is change so hard? There are prominent actors who want change, but there are also prominent actors who want to maintain the existing norms of governance (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:163). International reality is socially formulated through different interpretations and assumptions that give meaning to material existence (Adler, 1997:320). Using a holistic approach, this chapter will begin by examining the origins of the discipline of International Relations (IR) to highlight what gave rise to the theory and method of constructivism. Contextualisation is essential. The chapter

will provide a clarification of the concepts of norms and norm dynamics to set the background for a discussion for the evolution of a norm as propounded in Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) *norm life cycle*. Along with an evaluation of the three stages of the *norm life cycle* – (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade and (3) norm internalisation – the domination of norm entrepreneurs in the field of norm dynamics is highlighted. There is a spectrum of roles that actors play in the norm dynamics cycle (Bloomfield, 2015:1). Scholars of norm dynamics have not studied sufficiently the opposition to endeavours to reform global norms, because they have failed to account for the counterpart of norm entrepreneurs, namely norm *antipreneurs*. This study attempts to rectify that.

Origins of International Relations

It is important to describe the historical cognitive process to explain how reality is formed and what gives rise to change. The formal institutionalisation of international relations began to a large extent after WWI, when a diverse array of scholars and politicians began to argue for a better-integrated system that would prevent the recurrence of another Great War (Brown, 2005:22). This institutionalisation culminated in a discipline which is now referred to as International Relations (capital 'I' and capital 'R') (Brown, 2005:1; Gaddis, 1992:10). Although international relations (lower case 'i' and 'r') existed prior to WWI, it was only after the war that theories of IR were formally established. The inauguration of the discipline was initially International Politics, which was introduced at Aberystwyth University in Wales in 1919 (Brown, 2005:22). The subject was believed to entail the promotion of something wider than academic discussions – and that was world peace. Historically, the conventional evolution of IR is referred to as the Great Debates in which a series of disagreements played out between a variety of academics (Booth, Cox & Dunne, 1998:2). According to Ashworth, the most compelling historical narrative was seen in the first Great Debates in the 1930s and 1940s (2002:33). This debate was between the realists and idealists and it laid down the foundation for the subsequent Great Debates (Ashworth, 2002:34).

The traditional theories of IR

Realism is regarded as the first big IR theory and its roots can be found in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 (March & Olsen, 1998:944). The idea of the territorial Westphalia nation-state system was built around the central importance of a specific political actor – the sovereign state. The state became the central focus of concern for the realists (Held, 1999:32). States' pursuit of power

determined every interaction in the international system (Brown, 2005: 25). In other words, realism is considered to be ‘state-centric’ (Booth *et al.*, 1998:65). World geography became defined by the evolution of national boundaries and principles of international relations became built upon an identity of the nation-state system (March & Olsen, 1998:944). In other words, the ‘balance of power’ system. The ‘balance of power’ is a notion parallel with the concept of power politics (the aim of increasing one’s state power). Consequently, conflict between European states became the onset for WWI. Although the nation-state roots were European, this eventually extended to encompass most of the world. The Treaty of Westphalia ended the massive devastation of the 30 Years’ War, which had been fought on religious (ideational) grounds. The devastating effects of WWI led to politicians and academics alike to question the utility of political realism. Idealism, more commonly known as liberalism today, became the second dominant theory of IR (Ashworth, 2002: 33; Brown, 2005:20). The biggest advocate of this theory was US President Woodrow Wilson, whose idealism focused on a long-lasting peace for the post-war world was set out in the Fourteen Points speech of January 1918 (Booth *et al.*, 1998:11; Brown, 2005:21). The Fourteen Points speech stated America’s aim to prevent another Great War by proposing the theory and culture of liberal internationalism.

The key concept underlying the prevention of war for liberalists was to establish modes of diplomatic negotiation and institutional structures; this theoretical conviction was instrumental in the establishment of the League of Nations (Brown, 2005:22). The ‘balance of power’, was the system in which the League of Nations was established in 1920. Idealists or utopians believed that international bodies such as the League of Nations possess actual power (Ashworth, 2002:34; Booth *et al.*, 1998:1; Brown, 2005:25; Gladdis, 1992:12). The League of Nations was founded to provide peace and security for all. A liberal belief was founded in the value of education (Brown, 2005:22). So it is not surprising that the first department of IR was established in 1919 at Aberystwyth University in Wales. The idea was that the systematic study of IR would lead to the promotion of peace, international law and the League of Nations. ‘Collective security’ and cooperation are crucial norms to liberalists (Ashworth, 2002:48; Brown, 2005:22). The foundation here lay in the principle ‘one for all and all for one’ guaranteeing the security of all countries, which would inevitably prevent another Great War (Brown, 2005:21). A fundamental belief of liberalism was that the anarchic system of international relations prior to 1914 compromised the likelihood of peace. In order to prevent totalitarianism, Wilson advocated for democracy in his

idealist system (Brown, 2005:22). However, Wilson was one of the only statesmen at the time advocating for the idealist system and he battled to sell the concept to his colleagues. Wilson failed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference for being naively idealistic and this laid the foundations for WWII (Schild, 1995:26). The US Senate refused to join the League of Nations and this contributed to the inability of the organisation to prevent WWII (Booth *et al.*, 1998:1; Brown, 2005:23; Wilcox, 1945:954).

The first Great Debate, a disagreement between the idealists and realists, took place at the end of the 1930s and during WWII (Booth *et al.*, 1998:1). This Debate was significant in demonstrating the domination of realism and the marginalisation of liberalism (Ashworth, 2002:34). With the failure of the League of Nations, realists rejected the notion of collective security (Ashworth, 2002:48). The most important contributors to realist thinking can be traced back to the works of E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau (Ashworth, 2002:48; Booth *et al.*, 1998:10; Gaddis, 1992:7). Carr's publication entitled *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, gives the best summation of the polarisation between idealists and realists (Booth *et al.*, 1998:1). Carr's book was published in September 1939, the precise month WWII broke out. In general, utopians emphasize the opportunities in IR and realists emphasize the limitations (Booth *et al.*, 1998:65). Realism is concerned with the prevention of war and focuses this through the 'balance of power'. Morgenthau published a series of books, the most influential of which in the creation of a modern IR theory was *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, in 1948 (Ashworth, 2002:34; Brown, 2005:29; Gaddis, 1992:7). The book boils international relations down to states' pursuit of their own interests, which is equated to power (Brown, 2005:30). Morgenthau also incorporated normative factors such as morality, nationalism and international law, and how these influence global politics by limiting states' exercise of power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). Both authors exposed idealism as a failure. The evident inability of the liberal internationalists to cope with the international events occurring during the 1930s gave rise to the rediscovery of previous concepts intrinsic to the theory of realism (Brown, 2005:24). Traditional realists utilised history as a source to which they could apply their theory, rather than studying the context of historical patterns (Ashworth, 2002:33). Therefore, realism – or in other words, a verifiable science of politics – succeeded in the context of the 'balance of power' because it offered a compelling explanation for the war, a promising policy prescription and a hope for valid future predictions (Booth *et al.*, 1998:1; Gaddis, 1992:12).

IR became significant as a field of study in the post-WWII era. Many scholars debated the functions and assumptions related to the interactions between different actors in the international system. The second Great Debate in the 1950s and 1960s created a division between the behavioural scientific approaches and the traditional approaches in IR (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:11). The traditional theories encompassed a more humanistic or moral outlook versus behaviourist theories, which relied on empirical data. In the post-war era, realism triumphed over liberalism. Although realism did not place emphasis on the study of its own historical evolution, it offered more measurable data in its historical outlook (Ashworth, 2002:33). Since the norms of IR were built upon the identity of the nation-state system, the first half of the 20th century was plagued with wars. This created a suitable environment for realists to advance their theory (March & Olsen, 1998:944). However, by the end of the 20th century, the geopolitical context was considerably different. The further integration of the international system created a need for increased cooperation. Institutions were established to facilitate interdependence and economic cooperation; they included the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Economic Community (EEC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Brown, 2005:128; Keohane & Nye, 1977:9). In the 1970s and 1980s the theory of realism was subjected to increasing criticism for its obsession with the state and its neglect of any concepts outside the political-military realm (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:9). This gave rise to another theory that explained the shift in priority from the state to the global economy.

Contrary to what many believe, one of the longest standing theories in IR is Marxism (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:14). Vladimir Lenin provided one of the first major contributions to the formal study of global politics in his *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* in 1916, even though the first department of IR was established only in 1919 (Brown, 2005:22). Marxists are concerned with social and economic conditions, especially with the notion of class. They are particularly concerned with the emancipation of the working class. Class is believed to affect every aspect of an individual's life, from their economic systems to their cultural frameworks to their legal systems. The conflicts in the second half of the 20th century were not only geographical or ideological contests, but more importantly the Cold War established a clear socio-economic division between capitalist Western countries and communist Eastern countries. The class struggle at the end of the 20th century meant that Marxism became recognised as the legitimate alternative approach to realism in the third Great Debate in IR (Keohane & Nye, 1977:179; Neumann &

Wæver, 1997:12). Marxism proved that conflict can develop between different social classes (especially within and across state borders), which subsequently influences the interaction between agents in the international system (Adler, 1997:324; Ashworth, 2002:33; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903; Neumann & Wæver, 1997:14).

The origins of constructivism

It is important that we question everything (Cox, 1981:121). Constructivism has its conceptual roots in Critical International Theory, which emerged in the 1980s (Cox, 1981:126; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998:260). The main question that motivated critical IR literature was ‘How do theories go about explaining the nature of international politics’. The most recent concepts in IR have been critical in their analysis of what the function of traditional theories is in world politics. Are they supposed to explain and predict events in the political world? The end of the Cold War, a war between the capitalist West and the communist East, turned out to be problematic for the big traditional IR theories (Adler, 1997:342; Gaddis, 1992:5). Constructivism emerged at the closing of the Cold War to explain the behaviour of actors in the international system, and correspondingly the international system itself. Like the traditional theories of IR, constructivism emerged in response to an unanticipated international event.

Predictions of the future demand an awareness of the past (Gaddis, 1992:6). After WWII the hegemony of the USA was undisputed as various American-endorsed institutions were created to assist global growth and economic cooperation (Booth *et al.*, 1998:99; Neumann & Wæver, 1997:19). These institutions included the World Bank (an international financial organisation aimed at providing assistance and loans to countries all over the world), the IMF (an organisation working towards securing global monetary cooperation) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO – an intergovernmental military alliance, which consolidates the concept of a collective defence against aggression from an external party). The regime of the dictator Joseph Stalin from 1924 until 1953 transformed the Soviet Union from an agrarian society into an industrial and military superpower. In the second half of the 20th century the Cold War established a bipolar world order where the USA and the USSR imposed the majority of military, economic and cultural norms (Baccarini, 2018:103). Suddenly, the international system focused on social and economic conditions worldwide. More specifically, conflict developed between different social classes across state borders. The USSR-funded communist countries all over the world and,

correspondingly, the USA did the same with capitalist countries. The separate identities of the USA and the USSR shaped the interactions between political agents all over the world. This world system meant that only the USA and USSR had the capability to threaten each other's existence; this world order represented a 'balance of power' between two states (Brown, 2005:43).

When the Soviet Union collapsed in the late 1980s, the Cold War bipolar system became history (Huntington, 1996:4). Soviet jurisdiction was unseated worldwide and the USA became the unipolar power (Booth *et al.*, 1998:98). But how? The 'balance of power', collective security or the emancipation of the working class could provide an explanation for the sudden demise of the Cold War. Realism, liberalism and Marxism were unable to explain, never mind predict, the end of the Cold War. All three tended to depict politics as a reflection of society, political behaviour as a product of calculated self-interest, political action as the aggregate consequences of independent behaviours, and the distribution of resources and decision-making powers as the core of political life (March & Olsen, 1984:734). Constructivism emerged as an alternative theory. What is the point of theories if they do not give greater insight into important future IR events? The closing of the Cold War motivated social constructivism to ask how IR theories emerged and to examine the way in which they go about explaining international politics. Constructivism investigated the events that seemed systematically unimportant during the Cold War to prove that these phenomena, in fact, gave rise to the unpredictable end of the antagonistic relations. For example, the Soviet dissident movement which began after Stalin's death in 1953 fuelled the decline of the Soviet Union (Adler, 1997:342). Another event fuelling the delegitimisation of the Soviet Union was the Chernobyl disaster, which was a nuclear accident that occurred in 1986 in Ukraine (a Soviet Socialist Republic) and was rated under the maximum severity classification for nuclear disasters. On the eve of 1989 and 1990, the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled the demise of communist regimes all over eastern Europe (Booth *et al.*, 1998:43; Brown, 2005:208). Communism was challenged worldwide because of the unusual circumstances that had materialised in domestic communities in Eastern Europe. Hence, constructivism emerged in the 1980s to show that changes in the political context and the normative environment occurred, for example, in the practices and conventions of the communist world, long before these changes were evident in the material world, which eventually led to the end of the Cold War.

Constructivists believe that the construction of the world, or in other words what is perceived as reality, is as much physical as it is ideationally constructed (Adler, 1997:320; Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:3). Essentially, the idea that global politics is socially constructed through the combination of the ideational and material facets of existence explains how and why change can occur (Adler, 1997:319). Ideational phenomena include identities, values, ideas, expectations, beliefs, norms, and many other elements. International reality is socially formulated through different interpretations and assumptions, which give meaning to material existence (Adler, 1997:320). Hence, ideational factors such as norms are central to the theory of constructivism. Constructivism explains that norms influence agents of change in the global system. What are agents of change? Political agents in the global system describe the interactions between actors with specific identities, interests and behaviour. Consequently, actors are influenced by norms which are socially constructed through collective perceptions and meanings about the world (Adler, 1997:324). Norms, as defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:895), are a “standard of appropriateness” pursued by actors with a specific shared identity. Norms are central to this study.

How constructivism and norms explain the world

Normative issues and norms’ influence on political actors’ behaviour and subsequently on international interactions have been addressed since the discipline of IR emerged (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). IR scholars have questioned the concepts of good and bad and their influence on human behaviour. The assumptions created are often political in their analysis and determine the nature of further political analysis. Take for example, the Greek philosophers Aristotle and Plato in the 4th century BCE and the way they influenced subsequent philosophical thinking. Another example is Carr’s analysis in the 20th century of political action and its coordination with issues of morality and power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). However, Carr’s analysis of realism fails strictly because it excludes important characteristics of politics such as moral judgement and emotional appeals to support political objectives. This belief in the need to understand social purpose and legitimacy was pivotal to the evolution of politics and it continued through the 1950s and 1960s. Even realists such as Morgenthau wrote about how nationalism, international law and principles of morality restrict states’ exercise of power.

Early IR studies conducted on normative issues – human rights, decolonisation, European integration – acknowledged that a lot of UN activity relied on establishing norms; however, the

UN often failed to theorize the origin, function and scope of these normative processes (Claude, 1966:372; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). For example, Inis Claude's research on the development of the UN in world affairs and how the legitimising functions of the UN became increasingly important (Claude, 1966:367). Likewise, IR scholars acknowledged that the process of decolonisation and European integration was propelled by a profoundly normative agenda (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). Nonetheless, ideational and normative concepts have been extensively covered by IR scholarship for quite some time now (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889).

Different theories of IR have socially constructed the identities, interests and practices of powerful political actors. Political actors subsequently progressively depended on their IR theory of choice because it became a defining part of their identity (Adler, 1997:344). Norms of IR were built upon the identity of the nation-state system (March & Olsen, 1998:944). Take the P5 nations, for example; their pursuit of power with the veto right was very much based on the 'balance of power' system in line with the most prominent post-WWII theory, namely realism (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:9). It is important to highlight this because the identities of the P5 have shaped their behaviour in their resistance to relinquishing power in the Council today (Alder, 1997:342). The 'balance of power' system became further entrenched during WWII and it was not until the 1970s or 1980s that the system and the theory of realism faced increased criticism (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:9). The globalised, post-Cold War world had set up a further integrated international system. Hence, realism's obsession with the state and its neglect of any concept outside of the political-military realm became outdated (Neumann & Wæver, 1997:9).

Since the emergence of constructivism in the 1980s, IR has acknowledged the function of domestic communities (and norms) in bringing about changes in the political and international realm (Alder, 1997:344). Domestic events fuelled the demise of communism and the end of the Cold War. Fundamentally, the epistemic, domestic, regional and international dimensions cannot be separated from each other (Alder, 1997:344; Cox, 1981:121). In the globalised era of the 21st century nothing can be studied in isolation. The globalisation of the international system cannot be understood as a singular or discrete process or condition (Held, 1999:33). Globalisation is an ongoing process that encapsulates the changes shaping international politics; globalisation can be understood as the decline of the significance of national borders and the nation-state system (Held, 1999:33; March & Olsen, 1998:944). The practice of state sovereignty has always been in conflict

with the reality of state autonomy (Held, 1999:32). State sovereignty is no longer the central focus of IR as the identities of states are increasingly intertwined and changing over time. Globalisation is a combination of processes that have transformed the spatial configuration of human organisation from internally oriented to internationally oriented. It is the expansion of institutions and social relations to such an extent that human activities on one side of the globe are effectively influencing daily activities of those on the other side of the globe. Constructivism establishes that the processes of globalisation can have consequential effects on the international community (Adler, 1997:324).

Since the emergence of constructivism, the literature on norms has become a dominant feature of IR research (Bloomfield, 2015:1). Norms are influential in establishing and maintaining stability (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891;903). International relations are obsessed with maintaining or sustaining stability (Keohane, 1988:380). Norm theory has been broadly applied to the study of international institutions (such as the UN) because emergent norms have become increasingly institutionalised in the form of multilateral organisations since 1948 (Claude, 1966:370; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). The constant flux of the international system has influenced the evolution of interventionist norms such as the humanitarian norm, which seeks to promote human wellbeing and stability. Humanitarian interventions seek to limit the effects of armed conflict and, more specifically, protect people in the line of fire. States, acting through the UNSC have increasingly intervened to protect citizens other than their own since the end of the Cold War (Alder, 1997:344; Finnemore, 1996:153; Szasz, 1983:346). The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, which was endorsed by the UN at the 2005 World Summit, encouraged this behaviour (Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:2). The R2P norm is a global political commitment ratified by all the UN member states to combat four key areas of concern which threaten the security of global populations: crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Take, for example Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:9; Finnemore, 1996:153; Granja, 2017:18). The main goal of the UN interventions was not territorial gains, as the nation-state system might have suggested. In Cambodia the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was a peacekeeping operation in 1992, which became the first instance in which the UN took over the administration of an independent state (Finnemore, 1996:168). There were no obvious national interests at stake just as with lots of the UNSC post-Cold War

interventions. Constructivism explains the change and the adoption of sustainable development norms such as humanitarian norms (Adler, 1997:343; Finnemore, 1996:161).

Constructivism and norm theory explain the emergence of new standards of appropriateness that were created through the process of globalisation and the end of the Cold War (Adler, 1997:324). The end of the Cold War initiated the discovery of new global preferences by powerful regional actors in the UNSC. The globalised world has intensified the demand for UNSC reform to incorporate the norms of diverse powerful actors, particularly from the Global South. There is substantial inequity between the UNSC members: firstly, the NPM regional groupings of the EE and WEOG are over-represented when compared to Africa and Asia; and secondly, the majority (4) of the P5 members represent the Global North (Gould & Rablen, 2013:24). The effects of globalisation and the end of the Cold War have highlighted the fact that global governance norms within the UNSC have over-represented the Global North. This is unrepresentative of powerful actors' identities today. Consequently, this has created inefficiencies in the global mission of ensuring international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

The emergence of new global governance norms

Contextualisation is essential to understanding an issue: *Why is UNSC reform so hard?* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:888). With the emergence of IR scholarship and the institutionalisation of the UN, many scholars in the discipline recognized the importance of UNSC actors in establishing norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Although the USA, a P5 member, has held a key power position in the international system, especially since the end of the Cold War, its recent years of economic decline are in contrast with many other smaller countries experiencing economic growth (Brown, 2005:46; Naik, 2018:100). The ever-evolving world has produced a number of new powerful international actors, especially from the Global South (Naik, 2018:100). Emerging countries have acknowledged this and they have grouped themselves with other countries who share similar goals. An example of such a grouping is the G4, where two countries from the Global North (Germany and Japan) and two countries from the Global South (Brazil and India) have grouped together to initiate global governance reform (Ariyuruk, 2005:205; Baccarini, 2018:99; Schirm, 2010:201). Another example is BRICS, which consists of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Many new interregional groups such as these have emerged as representatives for the Global South to advocate for reformist initiatives in the current world order (Naik, 2018:100).

The rising powers in the 21st century hope to coordinate a multipolar world reality of governance because globalisation requires it (Ashworth, 2002:113; Naik, 2018:100). This calls for the expansion of global governance norms, especially in the preeminent organisation responsible for establishing and maintaining international peace and security – the UNSC.

The application of norm theory indicates that the UNSC is incapable of formulating collective responses for the globe because the UNSC is not representative of the globe (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:632). Although the R2P norm has been accepted internationally, it has not always been implemented effectively because the Global South is underrepresented in the UNSC (Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:2). Examples would be the NATO-led intervention in Libya and the failure in Syria. The Libyan intervention was led by American and British naval forces (including European forces), which meant that these actors' guidelines were pursued instead of those of the African or Libyan actors' guidelines for intervention on their continent (Fox, Boon & Jenkins, 2017:655; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:632). A very similar situation occurred in Syria. Although the majority of the UNSC peacekeeping interventions occur in the Global South, the UNSC over-represents the Global North through its global governance norms. Nonetheless, peacekeeping has become the most frequently spoken about and utilised instruments of the preeminent multilateral organisation (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Fox *et al*, 2018:654; Karlsrud, 2015:152). The UNSC is influential in the diffusion of new global political norms, so it should represent the globe accordingly (Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:632).


Constructivism is able to explain the ideational value of the UNSC. Much like its predecessor, the League of Nations, also a multilateral organisation conceived in the spirit of global cooperation, the UNSC was born in an entrenched 'balance of power' system. Constructivism highlights the ideational value of the agents of the UNSC, which influences the type of global governance norms emanating from the institution and the resistance of the institution to relinquishing any aspect of its power. The inability of the UNSC to represent global governance norms worldwide is having devastating impacts on the international system. The increase of different actors from the Global South in the UNSC will provide more appropriate guidelines for interventions across the globe (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). This will contribute to more peaceful international interactions. Furthermore, international macroeconomic and macro-political stability will be promoted (Gould & Rablen, 2017:161).

This is a norm dynamics study

Macro-level theorizing suggests how norms produce stability, but there has been little empirical research done on how norms change (Bloomfield, 2015:1). Since the emergence of constructivism, norm dynamics has become a dominant element in the study of global politics (Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:1). The theory and method of constructivism address the concept of change. Norm dynamics cycles provide a framework for studying the evolution of norms (Bloomfield, 2015:2; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891; March & Olsen, 1998:951). According to constructivists, a range of diverse actors play distinctive roles in the overall norm dynamics cycles. Yet despite years of research by constructivists, there are no consensually agreed frameworks formulated as to why norms emerge, develop and adjust over time. Furthermore, there is no complete understanding as to how one should approach the reform of global governance norms. But for the purposes of this study, it is important to highlight again the contribution of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work, entitled *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, which has provided crucial insights that inform this constructivist approach. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:887) argue that norms develop in a recurring *life cycle* and different behavioural logics influence different stages of the *life cycle*.

Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle*

Figure 2. *Finnemore and Sikkink's Norm Life Cycle*



(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896)

Understanding the *norm life cycle* is crucial to explaining the internalisation of global governance norms present within the UNSC and, accordingly, the emergence of new norms of global governance. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have utilised the constructivist lens extensively to discuss UN organisations and international organisations in the GPE (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:73; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:888). The principal aim of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm dynamics research was to theorise the emergence and dissemination of norms that change the role of actors in the international system (Bloomfield, 2015:2). The *norm life cycle* is a model that follows the evolution of a norm from its inception, through its international socialisation and its adoption. The influence of norms can be interpreted as a dynamic three-stage process: (1) norm emergence, (2) norm cascade, and (3) norm internalisation (Bloomfield, 2015:3; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Each stage of the *norm life cycle* is distinctive in its mechanisms of change, motives, actors and influence. The norm dynamic theory has been applied across a variety of topics in the field of political science (more specifically IR) such as women's studies, gender studies, international organisations, management and many more (Karlsrud, 2015; Kelley, 2008; Krook & True, 2010; Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:1). Like these studies, this research undertakes a thorough evaluation of each of the three stages of the *norm life cycle* by Finnemore & Sikkink (1998). Norm origins, which inform norm emergence, always stress human agency (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). As previously highlighted, agents of change are extremely important in the development of a constructivist lens. Political agents' cognitive structures and

identities are influential in the formation of global norms (Acharya, 2004:239). Norms function at the epistemic level, where they influence actors' behaviour in their daily lives (Romaniuk & Grice, 2018:2). Hence, norms apply to many different actors in the international system (Bloomfield, 2015:1), but norm entrepreneurs are imperative in the first stage of the *norm life cycle*.

Norm entrepreneurs

Finnemore and Sikkink refer to actors who create an emergent norm as norm entrepreneurs (1998:893). Norm entrepreneurs highlight issues, such as same-sex marriage, to call attention to them. Norm entrepreneurs are actors who attempt to change the existing normative structure to accord with the norms and ideas that they believe to be more appropriate. Consequently, new norms are produced to influence/change the behaviour of actors in the international system, specifically states. To successfully diffuse a new norm, entrepreneurs must take advantage of crises disrupting the international order to pave the way for the implementation of new norms or change (Bloomfield, 2015:17). An emergent stage of a norm is usually indicated by an actor/actors with strong perspectives on their domestic position. For example, Michael McConnell and Jack Baker were among the first same-sex couples to apply for a license to marry in the US state of Minnesota in 1971 (*Baker v. Nelson for Same-sex Marriage* 191 N.W.2d 185, 1971). But same-sex marriage began to be legalised internationally only in the beginning of the 21st century. Norm entrepreneurs tend to utilise international norms to reinforce their minority position on domestic issues (Finnemore & Sikkink; 1998:893). Gay marriages are now officially recognized in over 20 countries.

Domestic influences and norm entrepreneurs are the most prominent at the early stages of the *norm life cycle*; these influences lessen once the norm becomes internationally instituted. The distinctive attribute of the first stage of the *norm life cycle*, also known as norm emergence, is moral pressure exerted by norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). The main aim of international norm entrepreneurs is to attempt to persuade a significant number of states, which translates into state leaders, to adopt new norms. In most 'norm development' studies, the norm origins generally emphasize human agency as the distinctive feature or method (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). This means that norms do not appear haphazardly; norms are generated by actors with powerful conceptions of what is appropriate or preferable modes of conduct. Thus, norm entrepreneurs are crucial to the emergence of a norm because they systematically call attention to problems by using

provocative language, dramatisations and new interpretations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897). At the end of the day, what motivates norm entrepreneurs is often exclusively related to values that are altruistic, empathetic and contain an element of ideational commitment (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898). Take the P5 norm entrepreneurs, for example; their motives in establishing the UN in 1945 encompassed all three of these qualities with the political goal of achieving wellbeing and security for all.

Stage 1: norm emergence

Many international norms began as domestic norms and transformed into international norms. For example, the capitalist norm originated in Scotland and was transferred globally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). Adam Smith is regarded as the founding theorist of capitalism and he originates from Scotland. Capitalism was actively propounded by Smith and other actors with strong conceptions about what they thought was appropriate and preferable economic behaviour for their community. Hence, norm entrepreneurs are vital for the emergence of a norm because they frame problem areas to challenge normative status quos. To succeed, norm entrepreneurs must make two strategic advances (Bloomfield, 2015:13). Firstly, they must establish a normative issue, which justifies the instigation of justifiable attacks on the underlying ethics of the normative status quo (Bloomfield, 2015:14). There is no such thing as a normative vacuum; instead new norms emerge in an extremely contested normative space where norm entrepreneurs must battle with one another to reinforce their perceptions of interest (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897). The role of norm entrepreneurs contributes to our understanding of the implications involved in the relationship between logics of appropriateness and norms (March & Olsen, 1998:949). To challenge pre-existing logics of appropriateness, norm entrepreneurs may act deliberately “inappropriately” (possibly through acts of organised civil disobedience) to call attention to an issue even though standards of appropriateness are exactly what is being contested (March & Olsen, 1998:950). For example, the ways in which suffragettes sought the right to be politically included was through organised protest such as hunger strikes, abstaining from paying taxes, vandalising government buildings and others (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897). Inappropriate actions, which may bring about legal punishment or social exclusion as a consequence, can be powerful instruments for entrepreneurs seeking to send a message about a normative issue. It is unusual not to reference altruism, empathy and ideational commitment when referring to the

motivations behind norm entrepreneurs. For example, norm entrepreneurs perform inappropriate acts to the benefit of others, even if doing so may be to the detriment of their own wellbeing (March & Olsen, 1998:949). The essence of altruism, empathy and ideational commitment is a “shared perception about a common humanity”, that we all share common characteristics, which entitles us to the same rights or treatment (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898). Lastly, the obvious second strategic advancement that entrepreneurs must make is that the new norm they propose must offer a practical solution to the contested issue (Bloomfield, 2015:14).

All norm entrepreneurs who promote norms at an international level need some kind of organisational platform from which they can disseminate their new norm (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:163; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). These platforms are often structured specifically to promote the new norm. Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are constructed precisely to promote a new norm, for example, Greenpeace. Frequently, however, entrepreneurs work from already established platforms (for example, the P5 members acting through the UNSC). As such, these platforms have other purposes or agendas other than simply promoting the new norm. Thus, the agenda of the organisation determines the type of norm promoted significantly. The main aim of norm entrepreneurs is to attempt to persuade a significant number of states, or in other words a significant mass of leaders, to endorse their new norm (Bloomfield, 2015:3). This is known as the ‘tipping point’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). It ensures the more extensive diffusion of the norm (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:163). Different organisational platforms provide different instruments for entrepreneurs to do so (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). An international organisation such as the UN, although not tailored specifically for norm promotion, may leverage resources to coerce weak or developing states to endorse their new norm. Though, persuasion is often more of an option rather than coercion as in the case of NGOs. Norm entrepreneurs must convert what is perceived as appropriate into being regarded as inappropriate, especially in the eyes of the opponents protecting the status quo (March & Olsen, 1998:949).

For an emerging norm to meet a threshold and progress to the second stage of the *norm life cycle*, it must be institutionalised into a specific set of international regulations and organisations. Institutionalisation is not conditional for the norm to cascade; however, institutionalisation is a vital component of the *norm life cycle* and it often precedes or follows the cascading of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Since 1948 emergent norms have increasingly become

institutionalised in the order of multilateral organisations, as in the case of the UN. Such institutionalisation contributes heavily to the probability for a norm to cascade, because it specifies what the content of the norm is and what constitutes a violation of the norm (March & Olsen, 1984:736). This clarifies the process of norm breaking. Once norm entrepreneurs have persuaded a critical mass of states to endorse their new norm and become norm leaders, the process has reached the tipping point or threshold of the new norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:901). It is important that powerful states endorse the new norm (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:163). Approximately one third of the total number of states in a system must endorse the emergent norm for it to reach a tipping point. After the emergent norm reaches a threshold, it enters the second stage of the *norm life cycle*.

Stage 2: norm cascade

Before this second stage, little normative change occurs without domestic support (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Once the tipping point has been reached, a new dynamic kicks in. An increasing number of countries start adopting the norm with or without domestic support for the change. The political norm priority shifts from being domestically oriented to internationally oriented. The dominant mechanism of the norm cascade stage is an active undertaking of international socialisation, which is meant to persuade norm breakers to turn into norm followers. Diplomatic or multilateral endorsement is essential to the socialisation of a norm in the international context. States, networks of norm entrepreneurs and international organisations are all agents of the operation of norm socialisation (Romaniuk & Grice, 2018). The mechanism through which norm leaders persuade other actors to cooperate – or in other words, international socialisation – is the primary feature of norm cascade. Hence, institutionalisation of the new norm is an important mechanism in the norm cascade stage.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that states adhere to the new norm for reasons that relate to their identities as members of the international community; this is what motivates states to comply quickly to the new norm (1998:902). State identity determines state behaviour and state identity is constructed by the cultural-institutional arena in which states belong. Members of a particular community follow particular norms (March & Olsen, 1984:734; 1998:946). For example, the Cold War division evinced separate guidelines for actors' behaviour: either capitalist 'Western' ideals or communist 'Eastern' ideals. Both the norms and their powerful endorsers enter into the realm

of reinvention, where a shift in the political actors' identities, interests and practices is brought about (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). The degree to which states fashion a certain identity in relation to their international context indicates that the concept of the cumulative effect of socialisation may be a consequence of peer pressure among countries. The three probable motivations for countries complying to such peer pressure are legitimisation, esteem and conformity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). Legitimation is crucial to states in that it shapes their political behaviour. Being classified as a 'rogue state' means the loss of reputation, credibility and trust in international interactions. This implies that the end of the Cold War was sparked by a loss of the credibility of communist states (Alder, 1997:344). International legitimisation is imperative for citizen's perceptions of domestic legitimacy. Esteem is imperative for state leaders, thus their desire to protect their esteem can compel them to follow a norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). Domestic legitimacy means that citizens believe that the prevailing political institution is better than other alternatives and thus citizens conform. Conforming to the behaviour of the actors around us fulfils a psychological need to belong to a group.

Stage 3: norm internalisation

After norm cascade, a powerful mechanism contributing to the consolidation and internationalisation of norms is habitual behaviour. At this stage, conformity to the norm is practically automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). Hence, internalised norms are immensely powerful (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:163). An influential mechanism adding to the consolidation and universalisation of a norm after it has undergone international socialisation is iterated actions and habits (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:905). Consequently, behaviour in accordance with the norm is not questioned and difficult to discern. Recurring interactions among people eventually establish predictability, trust and stability. After the norm has been internalised into the leaders' and actors' identities, a taken-for-granted quality is established and consequently moulds their behaviour (to become predictable, trustworthy and consistent) (Bloomfield, 2015:4; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:892). Furthermore, the mechanisms of integration and internalisation are indirect and evolutionary. Fundamentally, routes to normative change may be evolutionary and indirect and, correspondingly, system changes that can induce new political procedures may lead to indirect and evolutionary ideational, normative and political consolidation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:905). When they become established, political institutions evince a resilient social structure.

Institutions set up resistance to change because they provide meaning and stability in social life. The relative autonomy of political institutions and the norms they permeate has created resistance to reform in the UNSC (March & Olsen, 1984:736). As the dominant norm dynamics model, Finnemore and Sikkink's 1998 *norm life cycle* (Bloomfield, 2015:3) explains these processes. However, the dominance of this model has created substantial inefficiencies for future norm dynamics research on the resistance to emerging norms.

The introduction of norm *antipreneurs* in the field

It is essential to theorise 'resistance' in the field. Social changes redefine the political world and, in turn, norms changes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Although, Finnemore and Sikkink acknowledge the fact that new norms must combat or defy other norms or perceptions of appropriateness, they do not conceptualise those actors who resist and the way in which they resist (Bloomfield, 2015:4; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894). This has created a case selection bias in the norm dynamics literature in general. Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* was one of the first and dominant models in the early wave of norm dynamics research; subsequently, many scholars have complied with it since. The problem highlighted by Bloomfield, and in many other norm dynamics studies, is that it presents the norm being studied as fixed (2015:4). The process of diffusing and establishing the norm is seen as a dynamic process, however, the actual norm itself is seen as stable (unchanging) (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891). Not only are norms essential to theorising international macroeconomic and macro political stability (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161), but it is equally important to study change and the reasons why change is met with resistance (Alder, 1997:344). Norms are not static and therefore we should not treat them as independent variables for the purpose of analysis. Understanding actors and the roles they play within the context of normative contestation is significant to achieving the aim of this study.

Furthermore, studies of norm dynamics lack research that is focused on conceptualising the role of opposition to the emergence of global norms – the "resistance to normative change" (Bloomfield, 2015:1). This has created an imbalance in the literature on norm dynamics. Norm dynamics scholars have failed to take sufficient account of the counterpart of norm entrepreneurs, therefore they have not studied the opposition to endeavours to reform global norms sufficiently

(Bloomfield, 2015:2). Consequently, there is an over-emphasis on the role of actors who establish new global norms - norm entrepreneurs. The study of norm dynamics has become impaired and biased towards cases that promote new global norms rather than cases that call for the reform of established global norms. The oppositional role of norm *antipreneurs* is increasingly being acknowledged in the literature. Norm *antipreneurs* (resisters) safeguard the normative status quo against norm entrepreneurs (changers) who want to alter the normative status quo. Acknowledging the role of *antipreneurs* will facilitate the recognition of a spectrum of roles that actors could play when there is pursuit to reform global norms. Norm entrepreneurs and norm *antipreneurs* are simply at opposite ends of the spectrum and they represent the extreme cases. An analysis of these powerful roles provides better clarification of the dynamic interactions between agents in the context of UNSC reform of global governance norms. Consequently, the recognition in the literature of the different roles that actors might play in norm dynamics *literature* enables a more balanced and unbiased conduct of study.

Bloomfield outlines three significant issues that arose from the ‘frozen’ approach to studying norm dynamics (2015:4). For example, Krook and True (2010) illustrate and compare the norm evolution of two global gender norms: gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming. Karlsrud (2015) illustrates the importance of norm emergence with specific reference to the UN peacekeeping norm. Kelley (2008) discusses the emergence of international election monitoring. The first problem is that these studies have created a standard of compliance with Finnemore and Sikkink’s *norm life cycle*, which has inevitably added to the superiority of Western-liberal normative frameworks. Subsequent scholars have become submissive norm followers and this has hindered active contribution to debates and resistance to dominant normative frameworks.

The second problem that emerged is a specific liberal-oriented bias which has developed among scholars in the field. Many scholars have pursued the study of Western liberal norms and their diffusion such as human rights norms, gender equality and democracy (Karlsrud, 2015; Kelley, 2008; Krook & True, 2010). Thus, the pervasive premise research has been that the Western norm entrepreneurs led the non-Western norm followers. The third problem that crept in was a one-dimensional selection of norm dynamics case studies. Essentially, most norm cases that have been studied are successful examples of norms that have been diffused and entrenched in the

international system; so contestation has not been thoughtfully addressed (Bloomfield, 2015:5). The resistance to norm emergence has been mentioned within the discipline only with regard to its failure (Bloomfield, 2015:5).

Take for example the 1999 volume on *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. The book begins by referencing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was adopted by the UNGA in 1948, and the impact and entrenchment of this norm worldwide (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink, 1999:1). The book develops a five stage ‘spiral norm model’, which outlines the socialisation of norms (Risse *et al.*, 1999:6). Human rights norms are accorded a special status in the book by specifying guidelines for appropriate behaviour and determining the identities of liberal states (Risse *et al.*, 1999:8). This has created the perception that human rights norm diffusion is a process by which specific states (with specific liberal identities) are welcomed into the liberal community once they have conformed to sound human rights. The book also goes on to distinguish liberal states as having community norms such as democracy, human rights and peaceful coexistence. Resistance in the model is mentioned in the third stage only as a delaying effect rather than a suspension effect, with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests referenced in this delay (Risse *et al.*, 1999:25-26). All the problems identified by Bloomfield (2015:4) are present in the norm socialisation model that Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999) put forward. Firstly, the specific states have no real agency other than denying or accepting the human rights norm prerequisites or suggesting institutional modifications (Bloomfield, 2015:5). Secondly, a liberal bias pervades the ‘spiral norm model’. Thirdly, despite the reference to how repression (a concession to the third diffusion stage) may result in the delay of the norm socialisation process, there is still a sense that the GPE is consistently developing towards a more peaceful, virtuous and ‘liberal’ environment. The spiral model is permeated with Western liberal state cases and liberal norm entrepreneurs are over-emphasized as the actors of change (Bloomfield, 2015:6). A case could be made that fascist organisations were also promoted by norm entrepreneurs.

On the contrary, Amitav Acharya has analysed the resistance to normative change, notably in his work titled *How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism* (2004). The contestation about global norm diffusion is not simply about why ideas make a difference, but it is also about whose ideas make a difference (Acharya,

2004:239). Many local ideas already constitute part of a legitimate international normative system that shapes the adoption of global norms. Hence, Acharya suggests that the norm socialisation process is a contestation between different domestic normative communities (2004:240). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is referenced in Acharya's evidence. At the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the ASEAN countries were faced with two proposals to reconstruct their institutional apparatus. The first was the establishment of a multilateral security institution based on the 'common security' norm, and the second was to develop the ASEAN model to adhere to international interventions in addressing transnational issues (Acharya, 2004:241). Instead, the local ASEAN actors responded by resisting external pressure and adjusting new norms to suit their pre-existing domestic normative frameworks (Bloomfield, 2015:7). Essentially, the local ASEAN communities resisted the dominant Western norm entrepreneurs. ASEAN states were determined to remain the central actors in the global norm diffusion of multilateral cooperation and this was pivotal in their quest to socialize internationally (Acharya, 2004:259; Bloomfield, 2015:7).

It is essential to be context sensitive (Adler, 1997:319; Cox, 1981:121). Context is essential to illuminate what roles actors play in the process of norm dynamics. To comprehend a normative contestation, it is crucial to analyse two significant matters (Bloomfield, 2015:3). The first is the institutional context; this is paramount to understanding how entrenched or institutionalised a normative status quo can be (March & Olsen, 1998:944). The entrenchment of norms is profoundly significant because it highlights the specific role the *antipreneurs* play and the number of strategic advantages the *antipreneurs* enjoy in their defence of entrenched norms. In the context of a particular institutional normative contestation, the distinction between norm entrepreneurs and norm *antipreneurs* is clear (Bloomfield, 2015:3). For the second matter, it is essential to consider the international context. Exogenous phenomena and contingencies influence the role that actors play and the manner in which they play them. The exogenous forces such as international crises and the international distribution of power must be taken into account. This is critical to note in the contestation of global governance norms present within the UNSC. The UNSC is a multilateral organisation which has a history of some 75 years of entrenchment but the 21st century is a completely different context to the international system in which it was conceived (Langmore & Farrall, 2016:59).

It is important to acknowledge the actors who resist change to maintain the normative status quo for the purposes of promoting UNSC reform. An entrenched norm accumulates precedents, which makes it increasingly harder to institute reforms. In any contestation of an entrenched norm, there are strategic benefits enjoyed by *antipreneurs* (Bloomfield, 2015:13). When norm entrepreneurs highlight an underlying moral issue in a normative status quo, *antipreneurs* are merely able to refute these claims (Bloomfield, 2015:14). History has shown that human behaviour has generally favoured the status quo over any sort of change. Unless the outcomes of a normative status quo fail, there is usually not much impetus for change. If norm entrepreneurs are successful in highlighting a problem area of a normative status quo with the proposal of a solution, *antipreneurs* are simply able to undermine the new norm, because there are distinctive strategic advantages they enjoy, which are considered as ‘sunk costs’ – these are endangered by the possibility of change. Even after the normative status quo fails, emerging norms may struggle to become established. An unproven norm allows *antipreneurs* to disparage the norm entrepreneurs consistently. A new norm is likely to prevail only once it has built up some credibility. These strategic benefits enjoyed by *antipreneurs* are usually a consequence of decades or even centuries of precedents behind them (Bloomfield, 2015:15). Consequently, *antipreneurs* acting in accordance with an entrenched norm can be confident that their actions will be more likely to be received as legitimate by others.

Furthermore, *antipreneurs* acting in accordance with institutionalised precedents enjoy broadly two advantages. Firstly, *they* are capable of taking advantage of the institutionalised status quo to contest the new norm. The reason that *they* are able to do this is because international law is very sparse; much of international customary law is based on historical examples, which are not even that common as in a highly-codified national context (Bloomfield, 2015:15). Take for example the jurisdiction of the UNSC; although fairly universal, it is relatively limited. The veto power which the P5 possess – especially considering that the veto right is weighted on historical-political rather than legal deliberations – empowers the *antipreneurs* with a disconcerting blocking power. To elucidate, the P5 yield the most significant *antipreneurial* benefits within the UNSC on the basis of their veto power. However, close allies of a P5 member – for example, Israel – can rely on their patron to veto any resolution not in their favour, or in other words to impede otherwise detrimental precedents from accumulating. *Antipreneurs* can simply resist precedents which would empower a new norm from accumulating.

The second advantage, which is referred to as the veto-player role, is that *antipreneurs* are able to block any institutional reforms such as new policy implementations or the reform of the institution itself (Bloomfield, 2015:16; Freixas & Zwicker, 2002:12). For example, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan continually promoted the R2P norm across the UN system and regional organisations. Annan attempted to implement a variety of small policy changes, yet the norm was met with continued resistance. For example, the P5 members were requested to acknowledge a ‘code of conduct’ where the veto could not be utilised if their national interests were not involved in the matter. This R2P policy reform was met with sustained resistance, which subsequently led to negotiations prior to the 2005 World Summit. The R2P norm entrepreneurs made efforts to reform the UNSC. However, an assortment of postponing tactics are available to *antipreneurs*, such as reopening a negotiation on a new norm after entrepreneurs had considered the case to be closed. Recently, the Western members of the UNSC fought for the application of the R2P norm in the case of Sudan’s Darfur region; however, China opposed it arguing that the conceptualisation of the norm was still unclear. Typically, *antipreneurs* utilise several strategic opportunities to delay the implementation and entrenchment of new norms. This highlights the fact that the norm of sovereignty remains superior in the global system, so international institutions empower states to safeguard their sovereignty by necessitating a consensus, a majority threshold or the absence of a veto, before reform can be implemented (Bloomfield, 2015:17).

It is imperative to avoid selection biases in credible research (Burnham *et al.*, 2008:2). Hence, norm dynamics studies must acknowledge oppositional roles. Norm *antipreneurs* should be accorded the same analytical status as norm entrepreneurs to highlight the resistance to efforts to reform norms of global governance pre-existing within the UNSC (Bloomfield, 2015:2). As defined by Bloomfield, norm *antipreneurs* aim to defend the normative status quo usually through their acquired strategic institutional power (2015:3). When the normative status quo of a problem area is entrenched through institutional structures, it is easy to identify who the norm entrepreneurs are (because they highlight normative issues to promote change) and who the norm *antipreneurs* are (because they resist change through the strategic advantages they enjoy). The degree to which global norms are entrenched through institutions is essential to understanding the advantages the *antipreneurs* enjoy and consequently why they resist change. Context is crucial to take into account the exogenous forces such as the changes in the global distribution of power and the effect this has on the role of actors in global politics (Bloomfield, 2015:3). This will better highlight the role

actors play in norm contestation in UNSC reform. The main purpose of recognising the different roles actors play and especially the role of *antipreneurs* is to facilitate a rebalance in the literature on norm dynamics, which will inevitably enable the selection of presently understudied cases where norms are not reforming, such as global governance norms present within the UNSC (Bloomfield, 2015:3). Consequently, UNSC reform will be realised only if we, as IR scholars, recognize the role of *antipreneurs* (Bloomfield, 2015:2).

Conclusion

Constructivism provides explanations for the changes that have come to characterise the post-Cold War, globalised multipolar era (Huntington, 1996:3). Agents of change are influential in the geopolitical flux of today and consequently norms influence the behaviour of these agents. The aim of this study was to assess the degree of entrenchment of global governance norms within the UNSC in order to draw a clear distinction between the agents promoting change and the agents resisting change (Bloomfield, 2015:1). Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) norm evolution framework helps explain the resistance to UNSC reform. The UNSC is a significant vehicle in establishing global norms; however, the inability of the institution to engage with its inner norm emergence, cascade, internalisation and contention (for example, the contestation regarding the UN Charter where 'peacekeeping', or the norm of humanitarian intervention, is not specifically stated) is highlighted through the emergence of alternative global governance norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894; Fox *et al.*, 2018:659). Finnemore & Sikkink's (1998) norm evolution framework also helps to identify the norm entrepreneurs framing the emergence, cascading and internalisation of new global governance norms. Bloomfield's (2015) contribution will help identify the norm *antipreneurs* resisting global governance reform within the UNSC.

Why is UNSC reform so hard? The P5 actors are recognized as the global governance norm *antipreneurs* as they increasingly resist UNSC reform because the normative status quo accords these actors the greatest power in the multilateral peacekeeping organisation (Bloomfield, 2015:13). The P5 actors are resisting any reduction of the veto power, which is contributing to the inability of the organisation to be representative of today's world. The norm entrepreneurs are acknowledged as the actors promoting UNSC reform, such as the G4 and BRICS groupings (Naik, 2018:100). The emergence of new norms of global governance is a consequence of changes that have taken place in global politics. Furthermore, the globalised world order means that there can

no longer be a domination of five powerful actors' identities, but instead there needs to be a platform for multiple powerful actors' identities to be represented. When the UNSC was established, the nation-state system was important to the identities of international actors. Hence the behaviour of the P5 as nation-states has been shaped by the pursuit of power, wealth, cultural commonalities, preferences and differences (Huntington, 1996:3). The strategic and institutional advantages enjoyed by the P5 are treated as power multipliers, while recognising that norm entrepreneurs may prevail in the face of increased resistance (Bloomfield, 2015:17). Recently, the UNSC has failed in their pursuit of international peace and security. The different identities of emerging powers need to be realised worldwide for the assurance of international peace and security (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). The UNSC needs to provide emerging powers with the platform to govern globally for the Council to effectively fulfil its mandate. The next chapter will identify and discuss the norm entrepreneurs demanding the reform of the current global governance norms present in the UNSC.


Chapter 4

The Entrepreneurs and *Antipreneurs*

Introduction

An analysis of the salient issue of reform of the anachronistic UNSC is the underlying objective motivating this study. The UNSC was established in the aftermath of WWII, during a time when the world was ruled by a few great powers, predominantly representing the Global North, which had been victorious in the war (Månsson, 2007:218; Trachsler, 2010:2). Presently, 4 members of the P5 represent the Global North (Gould & Rablen, 2013:24). Since WWII the decolonisation and the greater integration of states from the Global South have set in motion an escalating interdependence of international economics and politics. Globalisation has led to the emergence of new powerful state actors that need to be acknowledged for the sake of sound international governance. If the UNSC does not provide the Global South with equal representation, international peace and security may not be achieved.

Questions about change in power and global governance norms inform much of the empirical research presented here (Keohane, 1988:381). Constructivism and its analysis of change/resistance are fundamental in this analysis. Idea and norm shifts create system transformations (Adler, 1997:344). Constructivism's relevance was evident from its inception: it highlighted the flux of norms and agents of change that characterise the international system today. Global governance norms are a 'standard of appropriateness' to which state leaders conform if the norms encapsulate the leaders' identities and preferences (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Change in the GPE has created new preferences and identities, and new global governance norms emerged subsequently. There have been several attempts to reform the UNSC to make it more representative, efficient and legitimate in the current international environment (Trachsler, 2010:2). Who are the actors driving the norm for reform of the UNSC? The intention of this chapter is to apply Finnemore and Sikkink's first stage of the *norm life cycle* and highlight the actors responsible for framing the issue of UNSC reform and calling attention to it (1998:893).

Figure 3. *Norm emergence*

(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896)

This chapter focuses on the first stage of the *norm life cycle*, also referred to as norm emergence, as illustrated above. The actors who create an emergent norm are referred to as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). Norm entrepreneurs are the most influential at this stage because they are the drivers behind the contested norm. Although the UN’s organisational platform for UNSC reform, the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), has produced no tangible reform results in over 27 years, UNSC reform has become a norm. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, the norm emergence stage can sometimes last for over 80 years, as was the case with women’s suffrage norms (1998:896). According to UN documentation, UNSC reform was first mentioned in 1963 when the UNGA voted for an expanded UNSC membership from 11 to 15 members (Malone, 2000:5; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411; UNGA, 1963:13). Almost all UN member states continue to support further expansion of the UNSC membership, yet no expansion has taken place since 1965 (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161). There are many multilateral groups (or organisational platforms) demanding UNSC reform; however, three blocs, namely the Group of Four (G4), the Uniting for Consensus (UFC), and the African Union (AU), remain prominent since their emergence shortly after Kofi Annan’s report, *In Larger Freedom*, was launched in 2005 (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899).

This chapter will focus on the first stage of the *norm life cycle*, norm emergence; it will highlight the most prominent norm entrepreneur in the multilateral emergence of the UNSC reform norm. This will be followed by a discussion of the three blocs of norm promoters that framed the issue of UNSC reform and made it emergent: the G4, the UFC, and the AU. An alternative grouping bridging UNSC’s legitimacy gap is discussed as is the status quo regarding the UNSC. Finally, to

avoid an imbalance in this study of norm dynamics, the role of oppositional norm entrepreneurs is acknowledged at the end of this chapter (Blum, 2005:646; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:16; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897;899; Maseng & Lekaba, 2014:30; Trachsler, 2010:2; Vicente, 2013:20). Norm *antipreneurs* – or in other words the P5 – resist UNSC reform by strategically utilising their veto power (Bloomfield, 2015:16; Freixas & Zwicker, 2002:12).

Norm Emergence explained

As mentioned in Chapter 3, norm emergence always originates from agents (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). Most importantly, human agency is almost always the source, so the literature on norm dynamics stresses the role of key actors in the international system (Bloomfield, 2015:2; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:888). Normative issues do not just appear out of thin air. Norms are intentionally built up and advanced by actors with strong opinions about what is appropriate and what is not appropriate. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:897) refer to these actors as norm entrepreneurs, in other words, 'norm promoters'. Their motives almost always reference altruism, empathy and ideational commitment. Norm entrepreneurs frame an issue, usually in terms of what is considered as inappropriate acts to be rectified; norm entrepreneurs challenge existing normative structures by invoking actions deemed inappropriate. This is done to call attention to the specific issue being contested and make people question the existing standard of appropriateness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898). Furthermore, norms emerge in a highly contested normative environment. There are specific tools utilised by norm entrepreneurs, especially when a norm is pervasive at the international level (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The two most important tools to bear in mind in the first stage of the *norm life cycle* are organisational platforms such as the UN, and persuasion. Hence the three dominant blocs in the UN that have facilitated the emergence of the norm driving UNSC reform are referred to as organisational platforms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The only way a norm will enter into the second stage of the *norm life cycle* is if a critical number of state actors (preferably influential states) are persuaded to endorse the norm. For a norm to reach the 'tipping point' and begin to diffuse internationally, the critical number of states is usually one third or more of the total states in the system (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900-901).

The norm entrepreneur: Kofi Annan

Although the OEWG emerged in the 1990s, Annan advanced the issue of UNSC reform in an unprecedented way. The 2005 World Leaders' Summit was a prominent moment in the multilateral emergence of the norm driving UNSC reform. Initially, in December 2004, Annan circulated a report requesting a high-level UN panel of 16 members to, inter alia, 'make recommendations for strengthening the UN so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century' (Blum, 2005:632). Since the UNSC is recognised as the foremost international body responsible for advancing and maintaining collective security for all, the focus on UNSC reform became heightened (Langmore & Farrall, 2016:59). On 21 March 2005 Secretary-General Kofi Annan released his report to the UNGA, which formulated the agenda for what was going to be the World Leaders' Summit (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). After that a sufficient number of states began endorsing the norm for UNSC reform, which facilitated its emergence (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). In the report Annan proposed two options for the implementation of the expansion of the UNSC. In July 2005 the UNGA released three draft resolutions providing different implementation plans for the enlargement of the UNSC (Blum, 2005:648). After that leaders from all UN member states (191 at the time) met at the UN headquarters in New York City for the summit (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:157). It was held from the 14 to 16 September 2005, and the meeting brought approximately 170 heads of government and other leaders together (UN, 2005).

The UN described the summit as a 'once in a lifetime opportunity to make courageous advancements in the areas of development, human rights, security and [most importantly] *reform of the UN*' (UN, 2005). The agenda of the summit in Annan's report set the UN on a path to pursue the most ambitious route towards its reform since 1945 (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:151; Zifcak, 2006:136). Annan sought the cooperation of the UN in his comprehensive strategy for UNSC member expansion, strongly advising member states to make the UNSC more representative of the international community, taking into account the geopolitical realities of the day (Annan, 2005:5). Norm entrepreneurs often use international realities and norms to strengthen their position in normative debates (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). Nevertheless, in Annan's address to the leaders at the World Summit, he did not prefer any one form of implementation over another; however, he advocated for the decision to be made quickly, saying that the imperative issue of UNSC reform had been '*discussed for too long*' now (Annan, 2005:5). There is consensus on the

need for UNSC expansion, but there is little consensus on how to do so (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14; Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161; Zifcak, 2006:136). The categories of expansion that are debated incessantly are membership, voting power, the number of additional seats and distribution of these seats (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14). Since 2005 there has been a surge of multilateral consensus and organisational platforms on UNSC reform and enlargement. This surge has accounted for the critical mass of states that must endorse the norm for it to develop to the second stage of the *norm life cycle* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Moreover, Annan references altruism, empathy and ideational commitment in his promotion of the norm for UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897). Thus Annan is considered the norm entrepreneur for the multilateral emergence of this norm.

The proposals leading up to multilateral consensus

Currently, as it stands, the UNSC is comprised of 5 permanent members (PMs) and 10 non-permanent members (NPMs), the latter elected for non-renewable two-year terms, which takes the total UNSC membership to 15 (Dreher, Gould, Rablen & Vreeland, 2014:1). When Annan released *In Larger Freedom* prior to the World Leaders' Summit, the report proposed two options for the implementation of the expansion of the UNSC (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). Model A proposed the creation of 6 new PMs with no veto and 3 new NPMs with a term of two years, for a renewed membership total of 24 members. Africa would receive 2 PM seats, with no veto, and 4 NPM seats, non-renewable, for a period of two years. Model B offered no new PMs; however, it recommended the creation of a new category of members in which 8 new seats would be renewable and 1 new seat would be non-renewable. The 8 new members would serve for a period of four years, subject to renewal, and the NPM seat would serve for a period of two years, non-renewable in Model B's proposal. Africa would receive 4 NPM seats, the WEOG benefit more because they would receive 2 NPM seats for a four-year period and still preserve their veto provision.

After the release of Annan's report to the UNGA in March 2005, UNSC reform received increased attention in UN deliberations and resolutions. In July 2005 the UNGA discussed the process of expanding the UNSC (Blum, 2005:648). Three draft resolutions were released on the basis of these deliberations. The first draft resolution was submitted by the G4 bloc and it incorporated Annan's Model A proposal for enlargement of the Council (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Blum, 2005:648). The only departure was the creation of 4 NPMs (rather than 3, as proposed by model A), for a

renewed total UNSC membership of 25 (Blum, 2005:648). The second proposal was submitted by the AU and it proposed the expansion of the Council to a total of 26 Council members. The AU wished to add 6 new PMs (with the veto provision) and 5 new NPMs. This would ensure a membership of 11 PMs with the veto right, and 15 NPMs. The third resolution proposed by the UFC, which was led by Italy and other regional opponents of the G4, provided a renewed Council membership total of 25 seats (Blum, 2005:649). It advocated for the addition of 10 new NPMs, a number of which would be renewable four-year seats. Since none of these drafts had a realistic prospect of reaching the UN majority threshold of 129 votes, it would be in the best interests of these multilateral groups to harmonize their respective proposals (Baccarini, 2018:110; Blum, 2005:649; Hosli and Dörfler, 2017:6).

The three dominant organisational platforms

A lot has happened since the UNSC was established in 1945 in the immediate aftermath of WWII. The global reality has changed tremendously with massive integration, decolonisation movements and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Baccarini, 2018:98; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 887; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155; Vicente, 2013:19). However, the UNSC has undergone little to no reform (Granja, 2017:4). Currently, 4 of the P5 represent the Global North. The emerging powers, predominantly from the Global South, are challenging the great powers, predominantly from the Global North, who are increasingly enforcing their interests unilaterally or multilaterally to increase their own power (Brown, 2005:30; Trachsler, 2010:3). Since many of the new emerging powers were born out of turmoil, it is crucial that they be provided with the platform needed for global governance to address the flux in the GPE (Naik, 2018:100).

Norm transformations are to the constructivists what shifts in the balance of power are to realists (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894). There needs to be greater diplomacy between UNSC membership to realise the emerging global governance norms, so that collective action can be taken to address various international crises and changes across the globe (Du Plessis, 2014:1; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641). Although there is currently a legitimacy crisis within the UNSC, states (especially in the Global South and particularly in Africa) still desire membership of the UNSC because of its increased diplomacy and peacekeeping operations at the end of the Cold War (Malone, 2000:3). Hence, an expansion of the UNSC is widely supported (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161; Zifcak, 2006:136). Since Annan's report circulated in 2004, three

organisational platforms have been established, which dominate the literature on the norm for UNSC reform (Blum, 2005:632; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). Both the G4 and the UFC emerged in the midst of this normative contestation on UNSC reform; however, the AU has been pursuing African interests on global matters for over five decades now (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15-19).

The G4

The G4 formed immediately after Annan's report circulated at the end of 2004, and it was the first bloc to establish a consensus on a UNSC reform package (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19; Vicente, 2013:20). In 2005 Germany and Brazil together with Japan and India revealed their bid to obtain permanent seats on the UNSC in its undertaking to reform; this initiative became known as the G4 proposal (Baccarini, 2018:99; Schirm, 2010:201). This was one of the initial multilateral proposals put forward. The similarities between these states are their economies and their political motives: the primary reason for this coalition is to support each other's aim of becoming PMs of the UNSC. Early in 2005 the G4 proposed that the UNSC create 10 more seats in both categories, for a total membership of 25 (Blum, 2005:648; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19). The categories were designed as follows: 6 more PM seats and 4 more NPM seats (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). With the prospect of gaining permanent membership for all four bidders, the remaining PM seats were reserved for 2 African countries (Trachsler, 2010:2). The proposal was designed with the regional groupings in mind (Ariyork, 2005:205). Hence, in the NPM category, 1 seat was reserved for the EE group; another seat was reserved for Africa; another was reserved for Asia; and lastly, 1 NPM seat was reserved for GRULAC (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19).

Initially, along with many other reform proposals for PM expansion, the G4 requested their permanent membership to be of equal status to that of the P5. The question of the veto, however, is completely controversial (Trachsler, 2010:2). The veto right is the prerogative of the 5 PMs and it is also understood as a strategic advantage enjoyed by the *antipreneurs* to block any institutional reform (Bloomfield, 2015:16; Freixas & Zwicker, 2002:12; Trachsler, 2010:2). Although the veto right was already highly disputed when the UN was founded in 1945, it was also the prerequisite for the great powers' agreement to engage in any system of collective security (Trachsler, 2010:2). However, in June 2005 the US stated that they would not support any attempt made by the G4 to obtain a veto power (Blum, 2005:647). The G4 responded in a formal paper to the UN, offering

the waiver of the veto power for their permanent membership and proposing the postponement of this decision so that it could be duly deliberated. Furthermore, the G4 are considered to be flexible on the discussion of the veto right (Trachsler, 2010:2). However, their proposal stands as a bid to obtain permanent status on the Council. The most recent UN developments on this reform package are geared towards the affirmation of India's bid for permanent membership on the UNSC (Kumar, 2017:546).

The UFC

The PM expansion reform remains controversial because of the unequal power the veto provision bestows within the Council. But the NPM expansion reform gained sufficient support and it is preferred by regional competitors of the G4 (Schirm, 2010:202). Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Turkey and South Korea among many others oppose the G4 initiative and together they presented an alternative reform proposal advocating for the expansion of only the NPM category (Vicente, 2013:20). This would take the total Council membership to 25 members (Blum, 2005:646; Trachsler, 2010:2). The proposal was also designed to take account of the regional groupings. Moreover, 6 new seats would be reserved for Africa; 5 for Asia; 4 for the GRULAC; 2 for the EE group; and 3 for WEOG (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19). The proposal was presented in April 2005. The regional opponents of the G4 were also focused on preventing Brazil, Germany, Japan and India from achieving PM status on the Council (Blum, 2005:646; Trachsler, 2010:2). Most importantly, UFC continues to represent the bloc advocating for NPM expansion in UNSC reform to this day (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:13).

Historically, however, the UFC can be dated back to the 1990s (Ariyork, 2005:205). There are many states that reject the PM expansion proposal; it is undeniable that the veto power has stifled the potential for UNSC reform. In the 1990s, around the time the OEWG was created, a powerful lobby in opposition to PM expansion formed (Baccarini, 2018:98; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Malone, 2000:3). This powerful group became known as the Coffee Club and the UFC is reminiscent of this opposition (Ariyork, 2005:205). Under the leadership of Italy, the Coffee Club was resurrected in 2005, along with other like-minded member countries (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19). The movement became known as *Uniting for Consensus*, which requested that consensus be reached before any reform gets implemented on the form and size of the UNSC. However, the G4 have argued that consensus is an excuse for inaction, because real changes will

only be able to take place through a vote. Unfortunately, the G4 do not seem to stand a chance as several UN member states, especially members of the UFC, oppose their bid for permanent membership (Ariyork, 2005:205). For example, Pakistan opposes India's bid for a permanent seat, Mexico and Argentina oppose Brazil's bid, and China opposes Japan's bid. But the question remains how these multilateral proposals can be harmonized to satisfy the regional groupings and states' pursuit of equal representation on the Council (Baccarini, 2018:110; Blum, 2005:649; Hosli and Dörfler, 2017:6).

The AU

The original UN founders from the African group were Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and South Africa (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14; UN, 1945). The massive social construction project known as decolonization (catalysed by a profoundly normative agenda) reconstituted the identities of many African states (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). Since 1955, with the emergence of many newly independent African countries, UN African membership has grown substantially (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14). The OAU was created in 1963 and subsequently many of its members acquired UN representation. However, once the AU replaced the OAU in 2001, the drive for UNSC reform intensified (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15). As it stands, the AU comprises 55 states (Nti.org, 2019). Since the OEWG had produced no tangible results in almost a decade of deliberations, the AU took it upon themselves to pursue UNSC reform (Malone, 2000:3). Moreover, the AU has been a pivotal participant in the UNSC reform debates in the 21st century. The AU demands increased representation of African states, especially since Africa has been the main subject matter dealt with by the UNSC (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15).

Africa seems to have a reputation for always getting the short end of the stick with regards to the reform proposals (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). Although Africa is dealing with the most international crises in the world, it is the most under-represented region on the Council (Gould & Rablen, 2016:21). With the expanded UNSC agenda after the Cold War, and the concentration of this agenda on the African continent, the lack of equitable African representation on the Council is astonishing (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:13; Du Plessis, 2014:67; Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). Approximately 60% or more of the international conflicts addressed by the UNSC were in Africa between 1990-2013 (Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). Between 2004-2014 53% of the 678 resolutions passed were focused on African concerns. African membership of the UN is also at an all-time high. When

the total UN membership is distributed in regional groupings, Africa outweighs any other group. The African group accounts for 28.2% of the total UN membership (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12). Yet Africa is still not democratically represented in the Council.

Hence, the AU was motivated by a sense of historical injustice and put forward a proposal when the multilateral reform packages emerged, after Annan's report was launched in 2005 (Blum, 2005:632; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:906). This links to the legitimization and identity of African nations within the broader international context (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:906). The AU's primary aim in the UNSC reform negotiations is to achieve better African representation within the Council (Blum, 2005:648). Their subsequent reform package was named the Ezulwini Consensus, after the valley in eSwatini where the proposal was initially suggested (Vicente, 2013:20). Thereafter, the agreement was adopted by the AU on 8 March 2005 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AU presented the Ezulwini Consensus to the UNGA on 18 July 2005 (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:16). Along with many other proposed African solutions to African matters, the Ezulwini Consensus also advocated for the expansion of the Council in both the permanent category and the rotating elected category (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:16). The AU pursued the expansion of the UNSC by 6 PMs (with a veto right) and 5 NPMs, taking the total UNSC membership to 26 members. The AU requested 2 PM and 2 NPM seats to be reserved for African countries; 1 NPM seat for EE; 1 PM and 1 NPM seat for GRULAC; and 1 PM seat for the WEOG (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15; Trachsler, 2010:2). Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa are seen as the most promising potential contenders for PM seats; however, no one country has officially been put forward for the election (Trachsler, 2010:2; Venter, 2003:37). Furthermore, the AU countries demand that they be given equal status to the current PMs and as such they insist on having the veto right (Trachsler, 2010:2). The reform debates have thus far ended in a deadlock (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15).

Alternatively: BRICS

Another organisational platform worth mentioning is BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Since 1945 there have been periodic power shifts in the global order (Naik, 2018:100). BRICS represents a collaboration between countries from both the developed (Global North) and the developing world (Global South). The origin of this group stressed the vision of a multipolar world reality, a reality that would be economically and politically sustainable (Naik,

2018:101). Global governance norms have become increasingly institutionalised in the form of multilateral organisations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Most importantly, the BRICS group is incredibly vocal in their demand for UNSC reform. Since many developing nations emerged out of turmoil, it is crucial that they are provided with the platform needed for global governance to address changes in the GPE (Naik, 2018:100). The ever-evolving interdependent international system demands legitimate global governance, which can assist to create stability. Although our understanding of the GPE will never be complete or settled, its stability will always be the focus of IR scholars (Keohane, 1988:380). Equal representation is the focus of the majority of UNSC reform proposals (Maseng & Lekaba, 2014:396). BRICS aims to have greater representation in addressing global problems, especially concerning the Global South, such as R2P, green theory and climate change, etc. (Naik, 2018:101). In 2016, at the Eighth BRICS Summit in Goa, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that the group aims to concentrate all their energy into strengthening international peace and security by promoting development worldwide (Naik, 2018:101). Yet is this not the responsibility bestowed on the UNSC by the UN Charter, which was signed and adopted by the preeminent multilateral organization itself: the UN (Månsson, 2007:220)? Norms generate order and stability (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894). Therefore, the global governance norms present in the Global South need to be realised within the UNSC to ensure greater international peace and security. For this to happen, the UNSC status quo must reform.

Status Quo

The UN Charter, Article 24 paragraph 1, states that the UNSC is the main organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security (UN, 1945:7; Vicente, 2013:19). Although global reality has been drastically transformed since 1945, the UNSC has undergone no reform – with the exception of the 1965 amendment, which increased the number of elected UNSC members from 6 to 10 (UNGA, 1963:13, ; Vicente, 2013:19). The 15 members consist of the P5 and 10 other NPMs. The NPMs are elected by the UNGA through a majority vote. The UN majority threshold is two thirds, which means 129 votes from the UNGA. However, the UN majority threshold can be overridden by the P5 with their veto right (Gould & Rablen, 2016:35; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:229). Essentially, no reform of the UNSC can be implemented without the ratification of the P5 members, and why would they want to relinquish their power? Consequently, none of the

reform packages (advanced by Annan, the G4, the UFC and the AU) could ever come close to being adopted with this P5 veto provision in the way (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:17). The veto power constitutes part of the identity of the P5 members. Constructivism is the lens used to explain the resistance of the P5 to relinquishing their powerful identity in the UNSC. The transformation in global governance norms and identities is to the constructivists what shifts in the balance of power are to the realists (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894).

Article 108, which stipulates the majority threshold and the ratification of the P5 members for any amendments to the Charter to be passed, is the exact formula contributing to the limitations placed on possibilities for UNSC expansion and reform (Baccarini, 2018:101). Furthermore, the UNSC membership remains deadlocked, with three organisational platforms striving for their preferred reform packages (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899; Vicente, 2013:20). It is questionable whether the UNSC has the structural capacity to reform (Trachsler, 2010:3). Since 2005 the UNSC reform debate has been increasingly conducted at an intergovernmental level as opposed to the OEWG. Since the OEWG was appointed in 1993, there has been little to no progress on the issue of UNSC reform (UNGA, 1993:17). As previously mentioned, UNSC reform scholars have now dubbed it the *Never-ending Working Group (NEWG)* because of the lack of tangible results (Baccarini, 2018:98; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Malone, 2000:3). Furthermore, there are very few avenues open to continue on this burdensome path in search of increased multilateralism (Trachsler, 2010:3). Multilateralism is a dominant characteristic of the UN (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14). The UNSC's legitimacy will be further diminished if the multilateral approach, which is supported by international law, becomes an indispensable tool for overcoming this global problem.

Norm antipreneurs

Norm antipreneurs (resisters) safeguard the normative status quo in the face of the norm entrepreneurs, who want to change the normative status quo. Context is essential to illuminate what roles actors play in the norm dynamics process (Adler, 1997:319; Cox, 1981:121). The entrenchment of norms is a twofold process. First, the institutional context, and second, the international context leads to the further entrenchment of a norm. The UNSC is an entrenched multilateral organisation that is some 75 years old. Not to mention the fact that the world is completely different from the international system in which the UNSC was conceived (Langmore

& Farrall, 2016:59). An entrenched norm accumulates precedents, which makes it increasingly harder to reform. Successful UNSC resolutions and interventions have a long history, which ensures the institution's credibility. The exogenous phenomena and contingencies influence the role that actors play and the manner in which they play them (Bloomfield, 2015:3). The P5 are increasingly fearful of relinquishing their power in the flux and uncertainty of the globalised era (Bloomfield, 2015:13). In the context of UNSC reform, the distinction between norm entrepreneurs and norm *antipreneurs* is clear: the prominent norm entrepreneur is Kofi Annan as he was the catalyst in the multilateral emergence of the norm of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). However, 13 years later and the state actors constituting the three dominant reform blocs are acting as the norm entrepreneurs on the salient issue of UNSC reform.

The P5 acting in accordance with the institutionalised global governance norms enjoy even greater strategic advantages. With regards to UNSC expansion reform and the ever-growing support it receives from the international community, the P5 members continue to deploy delaying tactics. For example, in 2005 the USA utilized several delaying tactics in the drive for UNSC reform (Bloomfield, 2005:13; Blum, 2005:647). When the G4 presented their proposal in early 2005, the US stated in June that they would oppose the G4 bid to acquire the veto right. Thereafter, the US announced that they would only support the addition of 2 more PMs (one of them being Japan, with the likelihood of the other being India) and 2 or 3 NPMs, for a renewed Council membership total of 19 or 20. Simultaneously, the US made it clear that they would not support the expansion of the Council without the implementation of an overall reform plan for the UN (Blum, 2005:647).

Antipreneurs are able to block any institutional reforms such as new policy implementations or the reform of the institution itself (Bloomfield, 2015:16; Freixas & Zwicker, 2002:12). The jurisdiction of the UNSC, although fairly universal, is relatively limited. The veto power – especially considering that it is weighted on historical-political rather than legal deliberations – empowers the *antipreneurs* with a disconcerting blocking ability. The P5 members enjoy the most significant *antipreneurial* benefits within the UNSC because of their veto power. On 31 March 2005, shortly after the UNSC enlargement proposals were put forward, the New China News Agency announced that approximately twenty-two million Chinese citizens had signed a petition to deny Japan's bid for permanent membership on the UNSC (Blum, 2005:646). The petition enjoyed the implicit support of the Chinese government. Essentially, Japan's bid to become a PM

is unrealistic because China will veto the decision. Blum also states that China will be likely to veto a PM seat reserved for India (2005:646). The proposal for UNSC enlargement is problematic, with the continuous contestation between regional rivalries over who can best represent their region. However, the same conflict arises with each reform proposal put forward. *Antipreneurs* can simply resist precedents accumulating that would empower a new norm. Luckily, close allies of the P5 members – for example, Israel – can enjoy *antipreneurial* advantages (Bloomfield, 2015:15).

If the UNSC is the preeminent organisation responsible for establishing and maintaining international peace and security, the veto right conferred the greatest responsibility for maintaining this on the P5 (Månsson, 2007:218). However, this has created great inefficiencies for the reform and evolution of the UNSC. The P5 are accorded with the same status as norm entrepreneurs to highlight their resistance to efforts to reform the norms of global governance within the UNSC (Bloomfield, 2015:2). Context is crucial to consider the exogenous forces such as the changes in the global distribution of power and the effect this has on the role of actors in global politics (Bloomfield, 2015:3). The P5 were founded in the post-war system of the balance of power system and this shaped their behaviour, identity and norms (Alder, 1997:342; Brown, 2005:22; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900; Neumann & Wæver, 1997:9). The constant flux and ever-evolving globalised world have further entrenched these powerful norms of global governance. Hence, UNSC reform of global governance is contested and the norm of UNSC reform has become an emergent norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:892). Originally, the P5 members demanded veto rights to stop smaller UN member states from ever outvoting them (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). With hindsight, it is evident that the P5 were pursuing and protecting their own interests, which is in line with the political theory that was most prominent at the time, realism (Booth et al, 1998:1; Gaddis, 1992:12; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894). In the uncertainty that prevails in the 21st century, the P5 are incapable of relinquishing their veto power. In essence, the *antipreneurs* play a powerful role in the first stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle*: norm emergence, by defending the status quo and resisting reform of the global governance norms present within the UNSC (1998:896).

Conclusion

Although the OWEG was established in 1993 and this was the biggest historical drive for UNSC reform orchestrated by the UN, 27 years of debates since then have produced no tangible results (Baccarini, 2018:98; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Malone, 2000:3). The five problem areas with regards to UNSC reform that have notably been deliberated throughout these years are UNSC configuration, the veto provision of the P5, regional representation, UNSC procedures and, lastly, the relationship between the UNSC and the UNGA (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003; Gould & Rablen, 2017; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Malone, 2000; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014). It is highly unlikely that the P5 will relinquish their veto power, so therefore the most discussed and proposed UNSC reform option is the enlargement of the UNSC configuration based on different regional representation selections. In 2005 Annan's report, *In Larger Freedom*, provided two UNSC enlargement options (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156). Annan also stated that '*no reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council*', which declared explicitly the saliency of the issue (Zifcak, 2006:136). Once this report was released, the norm of UNSC reform emerged with powerful international endorsement from three dominant multilateral blocs (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:151; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897; Zifcak, 2006:136). An expansion of the UNSC is widely supported, as is evident in the three dominant organisational platforms that have been formed: the G4, the UFC and the AU (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161). However, the lack of consensus on how to undertake this is undeniable (Zifcak, 2006:136). The actors constituting these blocs also represent the norm entrepreneurs for the emergence of new global governance norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). Essentially, Kofi Annan is considered the norm entrepreneur for UNSC reform, while the growing multilateral support for the norm since 2005 describes the first stage of the UNSC reform norm *life cycle*: norm emergence (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). Annan's legacy depends on the success of the implementation of the UNSC reform package (Ariyork, 2005:205). More than two thirds of the UN endorse the norm of UNSC reform; however, attempting to implement this reform has ended up in a deadlocked debate (Blum, 2005; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Maseng & Lekaba, 2014; Trachsler, 2010; Vicente, 2013). Since a critical number of states has endorsed UNSC reform, the norm has reached its tipping point and so the next chapter will discuss its diffusion in the GPE (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902).

Chapter 5

The Diffusion of New Norms of Global Governance

Introduction

UNSC reform has been a longstanding issue. The disconnect between the UNSC and the 21st century geopolitical reality is becoming increasingly evident. The regional and global divisions within the UN have escalated over time and this has made institutional reform within the UNSC increasingly difficult (Dörfler & Hosli, 2013:450; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8; Von Einsiedel *et al.*, 2015:2; Dreher *et al.*, 2014:66; Gould & Rablen, 2016:43). Ever since the end of the Cold War in 1989 UNSC reform has been a dominant topic of UNGA meetings and summits (Baccarini, 2018:98). Notably, economic powers in the Global South as well as Japan and Germany (which were instrumental in peacekeeping missions during the Cold War) began to demand increased participation in UNSC decision-making at the end of the Cold War (Baccarini, 2018:98). This undoubtedly had to do with the changing global political climate. Many emerging states have grown eager because of their size, population and economic development to acquire representation in the body with the greatest responsibility for maintaining international peace and security: the UNSC. Since many emerging powers were born out of turmoil, it is crucial that they are provided with the platform needed for international governance to address the changes in the GPE. This will ensure greater international peace and security (Naik, 2018:100).

In 1992 the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched UNSC reform discussions once again, at a UNSC Summit, which laid down the conceptual framework for an ambitious *Agenda for Peace* (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:10). As a result, after many postponements on the issue of reform of the increasingly anachronistic UNSC, the establishment of the OEWG on the basis of the ‘Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and on Other Matters Related to the Security Council’ occurred in December 1993 (UNGA, 1993:17). The deliberations by the working group produced no results (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). Kofi Annan witnessed the globalisation processes and the inability of the UNSC to act collectively during his tenure as UN Secretary-General from 1997 until 2006 (Ayoade


& Folarin, 2018:156). It was time for a norm entrepreneur to frame the salient issue of UNSC reform to call serious attention to it (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893). In the penultimate year of his tenure Annan launched the most ambitious pathway for UNSC reform since its establishment. This cultivated the multilateral support needed to create an emergent norm. For this reason Annan is referred to as the norm entrepreneur (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893)

Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Turkey, Germany, Brazil, Japan, India, South Korea, and South Africa along with 53 other African states comprising the AU are just a fraction of the countries that have publicly endorsed the need for UNSC reform, which in turn has facilitated the emergence of new global governance norms. More than two thirds of the UN members support the norm for UNSC reform (Blum, 2005; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Maseng & Lekaba, 2014; Trachsler, 2010; Vicente, 2013). However, there is little consensus on *how* to go about reforming this body (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161; Zifcak, 2006:136). Since a critical number of states have endorsed UNSC reform, the norm has reached its tipping point and has proceeded to the second stage of the *norm life cycle* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Following on from the preceding chapter on norm emergence, this chapter examines the next stage of the *norm life cycle* outlined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:896). Its focus lies on the second stage of the *norm life cycle*: norm cascade (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Norm cascade is a dynamic process whereby acceptance of an emergent norm becomes widespread (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Finnemore and Sikkink argue that the pressure for agents to conform, the intention to strengthen international legitimation, and the yearning of state actors to increase their self-esteem are three motivations behind the diffusion of an emergent norm (1998:895).

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it will summarise the norm cascade stage, with specific reference to the three motivations behind norm socialisation: legitimacy, conformity, and esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898). The succeeding sections will explain why several multilateral organisations are advocating for UNSC reform. These groups include the UNGA, the AU, the G4 and the UFC (Baccarini, 2018:99; Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10; Kumar, 2017:546; Zifcak, 2006:136). The ways in which the norm of UNSC reform relates to these groups' legitimacy, identity and esteem is discussed in detail, as this sets out the process of norm socialisation. These multilateral organisations have an important role to play, considering that they

act as agents of the cascade stage of the process of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902).

Figure 4. *Norm cascade*



(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896)

Norm cascade explained

During the first stage of the *norm life cycle* little normative reform occurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). However, after passing the tipping point, a lively dynamic emerges as more actors begin to adopt the new norms more rapidly. The priority of the political norm becomes more internationally oriented and widespread. Furthermore, the dominant characteristic of the norm cascade stage is broad norm acceptance (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Although institutionalisation is not the most fundamental mechanism in this stage, it is present in most cases. Since 1948 emergent norms have become increasingly institutionalised in the rules of multilateral organisations (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Institutionalisation is not a necessary condition for the norm to cascade; however, institutionalisation is a vital component of the *norm life cycle* and it often precedes or follows the cascade of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Such institutionalisation contributes strongly to the probability for a norm to cascade, because it specifies what the content of the norm is and what constitutes a violation of the norm (March & Olsen, 1984:736).

By spelling out the specific processes that norm leaders must follow when norm-breaking occurs, leaders are able to signal approval or disapproval through sanctions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). This clarifies the process through which norm-breaking must be conducted under norm leaders, which either confers legitimacy on or withholds legitimacy from norm-breaking states. As such, the most prominent mechanism promoting the norm cascade process is an active undertaking

of international socialisation, through which norm leaders seek to socialise other states into norm followers by internalising the norm. Many scholars reference the norm socialisation process which, to put it simply, is intended to persuade norm breakers to become norm followers (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999:5). In the context of international politics and UNSC reform, socialisation entails diplomatic acclaim or condemnation, either bilaterally or multilaterally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). This acclaim or condemnation is often strengthened with material incentives or sanctions.

The agents of the norm socialisation include states, international organisations and networks of norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902; Romaniuk & Grice, 2018). The motivation for norms cascading through the world population may differ; however, in the case of states, this happens for three reasons: the desire to enhance international legitimation, the international pressure to conform to a norm, and the aspiration of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Finnemore and Sikkink argue that states adhere to the new norm for reasons that relate to their identities as members of the international community; this is what motivates states to comply quickly to the new norm (1998:902). One could think of this as ‘peer pressure’ among countries. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is important to acknowledge that state identity crucially shapes state behaviour and international interactions (Adler, 1997:344; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Another important contribution to norm dynamics research is the recognition that state identity is shaped by the cultural-institutional context. Collective legitimation is an increasingly important political function with the changing realities of global politics (Claude, 1966:367). Currently, the UNSC is suffering from a legitimacy deficit as the negative evaluations of the Security Council by UN members far outweigh the positive ones (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238). Members of a particular community follow particular norms (March & Olsen, 1984:734; 1998:946), therefore the norm for UNSC reform could ensure that the Council increases its legitimacy by incorporating the new global governance norms.

Legitimation

Legitimacy is an evasive concept (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). Legitimacy is also not a new concept in IR scholarship. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the need to understand social purpose and legitimacy was essential to understanding politics, especially politics within multilateral organisations (Claude, 1966:368; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889). Initial IR research on specific

issues such as decolonisation, human rights, education and integration acknowledged that most UN activity involved establishing norms, yet the UN often fell short in theorising these normative procedures. Nonetheless, legitimation is essential to the behaviour of states and multilateral organisations in the international system (Claude, 1966:370; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). It is important to acknowledge the role of international sources of legitimation, which shapes state behaviour. International organisations have a crucial role to play in ensuring adherence to international norms as they are the custodians that confer legitimacy on or withhold legitimacy from states (Claude, 1966:370). The costs of being labelled a 'rogue state' are too high when it comes to international interactions as this relates to loss of reputation, trust and credibility.

Since the 1980s and the rise of constructivism, IR has become increasingly clear about the function that domestic communities (and norms) play in bringing about changes in the political and international realm (Alder, 1997:344). Finnemore and Sikkink further argue that states care about international legitimation because it has become a necessary component of citizen's perceptions of states' domestic legitimacy (1998:903). Increasingly, citizens formulate perceptions about whether their government is better than alternatives by simply following international and regional assessments. Domestic legitimacy translates into obedient behaviour by citizens because it is the belief that current domestic political institutions are better than others. Domestic legitimation leads to compliance with government laws. Therefore, international legitimation is crucial insofar as it endorses the domestic legitimation of a state. Ultimately, international legitimation of a state contributes to the ability of its regime to stay in power (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903).

Conformity and esteem

Conformity and esteem similarly encompass evaluative relationships between states in the international system. When states conform with a norm, it acts as 'social proof' that they have adapted to their environment and that they 'belong' to the international community in which they function (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). Conforming to the behaviour of the actors around us fulfils a psychological need to belong to a group. Similarly, esteem is linked to conformity and legitimacy, but it is more deeply rooted in psychological needs. Esteem implies that state leaders sometimes become norm followers to be perceived as being held in high esteem. Leaders of states follow norms because they want others to respect them, and in turn they want to think well of themselves (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). For norms to become widely socialised, they must

be shared with other people and to an extent sustained through approval and disapproval (Elster, 1989:100). To an extent, norms are also sustained through the risk of ‘feelings of embarrassment, guilt and shame’ in the event that a person violates a norm (Elster, 1989:101).

Self-esteem is fundamental to the identities of actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). Therefore, the desire to develop or protect one’s esteem can explain norm-following behaviour. For example, liberal states will adopt liberal norms because this correlates to their identity, it is something they take pride in and consequently from which they boost self-esteem (Bloomfield, 2015:4; Risse *et al.*, 1999:8). The basis of the argument for conformity and esteem is psychological and founded in extensive studies done on their importance for individual wellbeing. In some studies individuals have said things that are objectively wrong to avoid diverging from group judgments (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). When objective reality is ambiguous, the most likely situation is that individuals will turn to ‘socially constructed reality’ to formulate their perspective.

Finnemore and Sikkink argue that at the state level state leaders conform to norms to avoid the disapproval associated with norm violation and to increase their national esteem, which consequently translates into their own self-esteem (1998:904). It is hard to generalize at the state level from studies done on esteem at the individual level; however, norm entrepreneurs often target individual state leaders to criticize and denounce them. Much norm advocacy includes highlighting discrepancies and holding actors personally responsible for their adverse actions. An important way to think about the role that norm entrepreneurs play is that they supply the information and provoke cognitive dissonance among norm violators by publicly exposing them. Research conducted on human rights norms suggest that state leaders care deeply about their international image and they do not want to be seen as human rights violators, so they make significant policy changes to avoid this (Bloomfield, 2015:4; Risse *et al.*, 1999:8). Legitimation, conformity and esteem are crucial to an actors’ identity (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903).

The UNGA and legitimization of the UNSC

Legitimacy is used to demonstrate that rules are fair, just and moral (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). For example, the Cold War was not only a geographical conflict among great powers, but it was also a war for ‘hearts and minds’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). Central to this notion was the coupling of power and what scholars call ‘legitimate social purpose’ (Finnemore & Sikkink,

1998:887). By conforming to one of the two predominant ideologies during the Cold War, an actor publicly conferred legitimacy on that ideology. With the notion of UNSC reform, a similar scenario occurs. When UN member states make optimistic statements about the UNSC, they publicly reveal their acceptance of the Council and thereby confer legitimacy on the body. Conversely, when states express disapproval of the UNSC, they withhold legitimacy from the Council. Questions regarding the UNSC's legitimacy have preoccupied UN member states for over two decades (Du Plessis, 2014:10; Schaefer, 2016:6). Nonetheless, there is no debating the fact that the UNSC is suffering from a legitimacy deficit.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Binder and Heupel systematically assessed the legitimacy deficit of the UNSC by examining UN member states' evaluations of the UNSC (2015:239). These perceptions are predominantly delivered at UNGA summits. The UN member states either declare their approval or disapproval of the UNSC. Binder and Heupel analysed these evaluative statements and found that the negative evaluations of the UNSC by UNGA member states far exceeded the positive assessments (2015:238). The negative evaluations could just be an act of 'social proof' that the member states belong to the UN group, so they conform to the norm for UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). Before Binder and Heupel conducted their study in 2015, the 2005 World Leaders' Summit was held when the norm entrepreneur, Kofi Annan, stated the importance of the issue: *'no reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council'* (Zifcak, 2006:136). Annan explicitly endorsed the norm of UNSC reform in that simple statement (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Since 2005 there has been an influx of multilateral UNSC reform proposals (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:10). This led to the emergence of the norm for UNSC reform internationally. In 2015 Binder and Heupel presented their analysis of the evaluative statements made by the UNGA members about the UNSC (2015:242). Ten years after the emergence of the norm there is proof that the majority of the UNGA subscribe to the norm of UNSC reform (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238). This matches Finnemore and Sikkink's argument that state leaders conform to norms to avoid the disapproval attached to norm violation and to enhance their reputation in the international community (1998:904).

The findings by Binder and Heupel also showed that states represented in the UNSC critique it less than the states that are not represented (2015:238). This could also be a case of PMs saying things that are objectively wrong to avoid diverging from Council judgments (Finnemore &

Sikkink, 1998:904). Such representational distortions are reinforced by the preferences of the over-represented or more powerful members of the UNSC (Gould & Rablen, 2016:23). This also relates to the identity of the P5 and how their behaviour is shaped by the central importance of the state and its pursuit of interests/power (Ashworth, 2002:34; Brown, 2005:29; Gaddis, 1992:7; Held, 1999:32). Nevertheless, the UNSC is not suffering from a complete legitimacy crisis, because it still possesses a rudimentary degree of legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). Binder and Heupel argue that states seek the Council's approval to indicate their political intentions and probable policy implementations to international state leaders (2015:239). It is also argued that the less powerful UN member states borrow legitimacy from the powerful members in exchange for financial assistance (Dreher, Sturm & Vreeland, 2009:766). States therefore continue to seek the UNSC's approval to justify their domestic and international actions (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:712; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017; Law, 2017:88). Since UNSC reform has become a norm, this has facilitated the emerging importance of alternative multilateral organisations. The ways in which the norm of UNSC reform relates to these states' identities is addressed below.

The AU

The African continent has a long history of injustices, especially in the context of colonisation, international crises, weak UN representation and resistance to UNSC reform proposals (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:13; Du Plessis, 2014:67; Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). The identity of the African continent and the challenges of modern conflict are ever-changing, along with the process of globalisation (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:155; Held, 1999:33; Williams, 2009:603). For many centuries the world used the African continent for resource extraction, and did not regard it as an equal contender for power. One of the most internationally renowned surges of foreign investment in Africa was the notorious 'scramble for Africa' (Bryceson, 2002:725; *The Economist*, 2019:9). This epoch introduced colonial governmentality characterized by the production of a submissive African colonial subjectivity. This scramble for Africa entailed the wholesale appropriation of African resources and land by European powers. The impetus for this was the Berlin Conference in 1884. The colonial economies that developed subsequently dismembered and fragmented the continent (Bryceson, 2002:725). By the mid-20th century the process of decolonisation of the African continent began ... and continues to this day (Baccarini, 2018:98; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, 887; Hosli & Dörfler,

2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155). The majority of the UN peacekeeping missions are deployed in Africa (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:155). There is therefore a pressing need to represent Africa internationally (Baccarini, 2018:97; Malone, 2000:3; Williams, 2009:603).

With the establishment of the UN and the decolonisation normative order after WWII, Africa became increasingly accommodated within the modern world system (Baccarini, 2018:97). Ethiopia, Egypt, Liberia and South Africa were among 47 UN founding member states (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14; Månsson, 2007:218; UN, 1945). Since 1955, with the emergence of many newly independent African countries, UN African membership has grown substantially (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:14). The OAU was created in 1963 and many of its members acquired UN representation. When the AU replaced the OAU in 2001, UNSC reform grew substantial support (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15). Today, the AU comprises 55 states (Nti.org, 2019; UN, 1945). Not only has the continent's independence increased, but its diplomatic influence, gross domestic product (GDP) and population are ever-growing (*The Economist*, 2019:9). One consequence was that another surge of foreign investment in Africa occurred during the Cold War, when the East and the West competed for the allegiance of the newly independent states (*The Economist*, 2019:9; Møller, 2009:15). The Soviet Union backed Marxist authoritarians on the continent, while America supported tyrants who claimed to value the ideology of capitalism. After the Cold War conflict resolution in Africa became one of the main issues dealt with by the UNSC (Du Plessis, 2014:67; Fox *et al.*, 2018:725). Between 1990 and 2013 approximately 60% of the conflicts the UNSC attempted to address were in Africa, yet the group of 55 African member states are still not democratically represented within the UN (Fox *et al.*, 2018:725; Nti.org, 2019). If anything, the Cold War managed to polarize African ideologies further and reduced the continent to a theatre of proxy wars (Møller, 2009:4).

Since these two waves of foreign investment, there has been a shift in the global economy and this time Africans could end up being winners (*The Economist*, 2019:9). Although more benign, there is a different wave of foreign engagement underway. As articulated in the article "*The new scramble for Africa*" (*The Economist*, 2019:9), there is increased positivity regarding the continent and ever-growing aspirations to build diplomatic, strategic and commercial relations with Africa in the current epoch. In terms of diplomacy, between 2010 and 2016 more than 320 embassies were opened in Africa (*The Economist*, 2019:9). In terms of strategy, China has military and

technological ties with 45 countries in Africa, and Russia has signed 19 military deals with African states since 2014. In terms of commerce, Africa's three biggest trading ties between 2006 and 2018 were China, India and America. Trade between Africa and Indonesia, Turkey, Russia and the European Union (EU) has increased more than three-fold (*The Economist*, 2019:9). Although this new form of investment in Africa is criticised by many as being a new form of imperialism, the engagement with the rest of the world has been mostly positive (Naik, 2018:105; *The Economist*, 2019:9). In 2019 the GDP per head was two-fifths higher than it was in 2000 in the south of the Sahara; this speaks volumes for what the continent could achieve. With the emergence of African economies and AU governance, the continent now has more of a choice than ever before (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15; *The Economist*, 2019:9). For example, think what the continent could achieve if countries created a free-trade area, or if the African regional blocs joined forces. If African states show more unity in this new scramble and are provided with the global platform to govern, they could possibly come out as winners (Naik, 2018:105; *The Economist*, 2019:9).

Why is this relevant? Today, the GPE emphasises increased multipolarity (Naik, 2018:104; Schirm, 2010:198). Media and academic research alike in the past two decades have been involved in a discussion of the role of emerging powers in the GPE and global governance (Schirm, 2010:197). The decolonisation of countries, especially in the Global South, have increased and established an escalating interdependence of international economics and politics. Many of these decolonised countries now play an important role as a result of their economic prosperity. With the historical injustices experienced by Africa, and the emergence of its independence, representation and global governance within the AU, it is of the utmost importance that Africa be represented at the UN. The AU represents 55 states (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10). Africa is representative of the Global South. The UNSC needs to provide Africa with a platform to address various international crises and changes across the globe (Du Plessis, 2014:1; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641). The AU is the pillar of African legitimacy, reputation and esteem (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898; Malone, 2000:3). Hence, the AU is a pivotal participant in the ongoing debates on UNSC reform. This links to the legitimisation and identity of Africa in the broader international context (Blum, 2005:632; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:906). Legitimate global governance will only happen once equitable representation of powerful African actors is provided (Von Einsiedel, Malone & Ugarte, 2015:3). The UNSC needs to represent Africa as this will enable more effective

diplomacy between UNSC member states so that collective action can be taken, which will enhance international peace and security (Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641).

G4

The G4 group is composed of four countries: Germany, Brazil, Japan and India. They champion their UNSC representation along with two other African countries (unknown) as they bid for PM seats (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10). This was one of the initial reform proposals put forward after Annan's *In Larger Freedom* was released and it was designed according to regional groupings (Ariyork, 2005:205; Baccarini, 2018:99; Schirm, 2010:201; Zifcak, 2006:136). The PM expansion reform is not favoured by many because of the controversy around the veto provision and the unequal power it bestows within the Council. Therefore, the G4 has offered the waiver of veto power for them in exchange for their permanent membership, but proposed postponement of this decision so that it can be duly deliberated. Nonetheless, the G4 are considered to be flexible on the veto right (Trachsler, 2010:2). However, they are adamant and vocal in their pursuit for UNSC reform and their proposal stands as a bid to acquire permanent status on the Council (Kumar, 2017:546). An analysis of the G4 actors' identities explains why this multilateral organisation has decided to be norm leaders in the mass socialisation stage of the norm of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895).

The similarities amongst Brazil, Germany, Japan and India are primarily on the level of their economies and their political motives: the primary reason for this coalition is to support each other's aim of becoming PMs on the UNSC (Schirm, 2010:202). Moreover, these countries have the legitimacy, reputation and esteem to support each other's bid for PM status (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898). They are considered to be the largest economies in their respective regions (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10). Brazil is the largest country in South America and Latin America (Bello, 1966:56), as well as one of the largest states of the Global South. Also, Brazil has a history of colonisation and authoritarian rule (Bello, 1966:56). However, Brazil declared itself a democratic federal republic only in 1988. This is important in the light of the global governance representational crisis present within the UNSC. Brazil's identity includes the experiences of historical injustice of colonial rule as well as its independence in the new world order. Hence, Brazil represents the emerging global governance norms. Brazil has also been extremely active within the UNSC. Between 2011 and 2016 Brazil was the second largest contributor of troops

within its regional grouping (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:17). Since 1990 Brazil has served most often on the security Council out of the GRULAC grouping (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:14). Although Germany represents the Global North and it has not served on the UNSC as frequently as Brazil, it played an active role in the EU3 (UK, France and Germany) during the negotiations with Iran in 2003 (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8). Later, Germany became part of the P5+1 format for negotiating with Iran to reach a nuclear deal. This led to an agreement in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1, which became known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action; Iran agreed to significant limitations on its nuclear programme. This is an example of the kind of diplomatic capacity that the UNSC currently lacks (Finnemore & Sikkin, 1998:898; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8). Germany is also part of the EU big three (with Italy and France), because it is one of the large founding members of the regional, political and economic coalition (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8).

Unlike Brazil, Germany and Japan, India is considered an emerging economy (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7). India, along with other middle-sized economies (such as South Korea, Iran, Turkey, Mexico, Pakistan, Indonesia), has shown increased national capabilities in recent years. This is in contrast to France and the UK, which have shown decreased national capabilities, especially considering these two countries were rated among the top 6 great powers in 1952 (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7). India is the seventh largest country by area and it is the most populous democratic country in the world (Da Graça, 1985:421). India was ruled by the British from the 18th century until 1947, when British India was divided into two independent states, the predominantly Muslim Pakistan and the predominantly Hindu India. It was only in 1950 that India became a sovereign democratic republic (Da Graça, 1985:421). With a long history of colonial rule and hardships, India worked hard to become an emerging power. India has served on the UNSC 15% of the time since the end of the Cold War (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:14). Also, a huge percentage of UN peacekeeping troops came from India between 2011 and 2016; India is among the top three countries contributing troops in the APG region (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:16).

The modernization of Japan began with the resignation of the final Shogun (military dictator) in 1867 (Da Graça, 1985:117). This transformed the feudal society into a great power. During the 1930s Japan pursued an expansionist policy, which established the country as a colonial empire in East Asia (Da Graça, 1985:117). Later Japan joined the Axis powers in WWII, occupying most of Southeast Asia. Japan surrendered to the Allies in 1945 when the USA dropped atom bombs on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan was under US military rule until 1952 (Da Graça, 1985:117). Japan's development is often described as a miracle (Da Graça, 1985:117). Between 1945 and the end of the Cold War, Japan's economy recorded strong economic growth, contributing to Japan's rise. Japan has served on the Council more than 35% of the time since 1990, which makes Japan the most frequently elected UNSC member in the APG region (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:14). Surprisingly, Japan's financial contributions to UN peacekeeping far exceeds that of 4 of the P5, namely the UK, France, Russia and China (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:17). Japan has also been an active member in the UNSC's 'Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions' to reform the Council's practices (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:19). In 2018 Japan led the difficult process of systemizing the UNSC working methods into what is known as 'Note 507' under the OEWG (United Nations, n.d.). In the context of UNSC reform, Japan is a norm leader (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902).

The G4 represent both the Global North and the Global South. They provide a collaboration of different political actors with distinctive identities. Scholars have acknowledged that the process of decolonisation explicitly seeks to reconstruct the identities of both the newly independent states and their former colonizers, including the relationships between them (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). The G4 is an example of exactly that: a grouping which represents the newly independent states and the former colonizers working together. Hence, this collaboration represents the new global governance norms (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:6). It is hoped that this will ensure greater diplomacy, peace and security. The UK and France extended their support for UNSC reforms to preserve the competency of the UN (Kumar, 2017:550). Although the USA is silent regarding the veto provision for new members, it supports the granting of PM seats to Japan and Germany (Kumar, 2017:551). However, the most recent UN developments on this reform package are geared towards the affirmation of India's bid for UNSC permanent membership (Kumar, 2017:546).

UFC

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the UFC group is largely composed of regional rivals of the G4 group. Under the leadership of Italy, many countries including Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Turkey and South Korea joined together to oppose the expansion of the number of permanent seats in the UNSC (Vicente, 2013:20). This group dates back to the 1990s,

around the time the OEWG was created. A powerful lobby in opposition to the PM expansion formed, known as the Coffee Club and later, the Uniting for Consensus (Baccarini, 2018:98; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146; Malone, 2000:3). The new name indicates that this group of states requests that consensus be reached before any reform gets implemented on the form and size of the UNSC (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19). This behaviour directly correlates to the identities of these actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). Since many of these countries were born out of turmoil, they are calling for greater representation, consensus and UNSC expansion (Naik, 2018:104). This group therefore strongly endorses the norm of UNSC reform. The UFC proposed an NPM expansion option because of the barrier the veto provision has created to potential reform (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). These actors want to acknowledge the flux that characterises the GPE today; they are fighting for equal representation. Pakistan opposes India's bid for a permanent seat, Mexico and Argentina oppose Brazil's bid, and China opposes Japan's bid (Ariyork, 2005:205). The UN member states comprising the UFC do not want to walk away empty-handed in the implementation of a UNSC reform package. These countries enjoy the legitimacy, reputation and esteem to support each other's bid for UNSC representation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:898).

The UFC group is another example of a multilateral organisation representing both the Global North and Global South. For the purpose of this study, four countries' identities will be analysed. First, Pakistan became independent only after WWII (Da Graça, 1985:156). Prior to 1947, Pakistan was part of British India, but after that date British India was partitioned into a Muslim region (Pakistan) and a Hindu region (India). Pakistan became a republic in 1956 (Da Graça, 1985:156). However, West Pakistan seceded from the Eastern Province in 1971 and became known as Bangladesh (Da Graça, 1985:25). Today, Pakistan is the fifth most populous country in the world. Pakistan is not considered an emerging power but a middle power (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7; Ogunnoiki, 2018:7). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data survey conducted in 2014, there was only one recorded interstate war since 1945 and that was between India and Pakistan (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:9). With the great hurdles Pakistan has had to overcome to become an independent state in the globalised world era, it needs to be provided with a platform to govern globally (Naik, 2018:103). This will help the UNSC to deal with the flux that characterises international interactions today and ensure greater international peace and security. Pakistan has served on the security Council 22% of the time since 1990 (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:13). Pakistan is the second state, after Japan, to serve on the NPM in the APG region (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:14). Pakistan,

along with India and Bangladesh, were the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping missions from 2011 to 2016 (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:16). This legitimacy, reputation and esteem proves that Pakistan is a viable contender for increased UNSC representation.

Italy represents the Global North. It is necessary for the Global North and Global South to work together to ensure greater cooperation, peace and security. Italy, as well as Argentina and Pakistan, is one of the most active members in the UFC group (Trachsler, 2010:2). Because of Italy's central geographical location in the south of Europe and the Mediterranean sea, it has historically been home to a multitude of peoples and cultures (Da Graça, 1985:113). In the mid-19th century intensified Italian nationalism led to a demand for independence. In 1861 Italy became a unified state (Da Graça, 1985:113). Inevitably, this escalated Italy's status to a great power (Da Graça, 1985:113). In the late 19th and early 20th century Italy acquired a colonial empire (Schild, 1995:28). Italy endured military defeat and economic annihilation after it had sided with the Axis powers in WWII (Da Graça, 1985:114). After WWII Italy established a democratic republic, enjoyed an economic boom and became a developed country (Da Graça, 1985:114). Compared to Germany and Spain, Italy has served considerable time on the Council since the end of the Cold War. Since 1990 Italy has served 19% of the time on the UNSC (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:13). Italy is also a notable contributor to the UN peacekeeping contingent. Italy contributed the most troops to UN peacekeeping missions in the WEOG region (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:17).

Argentina has served on the Council almost a third of the time since the end of the Cold War (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:13). Like Brazil, Argentina had the NPM seat for 30% of the time since 1990. After Brazil, Argentina is the largest country in South America (Da Graça, 1985:17). Argentina is a notable contributor towards UN peacekeeping troops; it is the third biggest donor in its region (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:17). The country has its roots in Spanish colonization (Da Graça, 1985:17). After a prolonged period of external and internal wars, Argentina replaced its viceroy with a local government in the capital, Buenos Aires, in 1810 (Da Graça, 1985:16). Argentina was one of the 51 founding members of the UN in 1945 (Månsson, 2007:218).

Although South Korea became a UN member state only at the end of the Cold War, in recent years it has proven itself to be a viable contender for power in the 21st century world order (UN, 1945). South Korea is considered a middle-sized economy. However, in the last few decades this country has achieved a higher national capacity than the UK and France (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7). The

Korean state has a long history of Chinese and Japanese colonisation (Da Graça, 1985:123). It was only after Japan was defeated in WWII that Korea was partitioned into North Korea (a communist zone) and South Korea (an American zone). In 1948, South Korea became an independent republic south of the 38th parallel (Da Graça, 1985:124). During the Korean War of 1950-1953 North Korea annexed large areas of South Korea. The UN intervened and sent forces to push North Korea back to the north of the 38th parallel (Da Graça, 1985:123). Since then South Korea has been a newly independent state in the globalised world era, which makes its voice and identity increasingly important in global governance norms today (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:2; Naik, 2018:103).

The UFC emphasizes multipolarity as the group attempts to shape a global voice by combining their actions and cooperating on the issues facing international politics (Naik, 2018:104). Similar to the G4, the UFC represents diverse actors' identities in the globalised world of the 21st century. These different actors have decided to band together with one common goal: achieving greater UNSC representation (Trachsler, 2004:1). The UFC group is more interested in obtaining equal representation for all. The formation of this multilateral organisation was in response to their rivals who might obtain PM status within the Council (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10). The UFC overtly aims to derail any possibility of the G4 to acquiring permanent membership, to ensure their vision is achieved (Kumar, 2017:552). The UFC have consequently also proposed reform in accordance with their own preferences and interests (Kumar, 2017:552). The UN member states comprising the UFC do not want to walk away empty-handed in the implementation of any UNSC reform package (Ariyork, 2005:205). These states have increased their diplomatic, economic and national capabilities in recent years (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8). States such as the members of the UFC endorse the norm of UNSC reform, because it relates to their identity as members of the globalised international community (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891). Furthermore, this collaboration represents new global governance norms (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:6).

Conclusion

The argument in this chapter endorses the argument that Finnemore and Sikkink propose, namely that states adhere to the norm of UNSC reform for reasons that relate to their identities as members of the international community (1998:902). State identity crucially shapes state behaviour and consequently international interactions (Adler, 1997:344; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). These states propose a multipolar world reality whereby the values and interests of these states become

equally represented (Naik, 2018:104). Actors who relate to the identities of the norm leaders for UNSC reform become norm followers, as in the case of the BRICS countries (Naik, 2018:102). States are motivated to comply with the norm of UNSC reform to show that they have adapted to the international context and that they ‘belong’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903).

The current global political reality is vastly different to that of the post-WWII or post-Cold War era. The new candidates for UNSC membership are considered to be rising powers because they have accumulated strong economic and diplomatic capabilities (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8). With Africa’s climb to independence and economic growth, there is increased positivity about the continent. The ever-growing aspirations to build diplomatic, strategic and commercial relations with Africa characterises the current epoch (Naik, 2018:105; *The Economist*, 2019:9). Similarly, the G4 and UFC members have proven to have higher national capabilities than members of the P5 (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7). It is worth noting that none of the candidates aspiring for P5 membership are large military powers. This highlights that the global political reality is different to 1945, when the victors of WWII were awarded custodianship of international peace and security on the basis of their military strength (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:8).

The UNSC is still relevant. Although it is unknown to what degree the statistics on troop contributions have an influence on Council deliberations, robust peacekeeping missions have increased dramatically since the end of the Cold War (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:17; Binder & Heupel, 2015:241). The norm of humanitarian intervention requires the approval of the Council (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:3). States therefore still associate themselves with the Council in an attempt to legitimize their behaviour and identities (Binder & Heupel, 2015:239).

What does this tell us about the UNSC? The UNSC is not suffering from a complete legitimacy deficit (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). Legitimation is implicit in the behaviour of states and multilateral organisations in the international system (Claude, 1966:370; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903). But the UNSC needs reform to become relevant to the identities of the rising powers and consequently increase its legitimacy. This will ensure more peaceful interactions. Therefore the argument stands that states’ desire to enhance international legitimation, their response to pressures for conformity and the aspirations of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem are all relevant to the cascading of the norm of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Since so many states endorse the norm of UNSC reform, actors inadvertently facilitate the emergence of

new global governance norms. Conformity with the norm of UNSC reform is almost automatic – which takes us to the third stage of the UNSC reform *norm life cycle*, namely internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904).

Chapter 6

The Internalisation of New Norms of Global Governance


Introduction

A lot has changed in the world since the UN's establishment in 1945 (UNGA, 2005a:2). The changing global geopolitical reality has led to the emergence of new global governance norms. The UNSC is becoming increasingly anachronistic with its inflexibility about reforming to remain in step with the times. The issue of UNSC reform has attracted increased criticism since the 2005 World Leaders' Summit (Zifcak, 2006:136). The norm entrepreneur for UNSC reform, Kofi Annan, stated the saliency of the issue by reiterating that UN reform would not be complete without the reform of its foremost international body responsible for advancing and maintaining international peace and security (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893; Langmore & Farrall, 2016:59; Zifcak, 2006:136). In July 2005 three draft resolutions were passed on the reform of the size and composition of the UNSC (UNGA, 2005a:2). But there has been no reform of the UNSC as of today (2020). Three prominent groupings have endorsed the norm of UNSC reform: the G4, the AU and the UFC (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10; Schirm, 2010:201; Zifcak, 2006:136). Finnemore and Sikkink explain the reason for the endorsement of this norm by actors is that it relates to their identities, legitimacy and esteem in the wider international community (1998:902). However, a coherent set of reactionary norms have emerged in opposition to UNSC norms of global governance (Baccarini, 2018:97; Bryceson, 2002:725; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:7; Kumar, 2017:551; Malone, 2000:3; *The Economist*, 2019:9).

This chapter will discuss the norm internalisation stage (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:906). The internalisation of the norm for UNSC reform has facilitated the emergence of new global governance norms; these new global governance norms call for increased representation, cooperation and development across the world (Baccarini, 2018; Barnett & Duvall, 2004; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). UN draft resolutions and the institutionalisation of international bodies propose reforms related to the size and composition of the UNSC (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020; ISS, 2017; Naik, 2018; UNGA, 2005a; UNSC, 2017; UNSC, 2018; UNSC, 2019). Firstly, this chapter will provide a summary of the

norm internalisation stage as described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:904). Secondly, the prominent category of emerging global governance norms, the issue of equitable representation, is discussed because it began the discussion of UNSC reform even before 1963 (UNGA, 1963:13). It is important to reference the three organisational platforms promoting UNSC reform; the G4, the UFC and the AU draft resolutions for UNSC reform represent the internalisation of the norm for UNSC reform, and the emergence of alternative global governance norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:894;906). Thirdly, with the increased criticism of UNSC representation, the old structures and procedures have become increasingly challenged (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020; Kumar, 2017; Naik, 2018; Schirm, 2010). So another emerging global governance norm category discussed is transparent, inclusive and legitimate working methods (Annan, 2005; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904; Zifcak, 2006:136). In addition, the suggested amendments to the UN Charter are discussed at length to show further entrenchment of the norm for reform (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005b:1; UNGA, 2005c:3). The norm for UNSC reform has thus entered the third stage of the *norm life cycle*: norm internalisation (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020; ISS, 2017; Naik, 2018; UNGA, 2005a; UNSC, 2017; UNSC, 2018; UNSC, 2019).

Figure 5. *Norm Internalisation*



(Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:896)

Norm internalisation recapitulated

Internalisation is defined as the process by which norms become deeply entrenched as a result of mass socialisation of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). Internalisation is at the extreme end of the norm cascade – the final stage of the *norm life cycle* (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). When norms are internalised, they become resilient (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:33; Barnett &

Finnemore, 2004:8). Finnemore and Sikkink describe this internalisation as a “taken-for-granted” status (1998:895). This means that the norm is no longer up for broader public questioning. It is simply accepted. For example, today very few people debate whether women should be permitted basic rights such as voting (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). Conformity with the norm of gender equality is practically automatic (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904).

When a norm is internalised, actors with similar identities will automatically abide by the appropriate standard of behaviour stipulated by the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). This means that internalised norms are immensely powerful (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005:33). Behaviour in accordance with an internalised norm is no longer debated and it is difficult to identify explicitly because actors no longer engage in debates on whether to conform with the norm or not. After norms have cascaded, the most powerful mechanism for the operation of internalised norms (which are indirect and evolutionary) is actors’ habitual behaviour. This iterated behaviour and habit contribute to the strengthening and universalisation of a specific norm. For example, the norm of European integration was internalised from regular interactions among people involving joint effort on technical tasks. This inevitably created predictability, stability and finally trust (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:905).

New norms of global governance

In 1993 the UNSC committed to reforming itself. During the establishment of the OEWG, member states expressed their concern about the outdated nature of the UNSC in the 21st century. Two problems with the Council became increasingly glaring: its working methods and the unequal representation of member states (Blum, 2005:646; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:13; Trachsler, 2010:2; UNGA, 2005a:2; UNSC, 1993:2; UNSC, 2018:3). Unfortunately, not much has changed today. In 1993 the president of the Security Council, Mr Yáñez-Barnuevo, stated that all Council members agreed to attempt to make the Council practices more efficient (UNSC, 1993:2). Similarly, the issue of representation within the Council was explicitly outlined by the highest authority of the UN in 2005, Kofi Annan, whereby three draft resolutions on the reform of the UNSC’s size and composition were proposed (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; UNGA, 2005a:3; Zifcak, 2006:136). In 2018 the president of the UNSC, Mr Alotaibi, explicitly stated that resolutions pertaining to UNSC reform are often proposed and endorsed, *‘but they then are simply not implemented’* (UNSC, 2018:3). There is clearly a problem with the

implementation of UN norms (Alonso & Ocampo, 2015:1; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641; UNGA, 2005c:1). Two categories of the norm of UNSC reform have become internalised in the workings of the UN and other multilateral organisations. These internalised UNSC reforms include (1) the equitable representation of member states with regards to the regional groupings, and (2) the adoption of transparent, inclusive and legitimate working methods (UNGA, 2005a:3; UNSC, 1993:2; UNSC, 2018:3). Consequently, this internalisation represents the adoption of the new norms of global governance.

Equitable representation

It is no secret that the UNSC is suffering from an equity crisis (Gould & Rablen, 2017:147). The economic growth of countries in the Global South has driven those states' emergence as new contenders for power in the GPE (Naik, 2018:100). The international environment is no longer one that lends itself to realist political thinking and the recognition of a bipolar (two great powers) geopolitical dispensation. In a time of great power transformations, multipolarity without ample concurrent multilateralism is dangerous (Elect the Council, 2020). This is why global governance debates have discussed the issue of representation for decades now (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:56). Barnett and Duvall (2004) discuss the relationship between power and global governance, which is appropriate to mention as a backdrop to the question: *UNSC Reform: Why is it so hard?* The structures of global governance are often corrupted by the special interests and preferences of an elite group. There are three global governance deformities that need to be addressed to achieve equal representation. The first is the distortion of the distribution of advantages and disadvantages (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:56). For example, Kuziemko and Werker (2006:905) discuss the corruption present within the UNSC with regards to NPMs receiving increased UN foreign aid during their tenure. The second is the distortion related to *who* creates international laws (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:56). The P5 members are ever-present and wield a veto on all procedural matters; the P5 are the *who* of the post-WWII era (Barnett, 1995:411; Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). The third distortion is the vast differences in the capacities of states and societies to adapt to the demands of the GPE – for instance, the extent to which the economic choices of the countries in the Global South are, if not dictated by, then determined by the institutions in the Global North (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:57). During the Cold War the UN's security agenda focused on the Global South and peacekeeping operations were predominantly funded by the USA with often little to no

cooperation with the territory being impacted (Barnett, 1995:414). Finally, the inconsistent and weak international laws cannot effectively constrain the unilateral and often illegal acts of the elite group (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:57). Hence, legitimate global governance that addresses these deformities in the 21st century is paramount to maintain international peace and security.

The UNSC has fulfilled its function of preventing another global conflict (which was its post-WWII mandate), but it has failed to respond to the global shifts in power (Baccarini, 2018:98). UN membership has more than tripled to 193 UN member states since its inception in 1945 (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161). It started when many smaller contenders for power emerged from the two greatest social reconstruction projects of the international community: decolonisation and European integration (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887). European integration redefined the Western economy for European nations. The UN was unable to respond to the conflict between nationalism (pursued by European countries) and independence (pursued by dominantly African and Asian states). The mass expansion of UN membership, which was largely due to the decolonisation and independence movements from the mid-1950s onwards was clearly unanticipated by the UN's creators (Baccarini, 2018:110; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155). UNSC reform has been pursued by the international community since the 1960s. The first resolution on UNSC reform to pass was in 1963 (Malone, 2000:5; Gould & Rablen, 2017:161; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411). The official reform of the UNSC occurred in 1965 when the Charter was amended to incorporate Resolution 1991 A (XVII) (UNGA, 1963:13). As a result UNSC membership increased from the original 11 to 15 members (UNGA, 1963:13). This expanded the NPMs from 6 to 10. This was the first and last UNSC reform to be implemented to date. Almost all UN member states continue to support further expansion of the UNSC membership, yet no expansion has taken place since 1965 (Gould & Rablen, 2013:8; 2016:44; 2017:161; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10; Kumar, 2017:551; UNGA, 1963:13).

As already mentioned, the most historical drive for UNSC reform by the UN happened in 1993 with the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to consider all aspects pertaining to the 'Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and on Other Matters Related to the Security Council' (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). The reason for establishment of this group was to investigate UNSC reform proposals; however, it is often referred to as the Never-Ending Working Group as it is currently entering its

27th consecutive year of deliberations. Over this time the OEWG has produced a comprehensive list of notes and draft resolutions (Alonso & Ocampo, 2015:1; UNSC, 2012:2; UNSC, 2018:5), but no resolution yet has been voted on by the UNSC and implemented. The OEWG has consistently acknowledged the need for a more equitably represented Council. However, the *antipreneurs* – the USA, Russia, the UK, China and France – seem to be the most inhibiting mechanism preventing UNSC reform (Zifcak, 2006:136). These UN founder members are able to block other smaller or newer UN member states from reforming the UNSC, or in other words, outvoting them (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). In 2012 the UNSC presidents (Li Baodong and Wang Min from the People's Republic of China) expressed in the 10th note on interactivity the view that UNSC members will pursue more enhanced communication and seek the perspectives of non-Council members (UNSC, 2012:2).

Resolutions, statements and notes made by the working group can only take UNSC reform so far. The failure to implement resolutions is the biggest problem in the context of UNSC reform (UNSC, 2015:1; UN, 2018:5). UN norm implementation is contested by many authors in the field of constructivism; despite the UN's interest in UNSC reform debates, its focus seems to be shifted when questions of implementation and diffusion arise (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:889; Gould & Rablen, 2013:2; Krook & True, 2012:106; Langmore & Farrall, 2016:63; Law, 2017:89; Ralph & Gifkins, 2017:641). More recent resolutions would suggest that the UN is not oblivious to its inability to effectively implement affirmative resolutions. The UNSC continues to declare its focus on welcoming wider membership engagement from the working group in the debates on the implementation of UNSC reform (UNSC, 2015:2). The State of Kuwait, acting in its capacity as the chair of the OEWG in 2018, advised that the UN and the Council should take a more direct responsibility in implementing affirmative resolutions on the representation in and development of the UNSC (UNGA & UNSC, 2018:1). This is an example of habitual behaviour and therefore the internalisation of the norm of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:905). The matter of implementation of UNSC expansion seems to be an ongoing issue with little to no substantial results. Nonetheless, for the purpose of understanding why the issue of UNSC reform is so entrenched in the international geopolitical culture of today, it is important to look at the institutionalisation of the norm.

In hindsight, the OEWG preparations have not been futile. The institutionalisation of the OEWG has contributed to the reason why UNSC reform is so entrenched in international culture today (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). The norm of UNSC reform was propelled forward in an unprecedented way after the release of Annan's *In Larger Freedom* report in March 2005 (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:893; UNGA, 2005aa:3; Zifcak, 2006:136). Annan reiterated the saliency of UNSC reform. This was a defining moment in propelling the UNSC reform norm into the first stage of the *norm life cycle*: norm emergence (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). Following the norm entrepreneur of UNSC reform and his successors, the most debated topics on UNSC reform concern the expanded size and composition of the renewed Council (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:15; UN, 2018). Most countries seem to support an expanded and reformed Council (Zifcak, 2006:137). Therefore, there has been mass socialisation of the norm of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). The Charter empowers the P5 with the highest representational power and without their ratification there will be no reform (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014:229). The P5 are recognised as the norm *antipreneurs* as they defend the normative status quo (Bloomfield, 2015:13). UNSC reform has continued to attract lots of attention over the last two decades. With emerging powers wanting to assert their presence on the global governance platform, more than a third of UN member states support UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:901). Once a 'critical mass' of UN member states endorsed the norm of UNSC reform, this norm entered the second stage of the *norm life cycle*: norm cascade (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:901). Subsequent informal and formal discussions held by the UNGA on the topic of UNSC reform legitimise the internalisation of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904; UNGA, 2005aa; UNSC, 1993; UNSC, 2018).

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the most defining moment of institutionalising the norm of UNSC reform occurred when the UNGA released three draft resolutions for the proposed implementation of the enlarged Council by the three organisational platforms: the G4, UFC and AU (Blum, 2005:648; Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:16; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:901; UNGA, 2005a; UNSC, 1993; UNSC, 2018). Annan proposed two models for the enlargement of the Council with the regional groupings in mind in March 2005 (Ayoade & Folarin, 2018:156; Zifcak, 2006:137). Three months later the G4 became the first group to present an alternative reform proposal in the form of UN legislation (UNGA, 2005a:1). The G4 proposed the enlargement of the Council from

15 to 25 by adding 6 PMs and 4 NPMs (UNGA, 2055a:2). The additional PMs are composed of the G4 members (2 Asian states, 1 WEOG state, and 1 GRULAC state) and 2 African member states (UNGA, 2055a:3). The additional 4 NPMs are composed of 1 Asian state, 1 African state, 1 EE state and 1 GRULAC state. Eight days later, the AU submitted another draft UNSC reform resolution, which granted Africa increased representation (UNGA, 2005b:2). The resolution proposed an expansion of 15 to 26 Council members with an addition of 2 African PM seats and 4 African NPM seats (UNGA, 2005b:3). The other Council seats are allocated according to the regional selection: 2 Asian PM seats, 1 GRULAC PM seat, 1 WEOG PM seat, 1 Asian NPM seat, 1 EE NPM seat and 1 GRULAC NPM seat (UNGA, 2005b:3). Later in July 2005 the 12-member UFC group (Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino Spain, and Turkey) drafted a resolution to expand the UNSC only in the non-permanent category (UNGA, 2005c:3). The resolution proposed a doubling of NPM seats, with 6 African seats, 5 Asian seats, 4 GRULAC seats, 3 WEOG seats and 2 EE seats (UNGA, 2005c:3). These three draft resolutions and the organisations promoting UNSC reform are important in the entrenchment of the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:897).

Furthermore, the three dominant organisations and alternative multilateral organisations calling for UNSC reform represent the new global governance norms. These new norms advocate for more equitable representation in global governance platforms (Baccarini, 2018:114; Hosli & Dörfler, 2020:6; Kumar, 2017:547; UNGA, 2005a:2; UNGA, 2005b:2; UNGA, 2005c:2). With the increasing emergence of powerful states, the tenure of the P5 is increasingly being contested in the literature on UNSC reform (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:28; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). The *antipreneurs* are not equally represented compared to other UNSC members. For too long now the P5 members have been acting as the *police* keeping an eye on the Council decisions (Barnett, 1995:411; Månsson, 2007:219; Ogunnoiki, 2018:46; Schild, 1995:28; Wilcox, 1945:944). With their tenure and veto provision, the five great powers of the post-WWII era are able to support or destroy resolutions that concern the international peace and security of the 21st century world; this is no longer relevant or tolerable (Barnett & Duvall, 2004:56; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:2). The permanent tenure of the P5 is one of the most compelling threats contributing to the end of the UNSCs legitimacy within the international community (Gould & Rablen, 2017:146). It also enables the P5 to yield strategic advantages in the reform of UNSC norms of global governance (Bloomfield, 2015:17). The promotion of the norm of UNSC reform

has become a habitual topic over the past two decades (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). However, the organisation is so deeply entrenched that it still possesses a rudimentary degree of legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The UNSC is still at the heart of global security with its original mandate to maintain international peace and security (Elect the Council, 2020). The UFC, G4 and AU aim to achieve more equitable representation within the Council and therefore challenge the norms promulgated by the current UNSC and its elite group (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899; Hosli & Dörfler, 2020:6; Kumar, 2017:547).

Nevertheless, there are other multilateral organisations which were constructed to propagate emerging global governance norms different from those of the UNSC (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). BRICS is an example of a group advocating for increased multipolarity, or in other words, equitable representation in global governance (Naik, 2018:100; Papa, 2014:2). The economic growth among countries in the Global South has led to the emergence of new contenders for power in the GPE (Naik, 2018:100). The primary basis for the interregional coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa is to promote the establishment of a multipolar world order, or in other words, a new international order (Naik, 2018:101; Papa, 2014:1). BRICS envisions a new international order which is more democratic, more equal, based on the international rule of law, incorporates increased cooperation, collective decision-making and coordinated action of all states (Papa, 2014:2). The BRICS countries have certain shared similarities and common goals, and therefore their identities align with one another as members of an international community (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902; Naik, 2018:101). The multilateral organisation demands the recognition of rising powers in the 21st century (Naik, 2018:100). The BRICS countries are advocating for an enlargement of the UNSC (Naik, 2018:101). Although BRICS was not constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting UNSC reform, the group promotes emerging global governance norms. These norms advocate a multipolar world order where every country is able to engage in global politics (Papa, 2014:1). These emerging global governance norms are internalised through the institutionalisation of the multilateral groupings: the G4, the UFC, the AU, BRICS and similar organisations endorsing UNSC reform.

Rising powers from the Global South are demanding a voice in global politics (Papa, 2014:1). Beyond nuclear war and interstate conflict, future global security challenges include the impact of climate change, terrorism, pandemics and cybercrime. This concerns everyone. In addition to the

mass engagement of UN member states with the norm of UNSC reform, there is broader participation obtained from the international community. Elect the Council is an international campaign aimed at soliciting support from civil society on UNSC reform (Elect the Council, 2020). The campaign is organised by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), which is an African organisation. The campaign is geared towards international participation in addressing the topic of UNSC reform by members of companies, religious institutions, non-governmental organisations, and regional groupings (Elect the Council, 2020). Elect the Council aims to create a resolution with detailed recommendations on UNSC reform from the emerging world order through lobbying, briefings and meetings across a broad spectrum of stakeholders (Elect the Council, 2020; Naik, 2018:100). Elect the Council hopes to enable this resolution to effect reform by two thirds of the UNGA members. Elect the Council believes that everyone will benefit if the heart of global security is reformed to relate to the demands of 21st century global governance (Elect the Council, 2020).

UNSC reform is no longer a matter of public debate, but rather has acquired an acceptable status within the UN and the international community itself (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). This proves that the norm of UNSC reform has entered the internalisation stage. Antonio Guterres, the current Secretary-General of the UN, addressed the General Assembly in 2018 on implementing reform within the organisation: United to Reform (UN, 2018). Guterres calls for greater integration in the UN, as well as greater alignment with global development (UN, 2018). Greater representation within the UNSC is essential to take into account the emerging powers in the era of globalisation (Held, 1999:30; Naik, 2018:102). Some states have risen and some have declined in power. Consequently, there is a demand to create a multipolar world reality with strong multinational institutions whereby all states have a voice (Antonio Guterres's speech, 2019; Naik, 2018:105). Since the imbalance between the number of UNSC members and the number of UNGA members became more apparent in the post-Cold War era, the old structures and procedures were increasingly challenged. It is no longer appropriate to have five states *policing* the new international system. The majority of UN member states are grouping together in an attempt to achieve multipolarity and transparent working methods in the renewed UNSC. Moreover, the AU, G4 and UFC, along with alternative groupings such as BRICS, are internalising alternative global governance norms to the anachronistic UNSC (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:15; Kumar, 2017:548; Naik, 2018:104; Papa, 2014:1).

Transparent, inclusive and legitimate working methods

The UNSC working methods are directly mentioned in the three dominant proposals for UNSC reform (UNGA, 2005a; UNGA, 2005b; UNGA, 2005c). Any reform of the UNSC would be incomplete without reform of the UN Charter (Granja, 2017:10; Månsson, 2007:220). The creators of the UN wanted to strategically pursue their own interests and redefine the meanings of the post-war world by diffusing their accepted norms through the UNSC (Granja, 2017:10; Månsson, 2007:219). The Charter legally ensured the diffusion of these norms; norms which emanate from rational thinking and habits, the concept of *policemen of the world*, and the utilisation of force (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887; Granja, 2017:10). Consequently, the way in which the obsolescence of the UNSC may be highlighted today is through extensive analysis of the Charter. The Charter provides the configuration and the procedure of the UNSC, which represents the status quo (Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:10). According to Article 108, any amendments to the Charter that would implement a reform of the UNSC would require 129 affirmative votes from the UNGA, including all P5 votes. The rest of the 63 UN member states have the option of forming a blocking minority. The Charter contains the exact formula contributing to the limitations placed on UNSC possibilities for reform (Baccarini, 2018:101).

The Charter

The Charter is legislation that will ensure the internalisation of the new norms of global governance within the Council when it is appropriately adapted to the demands of the 21st century (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). The three dominant multilateral organisations pursuing UNSC reform demanded several amendments to the Charter in their draft resolutions (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3). The first and foremost amendment should be made to Article 23, paragraph 1, which stipulates the membership total (UNGA, 2005c:2). The UFC pursues an amendment that only adds 20 NPMs for a two-year term (UNGA, 2005c:2). The AU acknowledges the need for UNSC reform stating that it is imperative for the Council to represent the global realities and for the UNSC to be more responsive to the objectives of all UN member states (UNGA, 2005b:2). Undeniably, the UN creators could not have foreseen the new rising powers and its contrast to European integration (Baccarini, 2018:110; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:6; Schlesinger, 2003:155). In 1945 most African states did not exist as sovereign independent entities, and as a result Africa has remained the only continent without a PM seat on the Council (UNGA, 2005b:2). The most powerful UN organ

responsible for addressing matters of international peace and security does not represent one of the largest and most unstable geographical areas on the globe (Gould & Rablen, 2016:21; Granja, 2017:10; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:12; UNGA, 2005b:2). With this in mind, the AU and G4 proposed to accord the new PMs and NPMs the same responsibilities and privileges as the current members, including the veto provision (UNGA, 2005a:3; UNGA, 2005b:2). UNSC reform is so widely accepted that almost all UN member states and rising powers (as in the example of BRICS) endorse the norm (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). The three dominant organisations endorsing the UNSC reform norm express a desire to ensure that all regions of the world are effectively represented within the Council and correspondingly stress the need for the Council's working methods to improve drastically (UNGA, 2005a:3; UNGA, 2005b:2; UNGA, 2005c:3).

The G4 and UFC resolutions urge the UNSC to improve its working methods by enhancing inclusiveness, transparency and legitimacy within the Council (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3). In conjunction with the AU, the G4 and UFC call for amendments to be made to Articles 27, paragraphs 2 and 3, in the Charter (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3).

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting (UN, 1945:7).

The G4 proposed that the Charter require the affirmative vote of 14 of the 25 Council members (UNGA, 2005a:4). On the other hand, the UFC proposed an affirmative vote of 15 of 25 Council members (UNGA, 2005c:3). Both the G4 and UFC determine that Article 108, and Article 109, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Charter, be amended to include a higher majority threshold for affirmative resolutions (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3). For example, Article 108 states:

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council (UN, 1945:19).

According to Freixas and Zwicker (2017:411), a high voting threshold in any political institution with a small number of members reduces the chances that winning coalitions can be formed. The

P5 voting power stipulated in the Charter is contested throughout the UNSC reform literature (Dreher *et al.*, 2014:28; Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21; Hosli & Dörfler, 2017:8). This highlights the fact that the UN decision-making procedures go beyond a simple majority rule; it does not even advocate for equitable representation (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:425; Gould & Rablen, 2016:21). Therefore, the G4 demand that an affirmative vote should require 14 of 25 Council members (UNGA, 2005a:4). In comparison, the UFC demands a higher threshold of 15 out of 25 Council members (UNGA, 2005c:3).

The G4 resolution calls for the implementation of Articles 31 and 32 in the Charter (UNGA, 2005a:4). Article 31 requires the Council to consult regularly with non-Council members (UNGA, 2005a:4).

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected (UN, 1945:8).

In conjunction with Article 31, Article 32 requires member states or even states that are not members of the UN to participate in UNSC meetings when they have a special interest in the substantive matters under deliberation (UN, 1945:8; UNGA, 2005a:4). Regardless of the overwhelming endorsement these resolutions have received, the implementation of UNSC reform seems to be the UN's biggest weakness (UNSC, 2015:1; UN, 2018:5). The draft resolutions proposed by the G4, AU and UFC reference the issue of implementation (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:1). The fact that the G4 has specifically requested the UN to implement Articles that are already in the Charter shows the broader issue of implementation within the UN (UNGA, 2005a:4). If the UN is unable to implement pre-existing legislation, then how do we expect the UN to implement reform within the UNSC? The call for more transparent, inclusive and legitimate UNSC working methods in these UN documents is an example of the internalisation of the norm of UNSC reform. It is evident through this internalisation that equitable representation and revised UNSC working methods are demanded to incorporate the new global governance norms (UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3).

Conclusion

Global governance and cooperation need to be strengthened to manage the increasing interdependence among countries more effectively (Alonso & Ocampo, 2015:28). The objective for all is to reduce massive inequalities that exist within and among countries by achieving sustainable development for all. Along with the prospect of maintaining international peace and security, the UN and the international post-WWII system was founded on the idea that there should be equality among all sovereign states (Binder & Heupel, 2015:238; Schlesinger, 2003:169; Szasz, 1983:345). However, the UN has fallen short of meeting this objective. Today this is highlighted in the outdated nature of the Charter, the most important piece of legislation within the UN, as well as the only UN organ with the power to authorise legally binding resolutions: the UNSC (Wilcox, 1945:943). The UNSC is recognised as the foremost international body responsible for advancing and maintaining international peace and security for all (Langmore & Farrall, 2016:59). With the increasing interdependence of countries from the effects of globalisation, the UNSC has failed to address these global shifts in power and has become increasingly anachronistic (Baccarini, 2018:98).

This chapter discusses the third stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's norm life cycle (1998:896): specifically the internalisation of the norm of UNSC reform. The way UNSC reform is internalised is through UN documentation urging and demanding that reform be implemented, more specifically the G4, UFC and AU draft resolutions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:916; UNGA, 2005a; UNGA, 2005b; UNGA, 2005c; UNSC, 2015; UN, 2018). It is clear that the UN itself endorses the norm of UNSC reform because it relates to the organisation's identity as a member of the international community (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:902). However, it is apparent that the UNSC reform falls short at the internalisation stage of Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* (1998:905). The internalisation stage explains the consolidation and universalization of UNSC norms of global governance through some 75 years of precedents. The UNSC has therefore a history of predictability and habits of trust. This entrenchment highlights the degree of strategic advantages enjoyed by the P5 – or in other words, the *antipreneurs* – in their defence of the prevailing UNSC global governance norms (Bloomfield, 2015:3). Although many countries, institutions, policies and the majority of the UN members endorse the UNSC reform, no institutionalisation and internalisation has occurred within the Council itself, because UNSC

global governance norms are so deeply entrenched (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). There has been no amendment of the Charter and so no reform of the Council has been implemented since 1965 (UNGA, 1963:13).

Finnemore and Sikkink are able to explain the internationalisation and consolidation of the existing UNSC global governance norms in the third stage of the *norm life cycle* (1998:892). Bloomfield's contributions also better explain the delay in the implementation of new norms of global governance by recognising the P5 as the *antipreneurs* (Bloomfield, 2015:17). For reform to be implemented, the current UN member states would have to refuse to participate in the existing procedures; however, the P5 members have the power to discourage this (Interview, 2020a). It is highly unlikely that Russia, China, the UK, the USA, France, and their allies will agree to reform the UNSC. The UN itself will become irrelevant (Interview, 2020b). Nonetheless, the norm of UNSC reform has succeeded in two of the three stages of Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* (1998:896). In 2005, when Annan announced that "*no reform of the UN will be complete without the reform of the Security Council*", his comment propelled the norm of UNSC reform into the spotlight (Zifcak, 2006:136). The three dominant organisations acting as norm leaders by endorsing and internalising the UNSC reform norm: the G4, UFC and AU (along with other multilateral organisations such as BRICS), represent a coherent set of alternative norms emerging in opposition to UNSC norms of global governance (Naik, 2018; Papa, 2014; UNGA, 2005a; UNGA, 2005b; UNGA, 2005c). These new norms of global governance demand equitable representation and transparent, inclusive and legitimate working methods (Hosli & Dörfler, 2020:6; Kumar, 2017:548; Naik, 2018:104; Papa, 2014:1UNGA, 2005a:4; UNGA, 2005c:3). Today, almost all countries reiterate the saliency of the need for the norm of UNSC reform, which proves the broad acceptance (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904). The UNSC has failed to implement institutional reform within the Council since 1965. Therefore, the norm of UNSC reform has entered the internalisation stage but it has not been consolidated (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:904).

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Introduction

Since the establishment of the OEWG in 1993, UNSC reform has been a dominant topic dealt with in IR. After WWII the great powers victorious in the war (predominantly the USA, the USSR and their allies) founded an international system grounded on principles of equality among sovereign states and an increased multilateralism among dominant international actors in the UN (Schlesinger, 2003:2). The League of Nations (the UN's predecessor) failed because of the absence of a great power (the USA) and they had no determinable organ of authority (Wilcox, 1945:943). Hence, the important responsibility of maintaining global peace and security was bestowed on the UNSC (more specifically the five great powers after WWII) through the most important piece of legislation of the UN: the Charter. The UNSC is the only UN organ able to issue binding resolutions on member states. The great powers became instituted as the P5 of the UNSC: the UK, the USSR, China, the USA and France. The establishment of the UNSC occurred in conjunction with the decolonisation of many countries in the Global South, European integration and the Cold War, which contributed to the UNSC's ineffectiveness (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:887; Ayoadé & Folarin, 2018:153). Presently, four of the P5 represent the Global North. The Global North is mainly characterised by the USA's dominance in the international system and the Global South is roughly characterised as being unequally represented on the global governance platform, especially Africa's decolonised countries (Zifcak, 2016:136). The surge of new powerful actors from the Global South means that the norms of global governance adopted by the UNSC must be reformed (Månsson, 2007:218). However, the P5 are defending the normative status quo; the Global North is unwilling to relinquish its power in the heart of the body dedicated to maintaining global peace and security: the UNSC.

Synopsis of the study

In order to understand the issue of reform of the increasingly anachronistic UNSC, Chapter 2 surveys the history of UNSC reform to contextualise the norm. The foundations of the UN and UNSC are entrenched in the functioning of the Allied powers of WWII (Ogunnoiki, 2018:47).

Essentially, the great powers reserved the right to determine which political norms or rules would be perpetuated in the Charter. The institutionalisation of the *Four Policemen* idea is seen in the establishment of the P5. The UNSC is unable to reform without an amendment to the Charter according to Article 108, which requires the ratification of all the P5 members (UN, 1945:19).

The P5 possess the most privileged role in UN membership with regards to their tenure and decision-making power (Freixas & Zwicker, 2003:411). Chapter 2 aims to explain how the imbalance in power between the UNSC members has created inefficiencies in addressing global governance. The Cold War sparked extraordinary changes in the global system and the veto provision became a power tactic between the USA and the USSR utilised to prevent each other from gaining more power and to protect their allies (Granja, 2017:14; Schild, 1995:28). UNSC's collective intervention increased and this was as a response to the civil and ethnic wars that erupted across the globe dominantly in the Global South (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:2; Garwood-Gowers, 2013:596; Law, 2017:94; Ralph and Gifkins, 2017:633). The issue of regional representation came to the forefront of UNSC reform: the Global North and Global South are unequally represented (Gould & Rablen, 2013:24). The UN endorses UNSC reform, but the General Assembly is unable to produce the majority for institutionalising UNSC reform.

Chapter 3 employs a constructivist lens to IR to gauge how context and history give rise to new global governance norms. Constructivism emerged in the 1980s, to show that changes in the normative environment take place long before changes are evident in the material world (Adler, 1997:320). Norms, as defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:895), are a “standard of appropriateness” pursued by actors with a specific shared identity. Norm origins always stress human agency. Agents' identity shapes their behaviour in the international community. The aim of this chapter is to explain the identity of actors involved in the issue of UNSC reform. Since the norms of the P5 are based on states' pursuit of power, these members are reluctant in relinquishing their power in the Council: they are the *antipreneurs* in this study (Bloomfield, 2015:3). The previously colonised and newly independent states are eager to acquire UNSC representation because of their struggle to establish themselves in the GPE.

The contribution of Finnemore and Sikkink's (1998) work, entitled *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, provides crucial insights that illuminate this constructivist approach. Their dynamic three-stage *norm life cycle* is crucial to understanding the internalisation of old global

governance norms present within the UNSC, and correspondingly the emergence of new norms of global governance. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 apply the *norm life cycle* to the evolution of UNSC reform (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:896). In the norm emergence stage the norm entrepreneurs utilise two important tools: an organisational platform and persuasion (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The norm entrepreneur was Kofi Annan because he propelled the norm of UNSC reform internationally in 2005. After that a sufficient number of states began endorsing the norm of UNSC reform, which facilitated its emergence (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Later in 2005 the UNGA released three draft resolutions (which would become the three dominant organisational platforms) providing three different enlargement options of the UNSC (Blum, 2005:648).

The first organisational platform was the G4 comprising Germany, Brazil, Japan and India (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:19; Vicente, 2013:20). Second, the UFC consists of Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Turkey, and South Korea among many others (Schirm, 2010:202). Thirdly, the AU also pursues greater African representation in the UNSC (Da Silva & Magalhães, 2015:15; Trachsler, 2010:2). For this reason, the UNSC still possesses a rudimentary degree of legitimacy (Binder & Heupel, 2015:240). However, no reform has been implemented as of yet.

This multilateral surge of endorsement has accounted for the critical mass of states to tip UNSC reform into the norm cascade stage (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:900). Chapter 5 discusses this. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that states adhere to the new norm for reasons that relate to their identities as members of the international community (1998:902). The ways in which the UNSC reform norm relates to the UNGA, G4, UFC and AU members' legitimacy, identity, and esteem is extensively discussed, as this sets out the norm socialisation process (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895). UNSC reform enhances their reputation in the international community.

With the emergence of African economies and AU governance, there are ever-growing aspirations to build international relations with the continent (*The Economist*, 2019:9). The G4 represents both the Global North (Germany) and the Global South (Brazil, Japan and India). This is an example of the newly independent states and the former colonizers realising a multipolar world reality (Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:6; Naik, 2018:104). Similarly, many of the countries in the UFC are newly independent states, therefore they are calling for greater representation (Naik, 2018:104). All these groups' members are rising economically and politically which makes their identities and norms

increasingly important in global governance today (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999:2; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020:10; Naik, 2018:103). Therefore, these countries have the legitimacy, reputation, and esteem to support each other's bid to acquire representation in the Council.

Lastly, Chapter 6 applies the norm internalisation stage to UNSC reform. No reform of the UNSC has been implemented since 1965 (UNSC, 2015:1; UN, 2018:5). Finnemore and Sikkink explain the entrenchment of the organisation and the membership of the P5 (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:899). The institutional and international context is equally paramount to understanding how entrenched or institutionalised a normative status quo is (March & Olsen, 1998:944). The UNSC is a somewhat 75 year old institution with a history of precedents. The failure to consolidate the norm of UNSC reform has facilitated the emergence of a coherent set of reactionary norms in opposition to the UNSC norms of global governance; these demand equitable representation, and transparent, inclusive, and legitimate working methods (Baccarini, 2018; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:895; Hosli, & Dörfler, 2020; ISS, 2017; Naik, 2018; UNGA, 2005a; UNSC, 2017; UNSC, 2018; UNSC, 2019).

Solving the Research Problem

This study aimed to identify, describe and explain the emergence of new global governance norms, and correspondingly, the entrenchment of UNSC norms of global governance. A constructivist lens is employed because its focus on change informs this norm dynamics research. The utility of this study is its explanation of the emergence of the norm of UNSC reform as well as the resistance to change UNSC global governance norms. This is done through the application of Finnemore and Sikkink's dynamic *norm life cycle* (1998). The UNSC's anachronistic nature is creating negative international interactions between actors. This occurs in conjunction with the irrevocable changes created by the process of globalisation, the further integration of the international community, and the surge of new powerful actors. The UNSC's most powerful members, the P5, are unrepresentative of the global regions: the Global North and the Global South. Post-WWII, the Global North composed the most powerful actors. Today, the Global South is proving to be on an equal playing field with many of its countries overcoming the obstacle of decolonisation and independence from the Global North. With the establishment of the OEWG in 1993 to investigate the UNSC reform proposals, it indicated to the rest of the world that the UN itself is aware of this anachronistic issue.

The theoretical framework in this study is instrumental in explaining how norms emerge and change in the GPE. Agents acting within the international system are influenced by ideational factors such as norms – which relate to their identity. The identities of actors shape their international interactions. The identity of the P5 is reminiscent of the theory of realism. The P5's inability to relinquish or diminish their power within the Council is evident in its reluctance to expand the UNSC. The globalised era has disintegrated the boundaries of the nation-state system. Therefore, it is imperative that the P5 are replaced with actors whose identities were conceived in the flux that characterises the current world order. This study showed that Finnemore and Sikkink's model fails to theorise the resistance to the change of global norms. However, Bloomfield's (2015:3) contribution identifies the role of the P5 as *antipreneurs*. The norm of UNSC reform succeeds only in the first and second stages of Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* (1998). Although the norm of UNSC reform has entered the third stage of internalisation, it has not been consolidated because it has not yet been institutionally implemented. Nonetheless, the utility of Finnemore and Sikkink's model is highlighted with the recognition of the emerging global governance norms alternative to the anachronistic UNSC norms of global governance (1998).

Answering the Research Questions

This study's main research question is: *Why is UNSC reform proving to be such a complex and intractable international issue?*

UNSC reform first became an issue when the decolonisation of countries in the Global South occurred from the mid-1950s. The imbalance between UNGA member states and the UNSC membership became increasingly apparent. The preeminent Council became increasingly unrepresentative of the international order. Although the UNSC reformed in 1965 to increase its membership total by 4, the majority of member states continued to support further expansion. Today, the world is vastly different from the international system the UNSC was conceived in. Many previously decolonised and newly independent states have acquired the power to achieve global governance. However, the UNSC is resisting reform of its global governance norms.

The supplementary questions are addressed as follows:

1. Who have acted as norm entrepreneurs and norm *antipreneurs*, respectively, in the framing of UNSC reform since 1993?

The UNSC reform norm was propelled in an unprecedented way after the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, addressed it in 2005. Annan said that no change within the UN would be adequate without the reform of its most authoritative organ. Since then, UNSC reform has attracted international attention. Therefore, Annan is the norm entrepreneur in the emergence of UNSC reform. However, the norm *antipreneurs*, identified as the P5 (the USA, the UK, Russia, China, and France) continually block UNSC reform. Consequently, the norm of UNSC reform has not been institutionalised.

2. How have new norms of UNSC reform emerged and diffused in the international system since 1993?

Since the UNSC has been incapable of reforming, alternative global governance norms have emerged. After Annan's agenda was released in 2005, the UNGA submitted three draft resolutions for the proposed UNSC reform. These proposals were endorsed by more than two-thirds of the UN membership: 55 African states, Brazil, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Turkey, and South Korea, among many others. These powerful actors who endorsed UNSC reform became norm leaders intending to persuade the norm breakers. Subsequently, these powerful state actors' identities and norms represent the alternative global governance norms to those present within the UNSC. International actors whose identities relate to the norm leaders endorse the UNSC reform norm.

3. Which institutions have been created and which norms have informed their operation in UNSC reform since 1993?

The three reform proposals submitted by the UNGA in 2005 institutionalised three multilateral organisations intended to promote UNSC reform: the G4, UFC, and the AU. They demand a renewed and expanded Council whereby the UNSC becomes more representative of the globalised world era. Norms of equity, multilateralism, and transparency inform these organisations' pursuit. All three organisations aim to provide a more inclusive global governance platform for the Global South and Global North.

4. Is there a coherent set of reactionary norms emerging in opposition to UNSC norms of global governance?

Yes, there are a coherent set of reactionary norms emerging in opposition to the UNSC existing norms of global governance. These norms demand equitable representation, through the realisation of a multipolar world order, and correspondingly, these norms demand transparent, inclusive, and legitimate working methods.

Areas of future research

It is evident that norm dynamics research has become a dominant topic in the theoretical framework of Constructivism and the field of IR. The holistic approach and the obsession with change helps scholars explain the stability/instability of the international system. Although norms are not a new concept to IR, their dominance in the field emerged with the method of constructivism in the 1980s. The identity of the nation-state system has determined international interactions for centuries now. In other words, realism was first conceived in 1648. Is the utility of a theory in their ability to predict and explain future events? It is essential to do future research on the identity of the current globalised system and the way this will eventually shape future international interactions. With the current pandemic the world finds itself in, this would be of great value.

Nothing can be studied in isolation. The norms and identities of international agents are influential to the maintenance of international peace and security. The preeminent institution bestowed with this responsibility is none other than the UNSC. However, the global governance norms of the UNSC are anachronistic. The constructivist lens is tremendous in understanding norm emergence and change. What about resistance to the change in norms? Although the contribution of Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* (1998) is able to identify and explain the first two stages of the emergence of the UNSC reform norm, the model fails in the last stage. The dominance of this model in norm dynamics research has created a bias to focus on the change rather than the resistance of norms. Bloomfield (2015) provides a valuable norm resister role in the context of failed norms. However, an area of future norm dynamics research should be to provide a norm resistance framework such as Finnemore and Sikkink's *norm life cycle* (1998).

Also, future research can be conducted on the impact of international organisations, like the UN, on the probability of a norm to internalise in the international system. Organisations, especially multilaterally, have the power to persuade large amounts of actors to endorse a norm through their

affluence. However, international organisations' normative cycles often fail in the implementation of norms. If the UNSC is unable to implement reform within itself, how does it expect to accurately implement peacekeeping operations? Future research could focus on the effectiveness of international organisations. Do multilateral organisations possess any relevance? In other words, do they possess the jurisdiction to exert their authority over sovereign states without the resources of the Global North?

Interview Questions

The following questions were used to guide the semi-structured interviews with the study's key informants:

1. Why is there no implementation of UNSC reform when most countries, policies, institutions and the majority of UN members themselves endorse the issue?
2. What needs to change in order to facilitate the institution of UNSC reform?

Key Informants

Anonymous. Interview conducted on 30 July 2020.

Anonymous. Interview conducted on 3 August 2020.

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